The time of demand upon negotiable paper may be affected either by the death of the holder or the death of the obligor upon whom demand is to be made. The death of the holder excuses a presentment until within a reasonable time after the appointment of a personal representative who is the proper party to make the demand. But as soon as the personal representative is appointed a demand should be made at the earliest practicable time thereafter.1 A case which in its decision presents an exceedingly reasonable view of the law arose on account of the death of the holder. The executor appointed by the will of the deceased found the note three days before its maturity and thereupon requested the indorsers to waive demand and notice, but they refused to do so. The executor proved the will afterwards within a month, but immediately relinquished his executorship and never qualified. Thereupon an administrator was appointed. He found the note within a week after his appointment and presented it for payment the next day, and the demand was considered to be seasonable.2 The same indulgence is shown in case the agent of the holder should die, such as a notary.3 If the delay be caused by the death of the agent alone, and the agent was not guilty of negligence in improperly delaying the demand before his death, the holder is not prejudiced unless he was himself chargeable with a want of diligence. This rule is eminently reasonable, for there is no negligence of any agent; the agent has ceased to exist. Sickness of the holder, in order to excuse delay, must have been so severe as to have prevented the employment of another to make demand.4 It has been suggested in the last case cited that the sickness must have been also sudden, but this is to be taken to mean simply that a man who has been guilty of a want of diligence, when he was not too sick to take thought of his business affairs, cannot justify the delay by the fact that he afterwards became incapacitated. It certainly cannot mean that a man who is ill is bound to anticipate that he will become worse. A like rule ought to be applied to the illness of the holder's agent, such as a notary; but so far as the cases show, notaries public are a remarkably healthy and vigorous set of public officials.

1 Jex v. Tureaud. 19 La. Ann. 64; Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380.

2 White v. Stoddard, 11 Gray, 258.

3 Duggan v. King, 1 Eice, 239.

4 Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380. The notice should be given as soon as a recovery is had, just as in all other cases; such as when an epidemic exists or a state of war, preventing demand, the presentation should be made as soon as practicable after the removal of the obstacle to demand. See Harp v. Kenner, 19 La. Ann. 63, where the delay was about six months and was unreasonable.

In case of death of the obligor or party to whom presentment should be made, the general rule is that presentment should be made to the personal representative of the deceased where the death is known to the holder.5 A diligent search should be made in the proper places to ascertain the personal representative.6 If no personal representative can be found after such diligent search, the presentment, it seems, ought not to be delayed awaiting the appointment of a personal representative,7 but should be made on the widow8 or perhaps upon some member of the family9 at the late residence of the deceased.10 But it may well be that the house may be closed up and no one there; in such case demand is not necessary, the paper is dishonored, and notice should be given accordingly.11 One court, which seems to have supposed that delicacy or even common decency has no part in the law, has held that the demand should be made at the dwelling-house even on the day of the deceased's death, or, we may suppose, of the funeral.12 If authority were required for such a ruling it could only be found in a misapplication of the Scriptural injunction that it is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting. If the demand is made upon the personal representative, it seems that it must be a demand of payment and not a presentation of the paper as a claim for allowance;13 yet how the administrator can pay the paper without allowance is problematical, to say the least of it. It has been held that if the note was indorsed after the death of the maker, no demand is necessary as to the indorser;14 and there was once, for a short time, authority for saying that if the personal representative is the indorser, no demand is necessary to charge him as indorser,15 but the contrary rule is established. Such a fact might perhaps excuse notice of dishonor to himself if he were both indorser and executor,16 but not a demand; but the decision upon the subject does not bear out this statement.

5 Blake v. McMillan, 83 Iowa, 150.

6Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16; Frayzer v. Dameron, 6 Mo. App. 153. Contra, Hale v. Burr, 12 Mass. 86. See Burrill v. Smith, 7 Pick. 291, where no demand could be made.

7 Huff v. Ashcroft, 1 Disn. 277: Price v. Young, 1 Nott & McC. 438.

8 Bank of Washington v. Reynolds, 2 Cranch, C. C. 289. But burden is on the indorser to show that there was a personal representative. One course to pursue would be for the creditor to have an administrator appointed, but that cannot be considered necessary.

9 See cases in note 7. And see Juniata Bank v. Hale, 16 S. & R 157; Johnson v. Harth, 1 Bailey, 482.

10 See cases in note 7 and 8, supra 11 Haslett v. Kunbardt, 1 Rice, 189.