The word "accommodation" presupposes two persons, - one who accommodates and another who is accommodated. An accommodation drawer, that is to say, one who lends his name for accommodation, and the accommodation indorser, who is a regular indorser, are entitled to have a demand of payment made upon the drawee.1 But the above statement is con-

3 Slack v. Longshaw, 8 Ky. Law R.166.

4 Dayton v. Trull, 23 Wend. 345. And see next nota

5 Brown v. Cronise, 21 Cal. 387; Adams v. Boyd, 33 Ark. 33; Carrol v. Sweet, 30 N. Y. Supp. 204; Far-well v. Curtis, 7 Biss. 160; Shriner v. Kelly, 25 Pa. 61; Shipman v. Cook, 16 N. J. Eq 251; Jennison v. Parker, 7 Mich. 355: Moore v. Brun-gard, 6 Miss. 557; Foote v. Brown, 2 McLean, 369; Blanchard v. Boom Co, 40 Mich. 566. As to want of notice, see Murphy v. Phelps, 12 Mont. 531; Stam t. Kerr, 31 Miss. 199. But see as to paper taken as security, In re Brown, 2 Story, 502; Westphal v. Ludlow, 6 Fed. R. 348; Griffith v. Grogan, 12 Cal. 317;

Boardman v. Steele, 13 Conn. 547: Van Wart v. Smith, 1 Wend. 219; Gallegher v. Roberts, 2 Wash. C. C. 191.

6 Cox v. Jones, 2 Cranch, C. C. 370; Stewart v. French, 2 Cranch, C. C. 300; Levy v. Drew, 14 Ark. 334; Colt v. Bernard, 18 Pick. 260; Tyler v. Young, 30 Pa, 143; Shelby v. Judd, 24 Kan. 161; Hunt v. Wad-leigh, 26 Me. 271. Contra, French v. Jarvis, 29 Conn. 347; Hall v. Mon-ohan, 6 Iowa, 216.

1 French v. Bank of Columbia, 4 Cranch, 141; Buck v. Cotton, 2 Conn. 126; Perry v. Green, 19 N. J. Law, 61; Sawyer v. BrownelL 13 R I. 141; Bogg v. Keil, 1 Mo. 743; Braley v. Buchanan, 21 Kan. 274; Rea v. Dorrance, 18 Me. 137; Barry fined to regular indorsers, that is to say, indorsers who indorse upon their own transfer of the paper. But there are also irregular indorsers, that is to say, indorsers who indorse the paper without transferring it, and, as will appear a little later in this section, such indorsers are governed by varying rules. If the paper were drawn for the accommodation of the drawer, he is not entitled to claim a demand,2 although one court says that an acceptance for accommodation of the drawer simply devolves upon the drawer the burden of showing that he furnished funds before maturity, if he claim to be entitled to notice.3 Such an acceptance cannot be called an accommodation acceptance. If the paper is drawn for the accommodation of the regular indorser, who shares in the consideration, he is not entitled to claim that a demand should be made.4 If the drawer is an accommodation drawer as to the indorser, and does not share in the consideration, he probably would be held to be entitled to have demand made and notice given to him of non-payment.

v. Friend, 87 Ark. 437. The greater part of these cases is in regard to notes, not bills of exchange. Sher-ley v. Fellowes, 9 Port. 300; Taylor v. Bank of Illinois, 7 T. B. Mon. 576; Todd v. Edwards, 7 Bush, 89; Susquehanna Valley Bank v. Loomis, 85 N. Y. 207, an irregular indorser, and this case is governed by the peculiar rule in New York as to irregular indorsers. It states, however, the general rule as to accommodation indorsers. But this rule should only apply to a drawer who accommodates the drawee, and to accommodation indorsers. A case contrary to the well-settled rule is Hull v. Myer, 90 Ga. 674, where the directors of a corporation were indorsers on the corporation's note. The court solemnly announces: "Good sense, good morality and good law are one and the same so long as they are not sundered violently by legislation or ignorantly by judicial error," and then proceeds to perpetrate some violent sundering on its own account. The inference of ignorance is irresisti-ble

2 Evans v. Norris, 1 Ala. 511; Ross v. Bedell, 5 Duer, 462; McLaren v. Marine Bank, 52 Ga. 131; Barba-roux v. Waters, 3 Met. (Ky.) 304.

3 Nicolet v. Gloyd, 18 La. 417; La-coste v. Harper, 3 La. Ann. 385. But New Orleans Sav. Bank v. Harper, 12 Rob. (La.) 231, seems contra.

4 Reid v. Morrison, 2 Watts & S. 401; Bank of Washington v. Way, 2 Cranch, C. C. 149; Martel v. Tu-reaud, 6 Mart. (N. S.) 118. Farmers' Bank v. Van Meter, 4 Rand. 553, applies the rule to an indorser who knew that the drawer was being accommodated.

So it would probably be as to a regular indorser who did not share in the consideration, but lent his name for the accommodation of a subsequent indorsor. The accommodation acceptor, however, is not entitled to have a demand made on the drawer.5

Turning now to the case of irregular indorsers, that is to say, indorsers who indorse the paper without being either indorsee or payee thereof, which indorsement may be made before the paper is delivered or after the paper is delivered, the rules of law differ in different jurisdictions. If such an indorser shared in the consideration or was the party for whose benefit the paper was drawn, he ought not, under the rule before stated, to be permitted to claim that a demand should be made or notice given to him in any jurisdiction. If he be not interested in the paper beyond merely lending his name, the courts differ as to his rights and liabilities. In some jurisdictions the question is controlled by a statute, and the statute, of course, would govern. But in nearly all the states such an indorsement may be explained by parol, and the actual meaning of the indorsement may be shown. This ruling was no doubt produced by the varying constructions given to such an indorsement, and is an instance contrary to the general rule that does not permit a written contract to be varied by parol. That actual contract would govern as to the rights of the parties, even as to a bona fide holder who had no notice of the agreement, since the indorsement is ambiguous. If the holder had notice, either actual or constructive, he would necessarily be bound by the agreement. But nothing more than the fact of the irregular or anomalous indorsement appearing, the United States courts and the majority of the state courts hold that such an indorser is an original promisor. This must mean, as to the holder, an original promisor with the person, drawer or indorser, for whom, or to give credit to whom, he signed. If that person was entitled on the bill to claim demand and notice, he ought to be entitled; but the language of the courts is confined to cases on notes and does not warrant this statement. He ought not to be governed by the same rule as the anomalous indorser of a note, and is entitled to have a demand made or notice given.6 This matter will rarely be of importance, since the question of authority or right to draw will usually control. In otb,er jurisdictions, as in Illinois, he is a guarantor; and no contract other than the writing being shown, he is not entitled to have demand.7 In other jurisdictions, such as New York and Wisconsin, and under statutes, he is a first or second indorser, as circumstances may determine, and hence is entitled as an accommodation indorser.8 This subject will be examined in section 241, post.

5 Cox v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank, 28 Ga. 529.