This section is from the book "The Law Of Banks And Banking", by John Maxcy Zane . Also available from Amazon: The law of banks and banking.
Where war has suspended the ordinary intercourse between two places, the transmission of notices between those places cannot be made.1 "While the state of war continues the giving of notice is nugatory.2 It will not be any evidence of notice whatever. If the countries of the person to serve and the person to be served are at war, or if the ordinary commercial intercourse has been suspended by proper authority, notice cannot be transmitted; but if the district is merely disturbed by a state of war, the condition must be such as to prevent commercial intercourse between the two places.3 If means of communication exist, it is the duty of the person to transmit notices by those means. But the transmission of notice through a country with which both belligerents were at peace, or the use of a licensed vessel, was wrongly suggested.4 This cannot be considered a proper rule, for the better rule would be that such a notice was void.5 But the excuse or necessity for delay exists only so long as the state of war continues or the interruption continues;6 as soon as commercial intercourse is resumed, reasonable diligence must be exercised in the transmission of the no-tice.7 With the magnificent disdain for private rights exhibited by so many revolutionary bodies, especially strict constructionists, a southern state attempted by a secession ordinance to dispense with notice upon existing paper.8 The prevalence of an epidemic suspending ordinary business excuses notice,9 but, unlike a state of war, a notice served during the prevalence of the epidemic is good,10 even though there be a statute suspending demands and notices until fifteen days after the epidemic was declared at an end.11
" See Sec. 263, ante.
15 See Sec. 237, ante.
16 See Sec. 262, ante.
17 See Sec. 244, ante. 18SeeSec. Sec. 287, 289, ante.
1 Lane v. Bank of West Tennessee, 9 Heisk. 419 (on the whole question involved this decision is wrong); House v. Adams, 48 Pa. 261; Bell v. Hall, 2 Duv. 288; Hopkirk v. Page, 2 Brock. 20.
2Norris v. Despard, 38 Md. 487; Hardin v. Boyce, 59 Bare. 425; Farmers' Bank v. Gunnell, 26 Grat. 131 (in this cas^ the court held that a part of the secession ordinance was unconstitutional); Bynum v. Apperson, 9 Heisk. 632; Bank of Old Dominion v. McVeigh, 29 Grat.
546; Union Bank v. Robertson, 19 La. Ann. 72.
3 See note 1. Even if war exists it will not excuse the use of due diligence in trying to transmit notice. Peters v. Hobbs, 25 Ark. 67 (this case wrongly holds that the existence of a state of war is a question for the jury); Dunbar v. Tyler, 44 Miss. 1; James v. Wade. 21 La. Ann. 548. Interruption of the mail is not alone sufficient to excuse. Citizens' Bank v. Pugh, 19 La. Ann. 43. But a notice deposited in the mail under such conditions is nugatory. Billgerry v. Branch, 19 Grat 393; Shaw v. NeaL 19 La. Ann. 156.
 
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