This question is frequently of controlling importance in the law of banking, because much of the bank's business consists of dealings with negotiable instruments, or collateral deposited as security. If the bank is that of a private banker or a partnership, notice to the banker himself, or notice to one of the partnership, is, of course, notice to the bank. It is the case of notice to any other individual. This is so in the case of an unincorporated association, even though the particular partner has an interest in the transaction adverse to the partnership.1 But both private bankers and corporations, the former by choice and the latter by necessity, deal with the public through agents. A private banker may receive notice through an agent, the incorporated bank can receive notice only in this way. The rules governing the question in the case of both private bankers and corporations are identical. The first inquiry must always be whether the agent received the notice in the line of his duties in the bank, or whether he obtained his knowledge in his private capacity. At the outset it is necessary to lay down the principle clearly that where the agent receives notice of a fact while he is acting upon the bank's business, being duly authorized to act, he is identical with the corporation, and notice received by the agent under such circumstances is notice once for all to the corporation. Secondly, where an agent acts for the corporation, and the corporation insists upon his act as giving it a right, it adopts his act in toto. It cannot adopt what is favorable to itself and repudiate what is not favorable. If the notice was received by the agent in the line of his duty, the bank will be bound by notice so received.2 Within this bank the reception of such notice lay. Another statement of the rule would be that the knowledge must be received by the agent in his official capacity.7 The private knowledge gained by a director, outside of his duties at the bank, unless communicated to the board or to some officer whose duty it was to receive the notice, is not binding upon the bank.8 But this latter statement must be taken with the limitation that the particular officer who has the private knowledge did not act in the particular transaction in regard to which notice of the facts within such officer's private knowledge is sought to be imputed to the bank.9 This distinction between the reception of knowledge by the bank officer in the line of his official duty in the bank and the reception of knowledge on his private affairs is one of the greatest importance. In the first instance the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the bank on the principle of identity. The agent, while acting in the line of his duty, is the bank. Notice so received by the bank is absolute. It cannot be disputed; it binds all other officers of the bank in their dealings;10 it is binding upon all subsequent boards of directors.11 But in the second case, where the agent's knowledge is gained in his private affairs and wholly outside of the scope of his duties as an officer of the bank, the fact of knowledge on the part of the principal depends upon

10 4 Thompson on Corp., sea 4919. 1 Stockdale v. Keyes, 79 Pa. 251.

2 Ihl v. St Joseph Bank, 26 Mo. App. 129. If the notice is commurule it is held that notice of facts to the general officers of the bank, such as cashier, president, or any active managing officer, received while such officer was acting in regard to the bank's business, is notice of such facts to the bank itself.3 So notice of facts stated in a letter received at the bank and there opened by the head book-keeper, whose duty it was to open and distribute the mail, is imputable to the bank.4 And notice to a receiving teller as to the disposition of a check received by him is notice to the bank.5 It is also true that notice of facts to an officer of the bank, whose duty it is to act upon such notice or to transmit it to the bank, will be considered as notice received in the line of his duty,6 however it was received, unless the officer received the notice not in his official capacity and has an interest in the matter adverse to the hank itself. This proposition leads us to the second consideration, and that is whether the knowledge was received by the officer of the bank in his official capacity. Mere private knowledge of some officer of the bank is not necessarily imputable to the bank. It is imputable to the bank when such officer communicated the knowledge to some officer or officers of the bank, whose duty it was to act upon the notice, or in whose line of duty in the nicated to the officer for the bank, the bank is bound. National Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill 578

3 As to cashier. McLeod v. Fourth Nat Bank, 20 Fed. R 225; New Hope Co. v. Phoenix Bank, 3 Comst. 156; Stebbins v. Lardner. 2 S. D. 127; Fall River Bank v. Sturtevant, 12 Cush. 372; Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass. 453; Gaston v. American Ex. Bank, 29 N. J. Eq. 98; Veasy v. Graham, 17 Ga. 99; Bank of America v. McNeil, 10 Bush, 54. As to president Bartlett v. Woodbine Bank, 57 I11. App. 425; Louisiana State Bank v. Senecal, 13 La. 525; McCann v. State, 4 Neb. 324; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt 410; Merchants' Nat Bank v. McAnulty,

31 S. W. R 1091. As to any active managing officer. Second Nat. Bank v. Howe, 40 Minn. 390; Savings Bank v. Holt, 58 Vt. 166; Newport Nat Bank v. Tweed, 4 Houst. 225; Branch Bank v. Steele, 10 Ala. 915.

4 First Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat Bank, 16 U. S. App. 1, 56 Fed. R 967.

5 Strauss v. Tradesmen's Nat Bank, 122 N. Y. 379.

6 Fulton Bank v. New York Canal Co., 4 Paige, 127; National Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill, 572; Bartlett v. Woodbine Bank, 57 111. App. 425. If received by him officially, his adverse interest is wholly immaterial. See Atlantic State Bank v. Savery, 82 N. Y. 291.

7 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 314; Bank of U. S v. Davis, 2 Hill, 452; Washington Nat. Bank v. Pierce, 6 Wash. 491; West-field Bank v. Cornen, 37 N. Y. 320. Goodloe v. Godley, 13 Smedes & M. 233, is a case in accord with the general rule, where agent was not authorized to act.