The certificate of protest, where it is admissible as evidence, either under the general law or by reason of a statute, is competent to prove demand, refusal of payment, and notice.1 The certificate, therefore, ought to be competent proof of all facts connected with and a part of the demand and giving of notice. Thus, the recital that the paper was presented at or notice sent to the place of business or residence of an in-dorser or drawer is competent proof of the fact of residence, and is prima facie sufficient.2 So it is of the fact as to whom the paper is presented and of his relation to the indorser,3 and as to the time,4 and of the reasons for not making a personal demand,5 such as that the person was absent or that the office was closed. But the certificate is not proof of collateral facts stated therein, such as that the person upon whom the demand was made or notice served was an agent of the person who should have received the demand or the notice;6 nor are the statements of hearsay contained in the certificate proof of anything more than that such statements were made; they are, of course, not sufficient to prove the truth of the matters of fact stated by way of hearsay.7

23 Pier v. Heinriohshofen, 6 Cent L. J. 285.

24 Brooks v. Day, 11 Iowa, 46.

25 Orons Bank v. Wood, 49 Me. 26; Bettis v. Schrieber, 31 Minn. 329; O'Niel v. Dickson, 11 Ind. 253; Roberts v. State Bank, 9 Port. 312; Fuller v. Dingman, 41 Iowa, 506; Case v. Getchell, 21 Pa. 503; Seneca Co. Bank v. Neass, 3 N. Y. 442; Simpson v. White, 40 N. H. 540. Contra, Bank of Alexandria v. Wilson, 2 Cranch, C. C. 5: Union Bank v. Humphreys, 48 Ma 172.

26 See Burk v. Shreve, 39 N. J. L. 214.

27 Baumgardner v. Rieves, 35 Pa. 250. See Nailor v. Bowie, 4 Md. 290 (this case is wrong as to the contents of the notice).

28 See Saul v. Brand, 1 La. Ann. 95. But this case is wrong in stating the converse of the rule given above, for the great weight of authority is that conclusions may be stated in a certificate. But the courts of Louisiana, Tennessee and Maryland hold the contrary. See Reier v. Strauss, 54 Md. 278; Cockrill v. Lowenstine, 9 Heisk. 206.

29 See Sec. 269, ante, et seq.

30 See Sec. 245, ante, et seq. 31 Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat 326 While this case states the rule as to a deceased notary's notice on paper not protestable, it shows that the rule is the same on paper properly protestable. Townsley v. Sum-rail, 2 Pet. 170; Sims v. Hundley, 6 How. 1; Brandon v. Loftus, 4 How. 127. The learned Justice Catron in this case talks about " fixing an indorsee"