7. Defendant says, that in January, 1919, he orally rented to said Lyle the property described in said bill of complaint, and that on Sunday, the 6th day of April, 1919, he executed with said Lyle the lease, a copy of which is attached to said bill of complaint of said Lyle in said cause, and marked Exhibit "A"; that said lease was dated the 7th day of April, 1919, because said 6th day of April was Sunday; that said lease so made and executed on Sunday has never been changed or ratified by this defendant on any secular day.

8. This defendant further answering, denies that said intervenors have in good faith become interested in the transaction between said plaintiff and this defendant, and they are not good faith contractors for the purchase of said real estate, and he denies that they or either of them are entitled to the relief or any part thereof in their said bill of com plaint demanded, and prays the same advantage of this answer as if he had pleaded or demurred to the said bill of complaint, and prays that the same be dismissed with his reasonable cost and charges in his behalf sustained.

W. J. LAMSON, WM. C. MUNSON,

Attorney for Defendant, Defendant,

B. J. VINCENT, By W. J. LAMSON, Counsel for Defendant. His Attorney, (g) Opinion of the Court.-(Caption.) The Court: This is a case brought on the chancery side of the court, by William Lyle, against William

C. Munson, asking for the specific performance of a contract which the plaintiff claims to have been made with the defendant, with reference to the rental and the purchase of a piece of land consisting of about twenty acres, in the Township of Buena Vista, in this county.

It is the claim of Mr. Lyle, the plaintiff, that he first had oral negotiations with Mr. Munson, the defendant, with reference to the renting of this land, and the purchase of the same, and that as a result of those negotiations an oral agreement was made to the effect that Mr. Lyle was to be permitted to go upon the premises and have the same as the tenant of Mr. Munson, for the period of two years, for which he was to pay him a semi-annual rental of one hundred and fifty dollars. He was also, any time during the period of the lease, to have an option to purchase this land for the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars.

This claim is disputed by the defendant in the case. He admits having talks with the defendant with reference to the renting of the place, but he denies that he, at any time, orally agreed with him that he was to have the privilege at any time during the period of two years, which was to be the rental period, to purchase the land for the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars. He claims the mention of the purchase was made at the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars, but that this had reference to the purchase of the place at the expiration of the period for two years, and if at the end of the lease, of two years, it was the desire of Mr. Lyle to purchase the place for thirty-five hundred dollars, that he had the right to do so, and that he would deed it to him.

That is the first question of fact that becomes necessary for the court to determine. This being a chancery case, it is necessary for the court, unfortunately, to determine the question of fact in the case as well as the questions of law.

I can appreciate the fact that it is not always a pleasant duty for a jury to determine those things, and it is particularly so for the court in a case of this kind.

It is the further claim of the plaintiff in the case that he insisted that this oral agreement be reduced to writing, and to that end called upon Mr. Munson several times, and asked him to do so. Mr. Munson put him off from time to time, because Mr. McDonald, his son-in-law, who was to draw the lease, was busy and was not in a position to attend to the matter at that time. But the plaintiff claims that finally, on the seventh day of April, 1919, being Monday, he went to the home of Mr.

McDonald, where the defendant Mr. Munson lived, and Mr. McDonald did draw up the lease and that the same was signed and executed by both of the parties, and the lease is produced here in court, has been offered and received in evidence, and has been known throughout the trial as Exhibit "A". This lease, among other things, which are the usual covenants and agreements in lease, provides: "Provided further that the said party of the second part shall, on or before the expiration of this lease, have the privilege of buying said above described property for the sum of three thousand five hundred dollars."

The defendant denies that this lease was executed on the 7th day of April, notwithstanding it was dated on that day, and he claims that it was executed on the 6th day of April, the day preceding, which would be on Sunday, and that because of the fact it was executed on Sunday, the lease is absolutely void, that the written lease is absolutely void insofar as affecting the parties.

It becomes the duty of the court to determine as the second question of fact whether or not this lease was executed upon Sunday, as claimed by the defendant, or upon Monday, as claimed by the plaintiff in the case.

The court has no hesitancy in determining, as a matter of fact, in this case, that the lease was executed upon Sunday. The court has had the opportunity of seeing the witnesses upon the stand who testified upon that subject. The great weight of the testimony shows that the contract or the lease was executed on that day. The court has confidence in the testimony of witnesses who have testified to its execution on Sunday; witnesses who are personally known to the court, and in who the court has confidence with respect to their veracity. The court therefore finds that the contract was executed upon Sunday, and so far as the written contract is concerned, is void and of no binding force or effect upon either of the parties in the case.

The other question presented to the court for its consideration is whether or not there has been such a performance of the oral contract to purchase this land as would warrant the court in specifically performing that contract, and to take it out of the statute of frauds, which provides that contracts with reference to the sale of real estate must be in writing.