In the matter of serving notices, the notice, however it comes to the person to be charged, whether by mail or by messenger, from the holder or his agent or from other prior party, must be given to him or to his agent duly authorized to receive notice, or due diligence must be shown in trying to give the notice. The result of the death of the one to be served upon the serving of the notice will be considered later.1 The cases which have been considered of service by leaving the notice with some person at the house or place of business of the person to be charged2 are, in the view of some courts, cases of service upon agents with implied authority, or perhaps agents from necessity.3 But that is not a correct view, for it does violence to well-settled rules of law as to agency, to hold that such service is had upon an agent. Rather are such cases simply a method of service provided by the law merchant from the necessities of commerce, just as statutes provide for constructive service of process by leaving it at the place of residence of the defendant. But in neither case is the person with whom the notice or process is left an agent. Such an idea requires us to consider the desk on which the notice is left, the door under which it is pushed, or the letter-box in which the notice is mailed as an agent. The cases of service upon an agent are always cases of actual agency. Service upon such an agent is good, provided his authority be shown.4 The authority, however, to draw may bind his firm in regard to a transaction which is truly a partnership transaction,13 and some courts wrongly regard all joint indorsements as partnerships pro hac vice.14 Including these last-named cases as partnership transactions, the rule is general that notice to the partnership is notice to all its members.15 Notice to a partnership is given by giving notice to any one of the general partners.16 The notice may be served on the common member of two firms, the one being indorser, the other being the holder.17 But in case the partnership has been dissolved the agency remains, and a notice to one partner binds them all;18 and a notice according to the previous directions of one partner binds the partnership, certainly before and on principle after dissolution.19 In case the partnership has been dissolved by death the notice will be good served upon a surviving partner,20 but it will not be good if served upon the personal representative of a deceased partner;21 for the notice to the surviving partner fixes the liability of the firm, and hence of the estate of a deceased partner, the notice to the administrator being necessary only as the presentation of a claim.22 But where a drawer of a bill upon a firm was once a member of that partnership, although at the time he drew the bill he was no longer a partner, which fact was not known to the holder, who considered the drawer still one of the firm, and therefore not entitled to notice of non-payment, the holder was held to have released such drawer by failing to give him notice.23

7 Such are the cases of customary service by mailing. See Sec. 288, post, note 5.

1 See Sec. 287, post.

2 See the cases cited in Sec. 274. Jacobs v. Turner, 2 La. Ann. 964.

3 Strictly an agent is one who brings the principal into contractual relations with another. A servant does not. Therefore, since no express authority exists in these cases, the agency must arise either by estoppel or from necessity.

4 Edwards v. Thomas, 66 Mo. 468. This would have been a good case of actual agency by estoppel, had the holder not known that the agency no longer existed. See New a bill will not imply, it is said, an authority in the agent to receive notice of dishonor,5 although a demand on such an agent who made a note has been held good6 in a concurring opinion, and if the rule is sound as to a demand it is sound as to the notice.7

In the case of joint indorsers or joint drawers, not partners, notice in order to hold either must be served upon both,8 unless the case has been modified by a waiver,9 or unless the common law as to the release of all joint obligors by releasing one of them has been modified by statute; in which latter case, the reason of the rule failing, the rule itself ought to fail.10 But it is needless to say the fact of a joint indorsement must appear upon the face of the "instrument itself, unless the holder had notice of the fact of joint indorsement; but even then he would not be bound by the fact of joint indorsement if it contradicted what appeared upon the instrument.11 The notice to joint indorsers need not, however, be addressed to both.12 Partnerships are not considered cases of joint obligation, because each partner

York Contracting Co. v. Selma Sav. Bank, 51 Ala. 805. The agency in this case can arise by estoppel or a holding out. See Wilkins v. Commercial Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 217. 5 Hockaday v. Skeggs, 2 Phila. 268.

6 Luning v. Wise, 64 Cal. 410.

7 The theory of the latter case seems the best, but the authority seems to be to the contrary. The authorities are cited in Hockaday v. Skeggs, supra. Valk v. Galliard, 4 Strobh. 99; La. St. Bank v. Ellery, 4 Mart. (N. S.) 87, where the authority given was to indorse and to do all acts necessary in connection therewith; De Lizardi v. Pouverin, 4 Rob. (La.) 393. But a notice to a general agent of a person is good (Hestres v. Petrovic, 1 Rob. (La.) 119; Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380); or general agent of a corporation.

Bank of Auburn v. Putnam, 1 Abb. Dec. 80 (here there was an estoppel).

8 Gaunt v. Jones, 1 Cranch, C. C. 210; State Bank v. Slaughter, 7 Blackf. 133. See Shepherd v. Haw-ley, 1 Conn. 367. But see as to anomalous indorser, Legg v. Vinal, 165 Mass. 555.

9 One joint indorser might waive notice.

10 If the statute provides that one joint obligor can be released it would control. Some courts permit the obligee to reserve his right to hold the other joint obligor not released.

11 Two men who sign separately are so bound regardless of their intention.

12 Cayuga Co. Bank v. Warden, 6 N. Y. 19.

13 Wheeler v. Maillot, 20 La. Ann. 75.

14 Dodge v. Bank of Kentucky, 2 A. K. Marsh. 610; Higgins v. Morrison, 4 Dana, 100. But this is not the correct rule. Sayre v. Frick, 7 Watts & S. 383; Boyd v. Orton, 16 Wis. 495; People's Bank v. Keech, 26 Md. 521; Willis v. Greene, 5 Hill, 232. In fact, if the joint indorsers were actually partners, the fact that they indorsed as individuals and not as a firm ought to show their intention to be held only jointly; but the law is not so.

15 See cases in note 18, infra.

16 Dormant partners are not within the rule, but the service is good on the agent Bliss v. Nichols, 94 Mass. 443.

17Riddle v. McBeth, 4 W. L. M. 153.

18 Dabney v. Stidger, 4 Smedes & M. 749; Slocomb v. De Lizardi, 21 La. Ann. 355; Coster v. Thomason, 19 Ala 717. See Nott v. Downing, 6 La. 680, and Hume v. Watt, 5 Kan. 34 And see notes 26-28, Sec. 274, ante.

19 Magee v. Dunbar, 10 La. 546.

20 See first two cases in note 18.

21 Locke v. Bank of Tennessee, 6 Humph. 51. See the cases on demand, Sec. 248, ante.

22 Locke v. Bank of Tennessee, 6 Humph. 51.

Where an indorser, after making the indorsement, has made an assignment of all his property for the benefit of creditors, notice of dishonor must nevertheless be given to him and not to the assignee;24 but there is authority for saying that notice to the assignee will bind the indorser who is assignor.25 But a reasonable compromise between the two positions would be to hold that the assignee is agent of the assignor to wind up his business while he is engaged about that matter, and if notice is given to him at the place of business where the assignor-indorser's affairs are being wound up, it would be a good notice to the indorser.26 Yet at the same time, as in all other cases of agency, notice to the as-signor-indorser himself would be good to bind the assigned property; but this is wrongly said not to be true, unless the holder had no notice of the assignment.27