The waiver of the necessity for demand and notice may be made by paroll unless the statute or rule of law held in the jurisdiction expressly, requires the waiver to be written;2 but even in the latter case a person may be estopped by his conduct from insisting upon a written waiver.3 This waiver may be made at any time after indorsement. It is difficult to see how a waiver could be made before indorsement, except by the drawer of a bill under certain peculiar circumstances, which are to be classed as excuses for making a demand and giving notice.4 If the waiver is made at the time of indorsement, as we saw in the last section, it is equivalent to an authority to write a waiver above the indorsement and is not a case of a parol modification of a written contract. So where the agreement is for an actual waiver at the time of the indorsement, it is difficult to see what effect the parol evidence rule can have.5 The theory and rationale of the doctrine is that the indorser, by his waiver or by his promise to be liable as a guarantor, makes the holder his agent to insert the contract above the blank indorsement which he gives to him. This authority can be given by parol, just as he could authorize a man to sign his name. The sole question involved is whether, by making such an agreement and executing the blank indorsement, he authorizes the holder to fill it up. If there is authority to fill it up, neither the parol evidence rule nor a statute requiring a writing is violated, for the contract is written. But reasonable as the above rule seems to be, it is settled by the great preponderance of authority, in spite of text writers to the contrary, that parol evidence is inadmissible to show a parol waiver or a parol guaranty contemporaneous with a regular indorsement.6 But in the case of an anomalous indorsement, the actual contract of indorsement may be, and in some states must be, shown by parol.7 Where the anomalous indorser is a guarantor or original promisor by law, the indorser may not show, according to some authority, the actual contract, to rebut the contract of guaranty inferred from the nature of the indorsement.8 In other 'states where the anomalous indorser is merely an ordinary indorser, parol evidence is admissible to show a parol contract of guaranty,9 but this holding is denied.10 But the proper rule would seem to be that in no case should the contract raised by the law from the nature of the indorsement be reduced by parol evidence as against a bona fide it is held to be a guaranty, ought to permit of a waiver being written above it if there were no other actual agreement.6 holder,11 although the same objection would not exist to evidence adding to the contract terms beneficial to the holder.12 This parol waiver in jurisdictions which permit such proof as to an indorsement may be proved as between indorser and indorsee.13 The waiver may also be made after indorsement. In case the statute or the rule of law requires a written waiver, a waiver after indorsement would necessarily be in writing, because the holder would not be authorized to write the waiver above the indorser's signature.14 But where a written waiver is not required this waiver may be made at any time before maturity,15 and by much authority after maturity, as will appear in a succeeding section. A parol waiver may be proved by facts and circumstances16 as well as by words.17 Cases examining the evidence to support such a waiver may be found in the note below.18 This waiver arises from the indorser's request to the holder not to protest the paper,19 or by the indorser wrongfully taking possession of the paper before maturity and retaining it until after maturity,20 or by the indorser's taking the paper and attempting himself to collect it.21 But the mere presence of the indorser at the demand is not a waiver,22 nor the fact that the indorser aided the holder in collecting interest upon the note.23 But if the indorser induces the holder to give time to the maker at the time of indorsement, or before or at maturity, his conduct is a waiver of demand and notice at the maturity of the note,24 but some authority holds that it is not so as to demand and notice at the expiration of the extension.25 If the indorser himself gives security upon the note, it seems that the security may be enforced, although the note was not demanded nor notice of non-payment given.26 The commonest form of waiver before maturity is examined in the next section.

6 This merely makes the indorsement what it purports to be on its face.

1Annaville Nat. Bank v. Kettering, 106 Pa. 531; Maples v. Traders' Deposit Bank, 15 Ky. Law R 879; Edwards v. Tandy, 36 N. H. 540; Fuller v. McDonald, 8 Ma 213; Kaiser v. Nial, 9 Mo. App. 590: Barclay v. Weaver, 19 Pa. 396; Andrews v. Simms, 33 Ark. 771; Schmeid v. Frank, 86 Ind. 250; Taunton Bank v. Richardson, 5 Pick. 436. A parol waiver of a demand may be shown with a written waiver of notice. Mills v. Beard, 19 CaL 158. Contra, Buckley v. Bentley, 48 Barb. 283. For the language used in waiving, see Taunton Bank v. Richardson, 5 Pick. 436.

2 Thomas v. Mayo, 56 Me. 40; First Nat. Bank v. Maxfield, 83 Me. 57a

3 Hallowell Nat. Bank v. Mar&ton, 85 Me. 488.

4 See Sec. Sec. 262, 290, ante.

5 See the last section. A parol waiver on an assignment is good. Dick v. Martin, 7 Humph. 263.

6 Rodney v. Wilson, 67 Mo. 123: Beiler v. Frost, 70 Mo. 185. Or a guaranty. Barnard v. Galin, 23 Minn. 192; Farwell v. Trust Co., 45 Minn. 495; Barry v. Morse, 3 N. H. 132; Bank of Albion v. Smith, 27 Barb. 489; Schmitz v. Hawkeye Co., 8 S. D. 544, and cases therein. See Stack v. Beach, 74 Ind. 571, as to what may be shown by parol evidence. These cases follow the English rule. This rule could not apply to a parol waiver after indorsement.

7Rey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341; Cady v. Shepard, 12 Wis. 639; Bright v. Carpenter, 9 Ohio, 139; Feather-stone v. Hendrick, 59 III App. 497; Owings v. Baker, 54 Md. 82; Kuntz v. Tempel, 48 Mo. 71; Stack v. Beach, 74 Ind. 571; Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 N. J. Law, 517.

8Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn. 15; Allen v. Brown, 124 Mass. 77; Dennis v. Jackson, 108 Mich. 295; Watson v. Hart, 6 Grat. 633. Contra, Rey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341; White v. Weaver, 41 I1L 409; Kingsland v. Koeppe, 137 111. 344; Strong v. Riker, 16 Vt. 554.

9McComb v. Thompson, 2 Minn. 139; Coulter v. Richmond, 59 N. Y. 478; Deering v. Creighton, 19 Ore.-. 118; Wells v. Jackson, 6 Blackf. 40.

10 Heath v. Van Cott, 9 Wis. 510 (seemingly overruled by Cady v. Shepard, 12 Wis. 639); Stack v. Beach, 74 Ind. 571, semble.

11 Schneider v. Schiffman, 20 Mo. 571; Salisbury v. First Nat Bank, 37 Neb. 872.

12 This view of the matter seems to be sound on principle.

13 Dye v. Scott, 35 Ohio St 194 See note 6, supra.

14 See cases in note 2, supra.

15 See the next section.

16 See cases in note 1, supra.

17 See cases in note 1, supra.

18Teconic Bank v. Johnson, 21 Me. 426; Oswego Bank v. Knower, Hill & D. Supp. 122; Lary v.

Young, 13 Ark. 401; Taunton Bank v. Richardson, 5 Pick. 436. For language not a waiver, see Kent v. Warner, 94 Mass. 561; Wright v. Liesenfeld, 93 Cal. 90. 19 Scott v. Grier, 10 Pa. 103.

20 Havens v. Talbot, 11 Ind. 323.

21 Braine v. Spaulding, 52 Pa. 247.

22 Grant v. Spencer, 1 Mont. 136.

23 Isham v. McClure, 58 Iowa, 515. A contrary decision in this case would have been proper.

24 Marsh v. Badcock, 2 D. Chip 124; Hudson v. Wolcott, 39 Ohio St 618;