"Title cannot be acquired by adverse possession to land which is in a wild state, vacant and unoccupied, and on which no apparent acts of ownership have been performed." Haas v. Wilson, 154 Pac. 1018, 97 Kan. 176; Davis v. Davis, 163 S. W. 468, 157 Ky. 530; Krueger v. Market, 145 N. W. 30, 124 Minn. 393; Jeffers v. Johnson, 175 S. W. (Mo.) 581; Morgan v. Pott, 101 S W. 717, 124 Mo. App. 371; Wiechers v. McCormick, 107 N. Y. Supp. 835. 122 App. Div. 860; Talbot v. Cook, 112 Pac. 709, 57 Or. 535; Chilton v. White, 78 S. E. 1048, 72 W. Va. 545; Driver v. Martin, 60 S. W. 651, 68 Ark. 551.

"Continuous use and occupancy for the time required by law for the purpose of range for cattle and hogs, and repeated occupation for the purpose of cutting timber, will not alone amount to actual possession of lands, within the law declaring that adverse possession of lands, accompanied by written evidence of title for seven years, will ripen into a perfect legal title, though the lands are so situated as to be unfit for actual physical residence, and unfit for cultivation and suitable only for the purpose above named." McCook v. Crawford, 40 S. E. 225, 114 Ga. 337; Nicholson v. Ar-onson, 48 Pac. 917, 58 Kan. 814; De Lancey v. Hawkins, 49 N. Y. Supp. 469, 23 App. Div. 8, judgment affirmed (1900) 57 N. E. 1108, 163 N. Y. 587.

"The inclosure of a tract of land with a large quantity of other lands in a pasture by means of a small amount of fencing, the remainder of the inclosure being by natural barriers, such as streams and bayous, is not such an actual and visible appropriation of such tract as to constitute adverse possession." Hyde v. McFaddin, 140 Fed. 433, 72 C. C. A. 655.

Cases holding acts sufficient to perfect title by adverse possession: Folley v. Thomas, 93 N. E. 181, 45 Ind. App. 559; Thompson v. Still-well, 161 S. W. 681, 253 Mo. 89; Myers v. Mayhew, 32 App. D. C. 205.

"Adverse possession of unproductive lands consisting of barren sand hills cut up by sloughs is shown by recording the deed under which the occupant claims, cutting all the timber of any value thereon, having the land surveyed and boundary lines grubbed out and staked, going upon the land at intervals, claiming absolute ownership, clearing a small portion, building a brush fence around the portion cleared, employing agents in the neighbor hood of the land to look after It, and paying taxes, without proof of actual occupation." Worthley v. Burbanks, 45 N. E. 779, 146 Ind. 534.

Moore v. Hinkle, 50 N. E. 822, 151 Ind. 343. "Neither actual occupation, cultivation, nor residence is necessary to constitute 'actual possession' of property in such sense as to render it adverse to the true owner, where the property is so situated as not to admit of permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party is evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim." McCaughn v. Young, 37 So. 839, 85 Miss. 277.

"Where defendant took possession of ground under color of title in April, 1885, and had ashes and other rubbish removed, and occupied it that year as a garden, and the following year constructed a barn on it, and continued in actual, open and notorious possession under claim of title until June, 1896, he was entitled to a decree of ownership in the ten years statute of limitation." St. Lukes Parish of Cedar Falls v. Miller (Iowa), 84 N. W. 686.

"In an action over a disputed boundary line it appeared that part of the land in dispute was cleared and cultivated by defendant, and the rest allowed to remain in timber, and used by him for cutting timber according to his needs. Held, that an instruction that, to show occupancy, it is not necessary that land be cleared and cultivated, but it is sufficient to show that it has been occupied for any purpose connected with farm usage, is not erroneous." Henry v. Henry, 80 N. W. 800, 122 Mich. 6.

Sproule v. Alabama & V. Railway Co., 29 So. 163, 78 Miss. 88. "Where it appeared that a railroad company built its tracks across lands in controversy in 1868, and from that time to the commencement of the suit, in 1883, occupied and used the land for a right-of-way, and there was no evidence tending to show that the railroad company entered into possession by permission of the plaintiffs, such actual, open, and continuous possession by the railroad company, was of itself, sufficient evidence that the possession was adverse to plaintiff's." Turner v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 542, 20 S. W. 673.

City of Houston v. Finigan (Texas) 85 S. W. 470. "Actual

Lands that are not actually occupied as a residence may be divided into two classes. First: Such lands as are cultivated, improved and inclosed, and second: Such lands as are wild and unimproved.

In the first class, it is generally held that the inclosing and cultivating the lands is sufficient to give the true owner notice that the lands are being held adversely, and if such acts continue for the statutory period it will give the claimant a good title to the lands.43 And though in the interim between harvest and recropping no person was actually on the land, and nothing done thereon, yet if such cropping continued from year to year this would be sufficient to constitute adverse possession.44 Actual physical inclosure by fence is not necessary to title by occupancy of premises, so as to indicate at every instance of time, by mere observation, the extent of the hostile use, it not necessary to satisfy Rev. St. 1893, Sec. 4214, providing that for the purpose of constituting an adverse possession of land shall be deemed to have been occupied only when it has been protected by an inclosure or has been usually cultivated since it need be only such continuous, exclusive, hostile use as in the judgment of the jury, under all the circumstances is sufficient to notify the true owner, actually or constructively, of the invasion of his rights and the actual extent thereof." Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 85 N. W. 402, 109 Wis. 418, 83 Am. St. Rep. 905.