Again, if consciousness were a transmutation, in some inconceivable manner, of molecular into psychic activities within the brain, then there ought to be both a specialization of nerve substance and a constant ratio between the brain and mind. But, as Prof. Ladd states:

"So far as we know anything about the particular mdecular activities of the central nervous system which are most directly connected with the phenomena of consciousness, they do not differ essentially from other molecular activities of this system not thus connected with consciousness. The chemical constitution and structural form of the nerve-fibers and nerve-cells of the brain do not differ from those of the spinal cord in any such respect as, of itself, to account for the difference in the relations in which the two stand to conscious mental states. They do not so differ even from the molecules which enter into the living plant or animal, of much lower species, mentally, than man." *

Thus, there is evidently no physical evolution of the ganglionic cells after they have reached a certain point. The most profound philosopher is using cells of the same kind to relate him to sensuous existence as his Darwinian "cousin," the ape. There ought to have been a further and most marked specialization of form and structure if mental activities had been evolved from increasing nervous complexities. Instead of this, there is only an entirely relative - not absolute - increase in the amount of these cells. Is it not evident that "gray matter" is only the pigment, as it were, with which the ape makes his feeble conscious daubs, while man produces magnificent paintings because the pigment in his case is in the hands of superior intelligence?

There is often, too, the most marked divergence between mental and physical evolution. The human child comes into the world perfectly mindless as far as anything beyond reflex action is concerned, yet it is possessed of a most perfect and elaborate nervous system, "far surpassing that of the most intelligent adult animal." Where is the mental activity which ought to have unavoidably accompanied this physical evolution, if the one process arises out of the other? In the first year of the child's life, mental activity makes the most wonderful strides, running far ahead of its supposed physical source. The same inequality attends their relations throughout life. Especially is it marked in old age, where, long after the physical has ceased to progress, and is even rapidly retrogressing, the mind retains all its pristine vigor. Of course, this is seen only in cases of men who have lived a mental life. A man who has passed his existence as an ambulating vegetable decays like one; he has no mind to shine forth amidst the ruins of his body. But the presence of a vigorous mentality connected with great physical decrepitude in but one case proves its possibility in all.

Cases of illness with mental vigor are in point here - in fact, many diseases, by refining and subduing animality, actually increase mentality. Of course, there is a golden mean, and bodily age or disease to the point of cutting off the Ego's hold upon its sense organs must be followed by their ceasing to give evidence of its presence. In such cases mental decrepitude apparently follows upon the physical. But, as already pointed out, there can be no argument drawn from this intimate dependence upon the body by the soul for its conscious relations with this plane against its actual and independent existence. Every entity in nature is dependent upon other entities; the very cells of man's body are made up of countless lives, having their own life history beyond and outside of this association, upon which, nevertheless, they entirely depend. The Ego within the body shows more numerous and important phenomena to entitle it to be claimed as a real unit entity than do any or all physical phenomena on the part of the latter; and if either is to be declared non-existent, it must, by all the laws of logic, be the body, and not the soul.

* Loc. Cit.

But the crowning physiological argument in favor of a soul is in the nature of consciousness itself, and that, as has been pointed out, all its higher spiritual activities can neither be connected with any definite material organ nor proven to arise out of any conceivable mode of molecular motion within the brain.

"For all the higher spiritual faculties," says Lotze, "which consist in judgment of the relations of given conceptions, we neither know how empirically to demonstrate a definite bodily organ, nor should we know how to conceive precisely what such an organ could contribute toward the solution of the most essential part of the problem - that is, the pronouncing of the judgment itself. It is conceivable, on the other hand, that these higher activities might presuppose the complete and clear representation of the content about which the judgment is to be passed, and, consequently, also the undisturbed function of those organs which contribute, first, to perception by the senses; then to its reproduction and combination with other perceptions; and, finally, to the appropriate attachment of feelings of value to each of them." *

Yet this "clear representation of the content about which the judgment is to be passed" must not be conceived of as taking part in the judgment itself. This would land us in the materialistic absurdity of supposing that all the activities of consciousness were only the product of the molecular associations concerned in their representation. As well try to identify the bile as a real physical secretion of hypochondria, or tears as liquid sorrow.

* Loc Cit., p. 558.

In this connection, too much stress can not be laid upon the importance of the unity of consciousness (before referred to), of the Ego, or soul. All our mental faculties are but modes of its behavior. Its presence and native powers are demonstrated by its phenomenal activities. It would be less unphilosophic to deny the existence of electricity than of the center of consciousness at the base of the soul; for all we know concerning the former is drawn entirely from its objective phenomena, while of the latter we have in addition to these its subjective phenomena as well. And although the mental states, perceptions, and sensations may be and are innumerable, they are alike referred to the one subject - the "I" upon which they all rest. Is it a thinkable proposition that the whole possible gamut of conscious experiences could be thus unified in a subject of them all without the real and actual existence of that subject?