A STUDY of the Soul, or of those phenomena of consciousness usually classed under this head, must logically be prefaced by proof that a "soul" really exists. Some doubt arises as to whether this can best be accomplished by an examination of those general evolutionary processes which lead up to the human soul as a necessary sequence, or whether the phenomena of human consciousness itself shall be first considered. As appeal will be taken to both classes of phenomena, it has been thought best to begin with the latter method, leaving the broader and more philosophic generalizations of evolution to follow. The evidence of a soul, then, will be sought first in Human Physiology.

Without cumbering the argument with histological, anatomical, or even physiological details, to be found in the numerous textbooks upon these subjects, let it suffice to state generally that these and allied sciences prove that the human body is a mechanism constructed and controlled from within without, by a central energy called variously "mind," "soul," "spirit," or "Ego," according to the inclination or bias of the writer. The existence of this central energy is disputed by no one; the issue being as to the relation it sustains to the body. Broadly defined, Materialism declares the mind or soul to be the product of the molecular activities going on within the brain; or, if not a direct product, at least a concomitant of these. Under this view, it must necessarily cease to exist when the brain molecules cease their activities. To account for the appearance of a conscious factor as an outcome of purely mechanical motion among molecules, it declares this to be a "property" of matter, capable of being exhibited under certain conditions similarly as electricity may be made to manifest its presence under proper excitation. Spiritualism takes the directly opposite view.

It declares that, while it is true that molecular activities are the counterparts ot conscious experiences in molecularly constructed bodies, the relation of effect is entirely upon the material side; that the mind or soul is causal, and quite superior to and independent of the body, except as this is a mechanism of sense organs constructed and synthesized by it, in order to relate its higher consciousness to material conditions. There can thus be no compromise; one or the other theory errs.

A little examination makes it evident that all thought, emotion, willing, or feeling arise from and in the inner recesses of our being, and are then reflected outwards in speech or action, or remain as unexpressed, subjective ideas or feelings. It is quite true that this inner arousing is apparently due primarily to external stimuli alone, and that all through life external impressions transmuted into sensations form a much larger basis for even the highest intellectual life than would be suspected except upon a searching analysis. But ex nihilo nihil fit; and if there were not present in the body a potential center of consciousness capable of being aroused, external stimuli might knock for eternal ages at the door of life without awakening a conscious response.

Here, at the first step, then, the battle for the existence of the soul begins. For when physiologists or psychologists say, though ever so glibly and confidently, that an external stimulus has been converted through nervous "shock" into a "sense" impression, they are assuming to explain a process of which they have absolutely no knowledge, and which no microscope nor culture chamber has ever demonstrated, nor can ever hops to demonstrate. For, "if by nervous shock be meant a physical event, the break between such shock and the nerve commotion which is its antecedent is absolutely impassable. No physical en rgy, under the general laws of its conservation and correlation, can pass this break";* no lightly leaping across a chasm proves its non-existence. In sound, for example, an entirely mechanical and physical shock has been transmuted into terms of consciousness utterly unlike its cause. Until it can be shown both how and why mechanical motion becomes sensation, two factors must be assumed. These are the receiver and transmitter of the nervous shock or commotion, and the inner observer of this commotion, as it records itself in molecular agitation or changes within the brain.

*Ladd's Physiological Psychology, p. 628, to which magnificent work I am more indebted in the preparation of this chapter than any quotation marks can adequately indicate.

It will be cheerfully admitted that this inner observer is quite dependent upon the physical apparatus for sensation upon and communication with the material universe, but this dependence in no way argues its non-existence as an entity, or the non- possibility of its possessing much higher powers upon its own spiritual plane than its sense organs enable it to display. As has been beautifully pointed out by Prof. Ladd:

"Beings do not lose their reality, or characteristic nature, or value in the universe of Being, because they are causally connected with other beings. On the contrary, none but real beings can thus be connected with each other; none but real beings can act and be acted upon. The so-called causal connection is no bondage of such nature as to destroy the nature of the beings which act under it. Only beings that have natures of their own can be causally connected. In other words, all that appears to us as a causal relation between the objects of our experience is, ultimately considered, due to no material spur or whip which urges, or band that represses, as though one kind of real being could thus dominate and subdue another. No atom acts without being acted on; what it does depends both upon what it is and also upon how it stands related to other atoms."*