In discussing the above proposition, the question as to how it was possible for Jesus to obtain a knowledge of the condition of the soul after the death of the body will first be considered. It has already been shown that under certain conditions the soul perceives with absolute accuracy the fixed laws of nature. It has also been shown that the soul does not possess during its sojourn in the flesh the power of inductive reasoning, but that its powers of reasoning deductively from any suggested premise are marvellous. I have ventured to use the expression in that connection, that "the subjective mind reasons deductively with extraordinary acumen." I have not ventured the assertion that its deductions are infallible, though there is good reason to believe that under certain conditions the assertion would be substantially correct. The instances cited of mathematical prodigies would seem to bear out that assertion. The power of perception in them must be perfect, or there would be nothing to distinguish them from other mathematicians. Their answers to mathematical problems, to be remarkable, must be correct.
That they are correct would seem to give us warrant for the inference that under favorable conditions the powers of the soul for correct deductive reasoning, or perception of fixed laws, are perfect. If it is true in mathematics, it must be true in all other matters governed by fixed laws, especially since all the forces of nature are correlated, and all are governed by mathematical laws.
It has also been shown that the deductions of the subjective mind are always logically accurate, even though the premises may be false. Any one who has had experience in dealing with persons in a hypnotic trance will bear me out in that statement.
The question now arises, What are the conditions necessary to give us assurance of infallible deductions from given premises? Before proceeding to discuss that matter, it is proper to premise that it is difficult, in dealing with the subtle forces of the subjective mind, to draw a distinct line between its powers of perception of fixed laws and its powers of deduction from given premises. Its perceptions seem to be instantaneous, and to preclude the idea of the employment of any such processes of reasoning as are known to the logic of objective education.
The distinction seems to be this: If the premises are given from an extraneous source, in the form of a suggestion, the processes of deductive reasoning are employed. If the premises are the result of intuitive perception, the conclusion is also perceived simultaneously. In such a case the whole law pertaining to the subject-matter is perceived at once; and it is inconceivable to the finite mind how any processes of reasoning have been employed. Thus, in the case of Zerah Colburn, his answers to mathematical problems of the most intricate character were given instantaneously, and he was never conscious of employing any process of calculation whatever. Moreover, his answers were always correct.
Now, whether the processes of deductive reasoning employed by the subjective mind lead to infallible results, it is not my purpose to discuss. It is certain that they are marvellously accurate, whether the premises are true or false; but whether they may be relied upon as always correct when the premises are true, I am not prepared to say from the data before me; nor is it important, for my present purpose, to know.
It is certain, however, that where the powers of perception are employed, under proper conditions, the conclusions are infallible.
We have now a starting-point from which we may form a correct estimate of the scientific accuracy of the spiritual philosophy of Jesus.
If we are to concede that his doctrines are true, it is obvious that we must demonstrate the correctness of the following propositions: -
1. That Jesus was endowed with the power to obtain a perfect knowledge of spiritual law by perception or intuition.
2. To demonstrate this we must show, (a) that his knowledge of spiritual law was scientifically accurate; and (3) that it could not have been obtained by the ordinary processes of objective education.
3. To show that his knowledge was accurate, it must be demonstrated that the conclusions arrived at by the inductive processes of modern science are identical with the doctrines that he proclaimed.
It has already been shown that, as far as his physical manifestations are concerned, each of the statements embraced in the foregoing propositions is true. It has been shown that he must have had an intuitive perception of the law of healing by subjective power, for the reasons, first, that in the state of occult knowledge existing in his day, it was impossible that he could have obtained his knowledge by means of objective education; and, secondly, that his knowledge of the law of healing was scientifically accurate, as shown by the fact (a) that he proclaimed and constantly reiterated the essential condition of the exercise of the power of healing precisely as it is known at the present day; (b) that he constantly practised by the methods known at the present day to be the best; (c) that he surrounded himself and his patients with the best attainable aids to the exercise of his powers, - precisely such aids, the utility of which has been demonstrated by modern practice; and (d) that he constantly sought to secure the mental environment which is now known to be of the first importance, if not absolutely essential, to successful mental healing.
In short, it has been shown that he must have understood every principle and every law of mental therapeutics, the rediscovery of which has distinguished the present century.
Reasoning, therefore, from the premises which have thus been established, we have the logical right to infer that he understood all the laws which pertain to the soul. If he understood the laws which govern it in its relations to its physical environment, it is fair to presume that he knew the laws which pertain to its continued existence after it is freed from the trammels of the flesh. Without any further proofs, therefore, we have the logical right to consider the one as presumptive evidence of the other.