Anew promise to pay the note after maturity, made by the indorser with knowledge of his release, is binding upon him as a new and valid contract,1 dispensing with the proof of demand and lYeager v. Farwell, 13 Wall. 6 (this is a rambling sort of an opinion by Justice Davis); Matthews v. Allen, 16 Gray, 594; Harrison v. Bailey, 99 Mass. 620; Rindge v. Kimball, 124 Mass. 209; Lockwood v. Bock, 50 Minn. 142; Cheshire v. Taylor, 29 Iowa, 492; Barclay v. Weaver, 19 Pa. 396; Pollard v. Brown, 57 Ind. 232: Bank of Columbia v. Mack-all, 2 Cranch, C. C. 631; Hoadley v. Bliss, 9 Ga. 303 (if waiver of proof). notice.2 But either the promise must be unqualified,3 or, if conditional, it must appear that the condition has been performed.4 This rule applies to indorsers and drawers of all kinds of commercial paper.5 The reason for such a rule is not apparent. The case has no analogy to one under the statute of limitations, although it is so treated. There is no consideration for the promise, if it is considered a promise, not even a moral or meritorious consideration, because the indorser was never under any obligation to pay. The new promise after maturity is perhaps considered as a waiver of demand and notice, but a promise to pay before maturity required, as has been seen, a consideration to support it by being acted upon.6 Probably it is for the reason that no consideration exists that the promise after maturity must appear to have been made with full knowledge on the indorser's part that he has been released by a failure to give him notice of demand and non-payment.7 One court applying a distinction made by Lord Westbury between ignorance of an abstract principle of law and ignorance of the application of the principle to the facts has held that the indorser must know not only that no demand has been made or notice not given to him, but must also know all other facts material to form a conclusion as to his liability.8 The promise to pay is presumptive evidence of demand and notice,9

2Seebree Bank v. Moreland, 96 Ky. 150, semble; Landrum v. Trowbridge. 2 Met (Ky.) 281; Ralston v. Bullits, 3 Bibb, 261; Huntington v. Harvey, 4 Conn. 124; Walters v. Swallow, 6 Whart. 446 (an accommodation indorser); Brown v.

Teague, 52 N. C. 573; Robinson v. Barret, 19 Fla. 670, semble; Wyckoff v. Andrews, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct 196. 3See the foregoing cases, and Neal v. Wood, 23 Ind. 523.

4 If the waiver is made after indorsement and before maturity, no extension being granted, where is there any consideration until the waiver is acted upon?

5 Grosvenor v. Stone, 8 Pick. 79.

6 Ex parte Tremont Nat Bank, 2 Low. 409.

7 Yeager v. Farwell, 13 Wall. 6; Curtis v. Sprague, 51 Cal. 239; Harmon v. Moffett, 6 D. C. 297, semble, are as to indorsers of notes; Stone v. Smith, 30 Tex. 138; Benoist v. Creditors, 18 La. 522, are as to drafts.

See also cases in note 7, infra. As to the language of a new promise, see Glendenning v. Canary, 5 Daly, 489; Martin v. Perqua, 65 Hun, 225.

2 Campbell v. Varney, 12 Iowa, 43, and cases in the last note.

3 See next note.

4 Keith v. Mackey, 5 Rob. (La.) 277; Turnbull v. Maddox, 68 Md. 579; Campbell v. Varney, 12 Iowa, 43.

5 See cases in note 1, supra.

6 See Sec. 299, ante.

7Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; Walker v. Rogers, 40 111. 278; Moore v. Cofield, 1 Dev. 247; Arnold v. Dresser, 90 Mass. 435; Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns. 375; Landrum v. Trowbridge, 2 Met. (Ky.) 281, and many other cases. But negligence as to means of knowledge may amount to knowledge. Hayes v. Werner, 45 Conn. 246.

8 Low v. Howard, 10 Cush. 159. See Matthews v. Allen, 16 Gray. 594, and Breen v. Buttorf, 3 Tenn. Ch. 285 (this case is absolutely wrong).

9Yeager v. Farwell, 13 WalL 6, and the cases in note 1, supra, and Pierson v. Hooker, 8 Johns. 68; Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523; Hazard v. White, 26 Ark. 155; and it follows from the fact of such a promise appearing that the burden is thrown upon the indorser to show that he had no knowledge of his release.10 But so far is the matter of necessity of knowledge on the indorser's part carried, that a note given by the indorser for a draft upon which the indorser had been released is invalid for want of consideration if the indorser did not know that he was released.11 The transfer of the note after dishonor by the indorsers,12 or the act of the indorsers in causing the holder to take the note overdue," is a waiver of demand and notice. The rule at common law is that the admission of liability by one joint contractor binds his co-contractor.14 The same rule would probably apply to a new promise. Where a. failure to notify one joint indorser has released all the indorsers, the new promise of one released imposes the liability to pay upon all.15 The new promise must be made just as a waiver must be made, to some one interested in the paper,16 who can hold that indorser liable upon the paper, and it inures, perhaps, to the benefit of all the holders of the paper to whom he is liable.17