A promise to accept an existing bill is a collateral promise as to any one who has already taken the bill, and should be founded upon a new consideration.1 To any one who upon the faith of the promise then takes the bill, the promise is original and not within the statute of frauds,2 and if it intelligibly describes the bill is sufficient,3 under the limitation that it be acted upon within a reasonable time, as will be pointed out in the next section. A written promise to pay an existing bill is said to be an acceptance4 under all circumstances, but a promise to accept an existing bill or order for money, whether oral or written, unless founded upon some new consideration, would not seem to have any efficacy. But the rule is stated by the highest authority generally that a promise to accept a bill, whether oral or written, is an acceptance, and no qualification is placed upon the rule whatever.5 It seems to be good if in writing,6 and certainly would be good if not in writing, provided the promisor was under any obligation to accept the bill, arising from the possession of funds or of the proceeds of the property represented by the bill, or of something obtained by the proceeds.7 Sometimes a statute requires the promise to be made before the drawing of the bill.8

12See Sec. 146, ante.

13 Michigan State Bank v. Pecks, 28 Vt. 200.

1 Barnett v. Boone Lumber Co., 43 W. Va. 441, so holds as to a verbal promise to accept. Strohecker v. Cohen, 1 Spears, 349, holds all verbal promises to accept binding as to bills of exchange.

2Kelley v. Greenough, 9 Wash. 659; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 170.

3 See note 15 to Sec. 215, ante.

4 Jones v. Iowa Bank, 34 111. 313. See notes 5 and 6 to Sec. 215, ante, and Cook v. Miltenberger, 23 La. Ann. 377. Contra thereto, First Nat Bank v. Clark, 61 Md. 400.

5 Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 91 U. S. 406, citing a number of cases, some of which are in point, to wit: the Illinois cases, and Spaulding v. Andrews, 48 Pa. 411.

6 It would not be within the statute of frauds, but the objection would still remain that it had no consideration. See the cases in note 4, supra.

Sec. 219. Reasonable Time For Acting Upon Promise Or Authority

As has been already stated, the promise or the authority must be acted upon within a reasonable time.1 The failure to act upon the authority for two years has been held to be an unreasonable delay;2 but a delay of fifteen days has been considered reasonable where no injury to the promisor was shown.3 What is a reasonable time must depend wholly upon circumstances, and the customs of the particular business must be taken into account.4 But a delay in getting a corrected draft was not unreasonable where the promisor was notified of the fact and made no reply.5