9 Beckwith v. Smith, 22 Me. 125.

10 Young v. Durgin, 15 Gray, 264; Robinson v. Barber, 8 Am. Law J. (N. S.) 59; Lewiston Falls Bank v. Leonard, 43 Ma 144 (represented by indorser to be his postoffice). See also Pierce v. Pendar, 5 Met. 352.

11 Fitler v. Morris, 6 Whart. 406.

12 See Sec. 272, ante. It is immaterial that the notice was never received. Sec. 273, ante, note 1.

13 This is the rule as stated in Young v. Durgin, 15 Gray, 264. See Goodwin v. McCoy, 13 Ala. 271; Wooley v. Lyon, 117 I11.. 244; Mc-Murtrie v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 206; Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307.

14 Curtis v. State Bank, 6 Blackf. 312; Walker v. Stetson, 14 Ohio St. 89.

15 Forbes v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 10 Neb. 338; Hazel ton Coal Co. v. Ryerson, 20 N. J. Law, 129; Reid v. Payne, 16 Johns. 218; Seneca Co. Nat Bank v. Neass, 3 N. Y. 442, 5 Denio, 329; Bank of Columbia v. Magruder, 6 Har. & J. 172; Woods v. Neeld, 44 Pa. 86.

16Bank v. Lane, 10 N. C. 453; Bank of Louisiana v. Corl, 3 La. Ann. 273.

17 Harrison v. Bowen, 16 La. 282; Pollard v. Cook, 4 Rob. (La.) 199.

18 Bank of Louisiana v. Corl, 3 La. Ann. 273.

19 Nashville Bank v. Bennett, 1 Yerg. 166.

20 See the cases cited in note 28, infra.

But the rule of the nearest postoffice is only a rule of presumption. For a notice that is directed to the postoffice where the person receiving notice is in the habit of receiving his mail will unquestionably be sufficient regardless of the rule of the nearest postoffice.25 And if the indorser should be in the habit of receiving mail at more places than one, notice to either of these places is sufficient;26 yet in Louisiana (a state where almost any kind of a decision upon this phasa of the law may be found, and where the multitudinous decisions lead one to imagine that the most active pursuit of the population was the indorsing of notes, which the makers never paid), the court thought an indorser ought to be protected against a postoffice twenty-two miles away from his residence, even though he was foolish enough to receive his mail there sometimes.27 If now the holder or his agent knows that the indorser is in the habit of receiving his mail at a certain postoffice, the notice may be directed there even if it be not the nearest;28 but he is not compelled, it appears, to

21 See note 8 to Sec. 272, ante.

22 Forbes v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 10 Neb. 338. And see notes 6-8, Sec. 272, ante.

23 Ireland v. Kip, 10 Johns. 490,11 Johns. 231. See notes 6-8, Sec. 272, ante.

24 See notes 6-8, Sec. 272, ante.

25Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Glasscock v. Bank of Mo., 8 Mo. 443; Mercer v. Lancaster, 5 Pa. 160; Nevins v. Bank, 10 Mich. 547; Montgomery Co. Bank v. Marsh, 11 Barb. 645, 7 N. Y. 481; Shaylor v. Mix, 86 Mass. 351; Grief v. Mo-Daniel, 14 La. Ann. 155; Farmers' Bank v. Battle, 4 Humph. 86;

Walker v. Stetson, 14 Ohio St. 89; Hazelton Coal Co. v. Ryerson, 20 N. J. Law, 129.

26 Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Follain v. Dupre, 11 Rob. (La.) 454; Menzies v. Farmers' Bank, o Ky. Law R 822; Crawford v. Read, 9 Rob. (La.) 243. See Shelbume Falls Bank v. Townnley, 107 Mass. 444; Mechanics' Bank v. Compton, 3 Rob. (La.) 4.

27 Pritchard v. Scott, 7 Mart. (N. S.) 491.

28Follain v. Dupre, 11 Rob. (La.) 4.14; Grand Gulf Co. v. Barnes, 12 Rob. (La.) 127; Bank of Illinois v. Taylor, 7 T. B. Mon. 579; Reid v.

do so. But if the holder does not know the. fact he needs not inquire, but should follow the rule of mailing to the nearest postoffice.29

There is yet another consideration that will govern the rule of mailing to the postoffice nearest the residence of the recipient of notice. While, as we have seen, the presence of an address for the indorser, not put upon the note by the indorser, will not justify the sending of notice there without inquiry, a direction to the holder to send notice to a certain place can be deviated from only at the risk of the holder.30 This direction as to notice will be reasonably and liberally and not strictly construed.31 It governs the rule as to the nearest postoffice,32 and the accustomed postoffice as well. The direction need not be given necessarily by the indorser, for the order to direct notice given by the drawer for an accommodation indorser,33 or the direction as to notice to indorser given by the person who presents the paper for discount, apparently for the indorser, is binding upon the indorser.34 But the direction as to notices must be given to the holder. He cannot take advantage of a direction given to the postmaster as to the forwarding of mail, in order to avoid the force of the rule as to the nearest postoffice.35

But it should not be forgotten that these rules are only compulsory when the indorser or drawer has not received notice in due time. If he has received such notice in due time from the holder, or from some other party to the paper, as hereinbefore stated, it is immaterial how the notice was directed,36 or to what place it was directed,37 or who conveyed it,38 or where it was received.39

Payne, 16 Johns. 218; Seneca Co. Nat. Bank v. Neass, 3 N. Y. 442.

29 See last case in last note and Taylor v. Bank of Illinois, 7 T. B. Mon. 576.

30 Paterson Bank v. Butler, 12 N. J. Law, 268. See as to address on paper, Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248.

31 Menzies v. Farmers' Bank, 3 Ky. Law R 822. See Follain v. Dupre, 11 Rob. (La.) 454; Priestley v. Bis-land, 9 Rob. (La.) 425.

32 Carmena v. Bank of La., 1 La. Ann. 369; Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill, 194.

33 Bank of Utica v. Bender, 21 Wend. 643.

34 Bank of Utica v. Davidson, 5 Wend. 587.

35 Ireland v. Kip, Anth. N. P. 195. In the upper courts the point was missed. This point would seem to be the only ground upon which this decision can be justified. But the point is really immaterial. It proves that the person has been getting his mail at the place, and if the holder does not know of the change, mailing to the place is good. McGrew v. Toulmin, 2 Stew. & P. 428.