Even if a usage be lawful, reasonable and uniform, it does not necessarily bind any one, unless it can be shown that the party sought to be charged with notice of the usage dealt with reference to it. It is apparent that a usage of this kind is only of value in interpreting a contract; it does not make a contract or prove one.1 If it is shown that the parties had either actual or constructive knowledge of the usage, it will be presumed, nothing else appearing, that they contracted with reference to the custom, which will be considered as written into the contract. The question is therefore one of fact. The bank will be presumed to know its own customs or the customs of its business.2 Such a custom may put it upon notice of certain facts which it would otherwise have no notice of.* The bank is bound by its own usages,4 and cannot abrogate them without notice to parties dealing with it.5 But as to third persons dealing with the bank the question of knowledge of the usage becomes of prime importance. If a third person has actual knowledge of a customary mode of dealing of a bank he will be bound by the custom.6 This actual knowledge will be inferred from the fact that he has chosen a particular bank with which to do business.7 It may also be inferred from the fact that the usage was a general one in the business,8 or was so notorious that a person in the position of the third party should have known it.9 Thus, the usages of a bank as to demand, notice of non-payment and protest are valid as to those who voluntarily select that bank to do business with,10 and as to those who reside in the particular place11 as well as to those who have actual knowledge of the usage.12 But if the third party has no knowledge of the usage, and cannot be charged with notice of it in the ways above indicated, he cannot be bound by it.13 Nor if a local usage has once been established by judicial decision can a third party be affected by a change of that custom, where he is not shown to have been cognizant of the change.14

1 Gallatin v. Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209. See Second Nat. Bank v. Western Nat. Bank, 51 Md. 128

2 Shaw v. Jacobs, 89 Iowa, 713. The principle of the decision was correct, but the great weight of authority is that a deposit of a check upon another bank for credit is not a sale but a bailment.

3 Comm. Ex. Bank v. Nassau Bank, 91 N. Y. 74.

4 Bank of Alexandria v. Deneale, 2 Cranch, C. C. 488.

1 Harper v. Calhoun, 7 How. (Miss.) 203.

2 Pope v. Bank of Albion, 57 N. Y. 126; Kilgore v. Buckley, 14 Conn. 363; Marrett v. Brackett, 60 Me. 524.

3 Taliaferro v. First Nat. Bank, 71 Md. 200.

4 See cases cited in last two notes.

5 Barnes v. Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 152: Hotchkiss v. Artisans' Bank, 42 Barb. 517. Contra, Citizens' Bank v. Graffin, 31 Md. 507.

6 Sahlien v. Bank of Lonoke, 90 Tenn. 221; Bridgeport Bank v. Dyer, 19 Conn. 136; Pope v. Bank of Albion, 57 N. Y. 131; Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat 581; Warren Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 10 Cush. 582.

7 Patriotic Bank v. Farmers'Bank, 2 Cranch, C. C. 560; Kilgore v. Buckley, 14 Conn. 367. This rule applies to those who make notes payable at a bank as well as to those who indorse such notes. See Mills v. Bank of United States, 11

Wheat. 431; Gindrat v. Mechanics' Bank, 7 Ala. 324.

8 Sahlien v. Bank of Lonoke, 90 Tenn. 221.

9 Citizens' Bank v. Graffin, 31 Md. 507; Grissom v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 87 Tenn. 350.

10 See cases cited in note 7, supra,

11 Gindrat v. Mechanics' Bank, 7 Ala. 324; Gallagher v. Roberts, 11 Me. 484; Marine Bank v. Smith, 18 Me. 99; Shove v. Wiley, 18 Pick. 558; Wild v. Gorham, 10 Mass. 366.

12 Lincoln Bank v. Page, 9 Mass. 155; City Bank v. Cutler, 3 Pick. 414; Bank of United States v. Norwood, 1 Harr. & J. 423.

13 Bank of Alexandria v. Deneale, 2 Cranch, C. C. 488; Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521.