Promises to accept a bill or order or check before it is drawn may arise either from an actual promise, oral or written, or from an authority given to draw the bill. Each instance may be considered as an offer on the part of the drawee, and an acceptance of the offer on the part of the person who takes the bill. Wherever the common law has not been changed by statute, an oral promise, whether made as a promise or by granting authority to draw a bill, made before a bill is drawn by the drawee agreeing to accept it, is certainly binding as a promise to any one who took the bill upon the strength of the promise,1 and such a promise is not within the statute of frauds.2 Even under a statute requiring a written acceptance there is usually a saving of the right to rely upon an oral promise to accept to one who drew a bill or negotiated a bill upon the strength of the promise, but the statute does not cover one to whom a bill was negotiated.3 The promise is usually held to inure only to one who loaned or gave credit to the bill upon the strength of the promise,4 and only to an indorsee who took the bill upon the strength of the promise.5 But other cases which are not entitled to the slightest weight, because they are either palpable blunders or bold specimens of judicial effrontery, hold that the promise inures to any indorsee6 or to any holder of the bill whether he knew of it or not.7 But in the case of banks it must be remembered that the promise to accept may be rendered invalid by the fact that the promise is ultra vires,

Here there was no delivery. A delivery was necessary.

7 See the case cited in the next note.

8 Sands v. Matthews, 27 Ala. 399.

9 Rutland Bank v. Woodruff, 34 Vt. 89.

10Hall v. First Nat. Bank, 133 111. 234 The court in this case seems not to have had the slightest knowledge that there was any dispute about the legal question involved. McCausland v. Wheeler Sav. Bank, 43 I11. App. 381; Mitting v. Sloan, 57 Ga. 392.

11Clements v. Yeates, 69 Mo. 623; Relf v. Mobile Bank, 20 Pa. 435;

Johnson v. Clark, 50 N. E. R 762. The order may be an assignment if in proper form. See Sec. 224, note 7.

12 Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 1 Sandf. 416, 3 N. Y. 243.

13 Miltenberger v. Attwood, 18 How. Pr. 330. But for checks see Sec. 150, ante.

14 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 38 Mo. App. 141. This opinion seems to be wrong. The drawee elected to treat himself as having accepted. He could not thereafter change his position. If he had not accepted he had no right to interplead the payee.

1 Havens v. Griffin, N. Chip. 23; Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406; Hall v. Cordell, 142 TJ. S. 116 (following common law in Illinois); Ontario Bank v. Worthing-toD, 12 Wend. 593; Howland v. Carson, 15 Pa. 453; Martin v. Bacon, 2 Const, R. 132; Crowell v. Van Bibber, 18 La. Ann. 637.

2Kelley v. Greenough, 9 Wash. 659.

3 Hall v. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116, and cases cited therein.

4 Exchange Bank v. Hubbard, 62 Fed. R, 112; Union Bank v. Coster, 3 N. Y. 203; Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story, 214; Franklin Bank v. Lynch, 52 Md. 270; Leegrue v. Woodruff,

29 Ga. 648; Woodward v. Commission Co., 43 Minn. 260; Lewis v. Kramer, 3 Md. 265; Lowery v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239; Kennedy v. Geddes, 8 Port. 263; Ontario Bank v. Worthington, 12 Wend. 593; Howland v. Carson, 15 Pa. 453; Martin v. Bacon, 2 Const. R. 132.

5 See last four cases in preceding note.

6 Springfield Marine Bank v. Mitchell, 48 I11. App. 486, semble; Jones v. Iowa Bank, 34 111. 313; Read v. Marsh, 5 B. Mon. 8. Second Nat. Bank v. Diefendorf, 90 111. 396, really overrules the Illinois cases.

7 See cases in last note and therefore worthless as an obligation of the bank.8 Written promises to accept bills arise in various ways. Authority may be given to purchase something and draw drafts for the price. Such authority, when acted upon, necessitates the writer's acceptance of the draft.9 Such a letter is practically a letter of credit, and any person who advances money upon the letter may rely upon it, if unrevoked, as an authority for the addressee of the letter to create the debt.10 It is said that such an authority is not an acceptance, where it is general and does not describe the bill, but that it is good as an authority and as a contract.11 It renders the promisor liable for the face of the draft as a general rule, but in some instances he may be liable only for inconvenience and loss.12 The letter of credit may be safely acted upon, if unrevoked, by any other person than the one to whom it is directed, and no notice to the writer is required of the fact that the offer in the letter is accepted and that bills have been drawn under it.13 Practically the letter is an acceptance in advance,14 although at common law it would hardly be safe to declare upon it as an acceptance. But a letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date of a bill, intelligibly describing it, and promising to accept it, is, if shown to one who takes the bill upon the credit of the letter, an acceptance binding upon the promisor.15

8 See Sec. 126, ante, notes 1-4.

9 Johnson v. Blakemore, 28 La. Ann. 140; Burke v. Utah Nat. Bank, 47 Neb. 247; Nelson v. First Nat. Bank, 48 Il1. 30 (in this case the promise was ultra vires); Riggs v. Lindsay, 7 Cranch, 500; Saulsbury v. Blandys, 65 Ga. 45; Sturges v. Fourth Nat Bank, 75 I11. 595.

10Storer v. Logan, 9 Mass. 55; Lienow v. Pitcairn, Fed. Cas. No. 8341.

11Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. Ill; Cassel v. Dows, 1 Blatchf. 335; Car-rollton Bank v. Tayleur, 16 La. 490; Von Phul v. Sloan, 2 Rob. (La.) 148;

Valle v. Cerre, 36 Mo. 575; Ulster Co. Bank v. McFarlan, 3 Denio, 553; First Nat. Bank v. Clark, 61 Md. 400; Kennedy v. Geddes, 3 Ala 581; Ulster Co. Bank v. McFarlan, 5 Hill. 433. And see Bell v. Moss, 5 Whart. 189.

12 Ilsley v. Jones, 12 Gray, 260.

13 See notes 4 and 5, ante, and Lonsdale v. Lafayette Bank, 18 Ohio, 126.

14 See the cases cited in the three notes preceding.

15 Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Lanusse v. Barker, 3 Wheat. 101; Schimmelspenich v. Bayard, 1 Pet.

The same statement may be made of an authority to draw a bill or bills, if the bill be in conformity with the letter.18 It is a good acceptance under a statute requiring a writing,17 and may be declared upon as an acceptance at common law.18 An exception that has little reason in it is made in some cases, that if the draft is payable after sight the promise or authority is not an acceptance, because it presupposes presentment and sight as a condition.19 The exception is trivial and valueless.20 To insist upon such a promise as an acceptance, it is said that it should appear that the bill was taken for a valuable consideration.21