This section is from the book "The Principles Of Economics With Applications To Practical Problems", by Frank A. Fetter. Also available from Amazon: The Principles of Economics, With Applications to Practical Problem.
4. Many fortunes built on favoring legislation are defended as due to social service. In the Middle Ages kings often granted great estates to nobles as rewards for past merit and as a payment for expected public actions. The great landlords were the magistrates,military leaders, and supporters of social order, and thus, in the judgment both of the king and of the commonalty, the nobles earned their incomes by their social service. While this practice has disappeared under constitutional government, large grants are still made to royal families. Many Englishmen who are democratic at heart uphold such grants as the price of social stability. Regard for royalty is so deep-rooted in the minds of the people of any long-established monarchy that there is always danger in change. England must pay many millions annually as the price of loyal and conservative sentiment. So long as this is true, a family of royal figureheads and idlers performs a social service.
Social services of favored classes.
Possible social service of protected industries.
Protective tariffs sought by wealthy manufacturers are granted, not ostensibly to help them, but to help the country. The argument is that the benefits are diffused. Aid to enterprises in private hands, such as ship subsidies or as the grants to the Pacific railroads, are defended on the ground that, as a whole, society benefits by thus increasing the income of one class. The promise of social service is most urged by those who get the immediate benefit. Their eyes are keenest. The manufacturer sees clearly the benefits that will come to his factory from a protective tariff, but before he can get it he must convince many others that they too will gain. The majority of the American electorate is not voting a special favor at the polls, but is recognizing what it believes to be in its own interest. Most students of social questions doubt the wisdom of most of these grants to the wealthy on grounds of social service. The burden of proof is on their advocates, but few today are so rash as to say that such a claim of social service is never sound.
Private property in land questioned.
5. Property in natural agents is the most strongly attacked. In the case of great natural deposits, such as those of coal or iron, the social service that is performed by the mine-owner is hard to see. Great incomes are drawn in the form of royalty or rent by those who never lift a pick or direct a stroke of work. Agricultural land in the hands of absentee landlords yields an income not very clearly due to social service, and this phase of property has been especially assailed during the past century. The modern form of this discussion is concerning "the unearned increment,' the rise in the value of lands as a result of social growth. It is proposed to appropriate by "the single tax" the entire rental value of the land for the use of the public.
The defense of property in land is first positive: taking not the extreme but. the usual case, private property secures the discovery and development of natural resources and their thorough use and good management (not necessarily by personal labor with the hands). If this is true, it is well for the individual and for the community to have this wealth in private hands. But in other cases there is merely a negative argument for property in land: no other better method of employing it, has been devised and found prae-ticablej. The experience with state ownership of mines, forests, and estates has not definitely answered in every case the question whether the social results of state ownership are more favorable than those of private ownership. In some cases they clearly are not, in others they may be; and as the balance of opinion inclines in the direction of public ownership, other reforms will doubtless be undertaken.
6. The present inequality of wealth, not private property as such, is often attached. It is estimated that in the United Kingdom two per cent, of the families own seventy-five per cent, of all the wealth, while ninety-three per cent, own less than eight per cent. In the United States it is estimated that one per cent, of all the families own more than the remaining ninety-nine per cent.; and at the other part of the scale eighty-seven per cent, of all the families own less than twelve per cent, of all the wealth. The trend has been toward concentration of fortunes and a larger proportion of the growing income from property is in a few hands. Many feel that the law of property is defective when this is possible, although at the same time the average income of the wage-earner is increasing. Yet, it is not the institution as a whole that is attacked, but its details. The custom of equal division of property among children in the United States has not been as effective in keeping fortunes small as was expected. The wealthy American families have averaged small, and in some of the most prominent the rule of equal division has not been followed. Opportunities for the investment of small savings at low interest are not lacking, but the great fortunes overtower the little ones, securing the great profits and great political and economic power. The farms and the villages are refuges for the small industry and for the small fortunes, and this fact has a great influence on our national character. The whole social atmosphere in the cities, with their extremes of wealth, differs from that in the country, and this contrast promises to become greater as the years go on.
Inequality of fortunes.
Private property vs. socialism.
7. The ideal of property rights is that they shall furnish the highest motives for efficient social service. Private property furnishes such a motive in a broad way, but its most ardent defenders will recognize that it does so imperfectly. It is an institution that has been tried and that does the work, while other methods suggested to do away with it are found to be dreams. The ideal of socialism is the abolition of private property, the centralizing under the control of the state of all wealth, except the simple personal belongings, clothing and other consumption goods. But history and 'human nature unite to testify that extreme socialism is an unworkable plan, excepting under special conditions, as in barbarous times and under a political despotism. The modern ideal for the control of wealth is the best attainable harmony of liberty and efficiency. If private property as it is, falls short of that ideal, at any rate it works either on a small or on a large scale, and socialism does not work at all. Property rights as they exist are not a product of pure reason. They are the result of social evolution, of historical accidents, of class legislation, and of selfish interest in many cases. Changing social conditions and ideas are bringing many changes in law, and further change must be expected to come.
 
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