Monuments are permanent landmarks, established for the purpose of indicating boundaries.147 They may be either natural or artificial.148 Examples of natural monuments are trees, rocks, rivers, etc. Artificial monuments are anything which may be treated by the parties as such. In describing lands by means of monuments, the monuments themselves must be identified, and it is not sufficient to refer to them as "a certain tree" or "stake." 149 Where land is conveyed by descriptions referring to highways or nonnavigable rivers for boundaries, it is taken that the center of the highway or the river is intended.150 When points on the bank of the river or side of the road are named in describing the land convoyed, the cases are in conflict as to whether the boundary is in the center or at the side of the. highway or river.151 An intention may, in any case, be expressed that the grantee shall not take to the center, as where the land is described as bounding on "the side or banks" of the highway or river. In such case the line would not be in the center, but on the edge.152 Where no such intention is

146 New Hampshire Land Co. v. Tilton, 19 Fed. 73.

147 Black, Law Diet. "Monuments."

148 The monuments may be erected by the parties after the conveyance is executed. Makepeace v. Bancroft, 12 Mass. 469; Lerned v. Morrill, 2 N. H. 197149 Drew v. Swift, 46 N. Y. 204; Bagley v. Morrill, 46 Vt. 94.

150 Boston v. Richardson, 13 Allen (Mass.) 146; Highways Berrldge v. Ward, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 400; Champlin v. Pendleton, 13 Conn. 23; Paul v. Carver, 26 Pa. St. 223; Fisher v. Smith, 9 Gray (Mass.) 441; Cox v. Freedley, 33 Pa. St. 124; Bissell v. Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 61; White v. Godfrey, 97 Mass. 472; Dodd v. Witt, 139 Mass. 63, 29 N. E. 475. But see Leigh v. Jack, 5 Exch. Div. 264; Sibley v. Holden, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 249; White's Bank of Buffalo v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 65; Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 87 N. Y. 287; In re Robbins, 34 Minn. 99, 24 N. W. 356.

151 l Dembitz, Land Tit. 72. And see Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 451; Sleeper v. Laconia, 60 N. H. 201; Arnold v. Elmore, 16 Wis. 509; Watson v. Peters, 26 Mich. 508. And, as to artificial streams, see Warner v. South-worth, 6 Conn. 471; Agawam Canal Co. v. Edwards, 36 Conn. 476. Cf. Buck v. Squiers, 22 Vt. 484.

152 Halsey v. Mccormick, 13 N. Y. 296; Child v. Stair, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 369,

§§ 263-264) expressed, but the usual case of the boundary line being in the middle of the road or stream exists, the grantee of the land owns to the boundary line in the center, subject to the easement of the highway or stream.153 The cases are in great confusion on the question of where the boundary line is when the land conveyed is bounded by a navigable river. Three different rules exist in the different states. In some states the land of the riparian proprietor is bounded by high-water mark,154 in other states by low-water mark,155 and in still others he owns to the center of the stream.156 While the body of the Great Lakes is never subjected to riparian ownership, the ponds and smaller lakes from half a mile to three miles in width which are found in the Northwest have caused much difficulty. The same conflict exists as in the case of navigable rivers.157 In any case, if a natural body of water has been raised by artificial means, the boundary lines continue as before the change.158 reversing 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 149; Murphy v. Copeland, 58 Iowa, 409, 10 N. W. 786; Dunlap v. Stetson, 4 Mason, 349, Fed. Cas. No. 4,164. See Lowell v. Robinson, 16 Me. 357.

153 Town of Old Town v. Dooley, 81 111. 255; Fisher v. Rochester, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 225; West Covington v. Freking, 8 Bush (Ky.) 121. And see ante, pp. 361, 368.

154 Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Mcmanus v. Carniichael, 3 Iowa, 1; Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682; Mayor, etc., of City of Mobile v. Eslava. 16 Pet. 234.

155 Union Depot Street-railway & Transfer Co. of Stillwater v. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297, 17 N. W. 626; People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461; Monon-gahela Bridge Co. v. Kirk, 46 Pa. St. 112; Wood v. Appal, 63 Pa. St. 210; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674. And see Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 375; Booth v. Shepherd, 8 Ohio St. 247.

156 Arnold v. Elmore, 16 Wis. 509; Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 308; Fuller v. Dauphin, 124 111. 542, 16 N. E. 917; Fletcher v. Boom Co., 51 Mich. 277, 16 N. W. 645; Webber v. Boom Co., 62 Mich. 626, 30 N. W. 469; Morcan v. Readmg, 3 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 366; Gavit's Adm'rs v. Chambers, 3 Ohio, 496.

157 1 Dembitz, Land Tit. 67; Jefferis v. Land Co., 134 U. S. 17S, 10 Sup. Ct. 518; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. 808, 838; Clute v. Fisher, 65 Mich. 48, 31 N. W. 614; Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139; Trustees of Schools v. Schroll, 120 111. 509, 12 N. E. 243; Cortelyou v. Van Brundt, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 357.

158 Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160. But see Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198.

Courses and Distances.

Land is said to be described by courses and distances when an identified starting point is given, and the boundaries are traced from that point as so many rods or feet in a certain direction, etc.159 When such descriptions are given, the lines are always to be taken as straight lines,160 and directions expressed as "northward," "eastward," etc., mean due north and due east.161 When monuments and courses and distances are both given, the monuments control, and the distances must be lengthened or shortened,162 though the courses and distances will control where such an intention clearly appears in the deed.163 When lands are described according to the congressional survey, and the corners-that is, the monuments-have been lost, the courses and distances, as they appear on the maps and field notes of the surveyor general, will control. But a difficulty arises from the fact that the chains used in making the surveys were often stretched by use, and so more land will be included in the description than would be indicated by the courses and distances. In the federal courts, and in some of the states, it is held, in conformity with the United States statutes,164 that the lost corner shall be established by locating it a proportionate distance from the nearest known corners. In this way the surplus land is divided among the several owners.165 In some states, however, a different rule prevails, and the lost corner is located by measuring the distance which it ought, by an accurate survey, to be from the eastern corner of the township. By this rule the surplus land all goes to the owners on the western side.166

159 As to the use of the words "more or less" in giving courses and distances, see Blaney v. Rice, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 62; Howell v. Merrill, 30 Mich. 283; Williamson v. Hall, G2 Mo. 405.

160 Campbell v. Branch, 4 Jones (N. C.) 313.

161 Jackson v. Reeves, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 295.

162 Preston v. Bowmar, 0 Wheat. 580; Bowman v. Farmer, 8 N. H. 402; Knowles v. Toothaker, 58 Me. 172; White v. Williams, 48 N. Y. 344; Miles v. Barrows, 122 Mass. 579. Cf. Hall v. Eaton, 139 Mass. 217, 29 N. E. 660.

163 Higinbotham v. Stoddard, 72 N. Y. 94; Buffalo, N. Y. & E. R. Co. v. Stigeler, 61 N. Y. 348. And see Hall v. Eaton, 139 Mass. 217, 29 N. E. 660.

164 Rev. St. U. S. § 2390.

165 Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 429; Moreland v. Page, 2 Iowa, 139. 166 Major v. Watson, 73 Mo. 665; Vaughn v. Tate, 64 Mo. 491; Knight v. Elliott, 57 Mo. 317.