2 Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 250; Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Schoales & L. 22; Graham v. Musson, 5 Bing. N. R. 603; Rucker v. Cammeyer, 1 Esp. 105; Wright v. Daunah, 2 Camp. 203; Greene v. Cramer, 2 Con. & L. 54; Inhabitants of Alna v. Plummer, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 258; McVVhorter v. McMahan, 10 Paige (N. Y.) 386; Law-r.uce v. Taylor, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 107; Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 502; Ulen v. Kittredge, 7 Mass. 232; Yerby v. Grigsby, 9 Leigh (Va.) 387; Johnson v. McGruder, 15 Mo. 365; Talbot v. Bowen, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 436; Coleman v. Bailey, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 297; Curtis v. Blair, 4 Cush. (Miss.) 309; Johnson v. Dodge, 17 111. 433; Roehl v. Haumesser, 114 Ind. 311; Neaves v. Mining Co , 90 N.C. 412; Campbell v. Fetterman's Heirs, 20 W. Va. 398; Hargrove v. Adcock, 111 N. C. 166. But see Caperton v. Gray, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 563. Mr. Fell (Merc. Guar. Appendix No. VI.) argues very forcibly against the propriety of this rule, but admits it to be settled. Of course this rule does not hold where a particular Statute of Frauds specifies that the appointment shall be in writing. See Linn v. McLean, 85 Ala. 250; Hall v. Wallace, 88 Cal. 434; Edwards v. Tyler, 141 111. 454; Albertson v. Ash-ton, 102 111. 50; Chappell v. McKnight, 108 111. 570, in which case a ratification must also be in writing in the absence of some element of equitable estoppel. Kozel v. Dearlove, 144 11l. 23; Hawkins v. McGroarty, 110 Mo. 546; Salfield v. Sutter County Co., 94 Cal. 546. But such a statute does not affect the right of a real estate agent, who has no written authority to sell a parcel of land, to recover a commission. Gerhart v-Peck, 42 Mo. App. 644.

3 Blood v Hardy, 15 Maine (3 Shep.) 61; ante, § 14. In a late case of appeal from the Exchequer, the plaintiff, a hop-grower, having sent samples of hops for sale to N., his factor, with instructions as to price, the defendants, who were hop-merchants, called at N.'s office to see the samples, but could not agree as to price. Subsequently, on the same day, the defendants met the plaintiff, and. after a conversation about the hops, they went with him to N.'s office, and there in N.'s presence, made the plaintiff an offer for the hops, which, in the presence and hearing of the defendants, the plaintiff asked N. whether he should accept, and was contracts, however, may be given subsequently to the signature, by parol ratification of it.1

§ 370 b. One, who as agent has made an oral contract may not, after his agency has terminated, bind his former principal by reducing the contract or a memorandum of it to writing.2

§ 370 e. In many of the American States the Statute of Frauds does not in terms provide that the memorandum may be signed by the agent of the party to be charged. The language of the Tenterden Act is that there shall be writing "signed by the party to be charged," and it is said that, because of that explicit provision, the writing under the Tenterden Act cannot be signed by the agent of the party to be charged.3 By the same reasoning, the memorandum of agreement under 29 Car. II. cannot be signed by the agent unless that statute as re-enacted expressly so provides. The question does not appear to have been raised in any of the American States where that statute as re-enacted fails to provide explicitly for signature by agent.

1 Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722; Gosbell v. Archer, 2 Ad. & E. 500; Sugden, Vend. & P. 134; Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238; Hankins v. Baker, 46 N. Y. G66; Fitzmaurice v. Bayley, 6 El. & B. 868; Heffron p. Armsby, 61 Mich. 505; Swisshelm v. Swissvale Laundry Co., 95 Pa. St. 367; Tynan v. Dulling, 25 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 465.

2 Elliot v Barrett. 144 Mass. 256.

3 Nevada Bank v. Portland National Bank, 59 Fed. Rep. 342; citing Hyde v. Johnson, 3 Scott 289; Clark v. Alexander, 8 Scott N. R. 147; Williams v. Mason, 28 Law T. (n. s.) 232.