A bill of exchange differs from a checkl in this, among other things, that an absolute acceptance of it does not release the drawer or indorser; they remain liable secondarily to the acceptor. But in order to have this effect the acceptance must be an acceptance according to the tenor of the bill. It must be absolute, or if conditional it must be notified to prior parties.-If the prior parties acquiesce and do not object to such an acceptance they will be held to have assented thereto.3 If

Bigler Road Co., 2 Nev. 214 If he accepts personally he binds himself. Lollerstedt v. Griffin, 29 Ga. 708; Nicholls v. Diamond,j3 Exch. 154; Taber v. Cannon, 8 Met. 456. Compare Walker v. State Bank, 9 N. Y. 582. But it has been held that the agent accepting individually may show that the holder knew lie was agent and was accepting as agent. Bruce v. Lord, 1 Hilt. 247. But see Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Vt. 402. But if a bill is drawn by a principal upon its officer as an individual, his acceptance in the name of his company is not an acceptance by the drawee. See Walker v. Bank of State, 13 Barb. 636.

30See Markham v. Hazen, 48 Ga. 570; Rice v. Ragland, 10 Humph 545, and note preceding.

31 Smith v. Milton, 133 Mass. 369.

32 Kenner v. Creditors, 1 La. 120.

33 Roberts v. Bethell, 12 C. B. 778. The acceptance may be made before the bill is drawn (Hopps v. Savage, 69 Md. 513), or before it is completed. Pittsburgh Bank v. Neal, 22 How. 97. 1 See Sec. 150, ante.

2Rowe v. Young, 2 Bligh, 391; Scattergood v. Finley, 20 Ga. 423, seinble.

3 The holder has the right to insist upon an absolute acceptance. Tuckerman v. Hartwell, 3 Me. 153; Green v. Raymond, 9 Neb. 295. The making of the acceptance payable at a particular place of business is not a variation or a condition. Troy City Bank v. Lauman, 19 N. Y. 477; Todd v. Kentucky Bank, 3 Bush, 626; Myers v. Standart, 11 Ohio St the payment of the bill be postponed by the acceptance, the prior parties, if they do not assent thereto, will be released.4 This results from the general rule that the acceptor being the principal debtor and the prior parties sureties, any extension of time granted by the holder to the principal releases the sureties not assenting thereto.5 This rule is so universal that it is nothing less than astonishing to find the Supreme Court of Illinois solemnly asserting that an extension of time to the acceptor does not release the drawer.6 The release is no less effectual, it is said, though the extension of time be void;7 but the very same court has said that the drawer must have been injured in order to complain.8 But an extension of time to a drawer does not release the acceptor,9 even though the holder knows him to be an accommodation acceptor.10 Nor does a release to one indorser release prior parties on the paper,11 even though the paper be made for the accommodation of that indorser.12 But the

29. Contra, Rowe v. Young, 2 Bligh, 391.

4 Burthe v. Donaldson, 15 La. 382; and see next notes.

5 This is an extension of time to acceptor, and hence is a release to the drawer and indorsers. See United States Bank v. Hatch, 6 Pet 250; Ross v. Jones, 22 Wall 588; Uniontown Bank v. Mackey, 140 U. S. 220, for the principle. The acceptor being principal debtor cannot complain as to the holder's acts toward the drawer. Fowler v. Gate City Nat. Bank, 88 Ga. 29; Wilson v. Isbell, 45 Ala. 142; Ash-ton v. Reeves, 3 Phila. 339; Diver-sey v. Moor, 22 I1L 331. But see Bradford v. Hubbard, 8 Pick. 155.

6 Diversey v. Moor. 22 I11 330. The opinion is by Breese, J. It is marvelous to notice the ponderous unconsciousness with which the learned judge perpetrates this startling error. The statement is, however, absolute dictum.

7 Parmalee v. Williams, 72 Ga. 42. The general rule as to sureties is otherwise; but in this particular case, where notice of non-payment must be given, the void extension, if acted upon, is certainly a release, unless the other parties concur.

8 High v. Cox,55Ga. 662.

9 Diversey v. Moor, 22 111. 330; Lambert v. Sanford, 2 Blackf. 137. Contra, Meggett v. Baum, 57 Miss. 22.

10 This follows from the rule that the acceptor becomes principal debtor, which legal conclusion he is not at liberty to dispute. See note 12, infra, and note 5, supra.

11Bank of Kentucky v. Floyd, 4 Met. (Ky.) 159; Sargent v. Apple-ton, 6 Mass. 85.

12 See In re Babcock, 2 Story, 393; Wilson v. Isbell, 45 Ala. 142; Anderbetter rule would be that the parties, except the acceptor, are to be considered principals or sureties upon the paper, according to the holder's knowledge of their relations, not according to the apparent fact shown by the paper. But an intentional release to one joint acceptor releases all the acceptors, unless there be a statute making a different rule.13