Herodotus asserts of the Atlantes, the inhabitants of Mount Atlas, that they neither eat animal food nor dream. Lode professes to have seen a man who, though his memory was by no means defective, assured him that he had never dreamt till after a fever which affected him about the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth year of his age; and Plutarch mentions his friend Cleon, who though he had attained a great age, had never dreamed, and says that the same was recorded of Thrasymenes. It is possible, however, that these persons had dreamed, though the impression made on their mind might have been so slight as not to excite any recollection. Aristotle observes, that those who never dream till grown up are generally liable after their experience of this kind to some change of constitution, a remark con-firmed by Beattie, who professes to have known a gentleman who never dreamed but when his health was disordered. The habit of dreaming, however, prevails so generally, that it may be considered as an ordinary exercise of the human mind, and its tending to prove its inherent powers of reflection, and it is probable that if the mind is capable of being entirely quiescent, it rarely ceases to think however its thoughts may sometimes be forgotten as speedily as they arise. Clemens Alexandrinus deemed an entire quiescence to be a death of the soul. Mr. Locke's argument that it is not essential to the soul to think, because it does not always dream *. is founded upon an argument which is at least disputable, for though it may be allowed that the mind cannot think without being sensible that it does think, it need not necessarily be admitted that it does not always dream, because it cannot pecal its dreams when awake, or because it does not even remember that it has dreamed; since it might be conscious of its reflections when the body was asleep, though no recollection of them be retained at the return of morning, which instantly presents new scenes to the eyes, and excites new and stronger impressions on the mind. The voluntary operations of the mind seem to cease during sleep, so that the mind becomes in great measure passive, and we can seldom discern any accurate recollection or powers of reasoning.

* De Providentia.

† Schenk's Observat. L. i. p. 64.

* Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, B. ii. C i. §. 1. Watts's Essays, p. 120. Aristot. de Insomn. Hobbes's Leviathan, B. ii. C. 45.

"Ebon night is no logician*."

Many things which did occur in sleep, and many things which strike the mind when we are awake, escape almost instantly from the memory, and are not recollected till perchance some remote event recall them to our remembrance: so likewise drunken persons often forget the events and actions which took place during their intoxication; and with respect to dreams, Nebuchadnezzar forgot his dream till Daniel recalled it to his mind †.

Dreams, though sometimes forgotten almost as soon as framed, are not to be considered as useless: they may serve to exercise the faculties and improve the temper of the mind, which may derive profit from the contemplation of successive images, but could receive no advantage from apathy.

* Mysterious Mother. † Pan. ii. 5.

Incoherent as they are, they enable us on reconsideration to watch the temper of the mind, to regard its predominant affections, and to note its undisguised propensities; and they who are disposed to correct any mischievous tendencies, may be assisted thereby in discovering where it may be done with most benefit and effect.

Zeno was of opinion, that every one might form a judgment of his advancement in virtue from his dreams, since if he found himself not pleased with any thing disgraceful and unjust, but his powers of mind enlightened by reason, shining out for the reflection of pure images, like a placid and waveless sea, he might have ground for self approbation*; on the other hand, if in sleep the mind seemed readily to yield itself to vicious passions, there must be much cause for vigilance.

* Plutarch. Wyttenbach, vol. ii. p, 316

It was upon a similar conviction that Diony-sius inflicted the punishment of death on Mar-syas, for having dreamt that he had cut the tyrant's throat, being persuaded that it must have formed the subject of his waking thoughts *. When we are awake, as Plutarch has observed, if vice peeps out, it accommodates itself to the opinion of men, and is abashed; and veiling its passions, it does not entirely give up itself to its impulse, but restrains and contends with it, but in sleep flying beyond opinions and laws, and transgressing all modesty and shame, it excites every lust and stirs up its evil propensities, aiming even at the most dreadful crimes, and enjoying illegal things and images which terminate in no pleasure, but promote disorder †. It is observable, however, that when the passions operate to excess in dreams, the mind is affected with a sense of conscious guilt, the influence of which throws a gloom over the waking thoughts; and Plato was of opinion that the mind might be so subjected to the influence of reason, as not even in sleep to be carried away by any vicious desires.

* Plutarch. Dionys.

† Plut. vol. i. p. 398. Edit. Wyttenbach.

The mind appears to entertain some idea of the length of time that the body has slept, though probably this is from a consideration of circumstances when it awakes, since its estimate does not seem to depend upon the succession of images which it has contemplated; and if sleep is extended to any unusual length of time, no accurate idea of the time elapsed is preserved, as a person who had slept for a week is known to have fancied that he had slept only one night.