A promise to accept drafts drawn against shipments is necessarily conditional upon the shipment or bill of lading accompanying the draft;1 but such a promise is an acceptance of drafts accompanied by bills of lading,2 even though the bill of lading be not genuine, if that fact is not known to the payee.3 If the authority requires the bill of lading to be attached, it is sufficient that it be delivered with the draft though not actually attached.4 A promise to accept a bill cannot be construed to cover a bill for a debt not contemplated by the letter itself.5 Subsequent letters, however, may be construed in accordance with the terms of former letters.6 The word "draft" may include more than one draft.7 A letter authorizing a draft at so many days may be construed to cover a draft so many days after date as well as so many days after sight,8 but other cases hold that it means only so many days after sight.9 In such a case, evidence as to the meaning of the term ought to be admitted as controlling the meaning. The letter, when it contemplates a continuous drawing, makes a separate contract with each person that acts upon it.10 It is needless to say that the controlling authority is that any one to claim the benefit of such a letter, whether of authority or credit, or of promise to accept or to pay the draft, must have acted upon the letter,11 and parted with a valuable consideration. And it should be remembered that, in the case of such promises, whether oral or written, emanating from banks, a bank has no power to lend its credit for accommodation, and such promises may be nugatory.12 A promise of acceptance by more than one person is a joint and several promise as to each promisor.13

1 First Nat. Bank v. Bensley, 2 Fed. R 609; Craig v. Marx, 65 Tex. 649. It is immaterial that the drawee who authorized actually received the goods, as these cases show. See Sec. 220, note 14

2 Young v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 519. 3Craig v. Libbett, 15 Pa. 238.

4 Foreman v. Walker, 4 La. Ann. 409. Compare Murdock v. Mills, 11 Met. 5.

5 Hodges v. Iowa Barb Wire Co., 80 Iowa, 65.

6 Berckhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, 634.

7 Hall v. First Nat. Bank, 35 I11. App. 116.

8 Burnes v. Rowland, 40 Barb. 368; Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. 46.

9 Ulster Co. Bank v. McFarlan, 5 Hill, 433, holds it means after sight not after date. Allentown Bank v. Kirmes, 4 Wkly. Notes Cas. 401, holds it to mean after date.

10 Union Bank v. Coster, 3 N. Y. 203.

11 See g 215, ante, notes 4 and 5, and note 21 to the same section.