110. A mortgage is a conveyance of land as security, and is usually in the form of an estate on condition subsequent.

The discussion of mortgages in this chapter includes only mortgages of real property. A more specific definition of a mortgage than a conveyance of land as a security would exclude some of the many forms which such a conveyance may assume.1 A mortgage

1 1 Jones, Mortg. (5th Ed.) § 16. And see Draper v. Draper, 71 Hun, 349, 24 N. Y. Supp. 1127; Harriman v. Light Co., 163 Mass. 85, 39 N. E. 1004; Anderis an estate on condition subsequent; that is, the mortgagee has an estate which is defeated by the performance of the condition by the mortgagor. The condition is usually for the payment of money, but it may be for the support of the mortgagee,2 or for his indemnity against liability.3 When a mortgage is given to secure a debt, it is usually accompanied by a note or other evidence of indebtedness, though this is not essential to the validity of the mortgage; for there may be a valid mortgage without any personal liability on the part of the mortgagor, for example, when the creditor's only right to payment is out of the mortgaged property,4 or when the mortgage is given to secure a debt of another than the mortgagor5 It will not be presumed that the mortgagor is personally liable, from the mere execution of the mortgage.* The time when the debt is due should be fixed with certainty, so that it may be known when the mortgagor is in default.6 A stipulation providing that, son v. Smith, 103 Mich. 446, 61 N. W. 778; Baum v. Gaffy, 45 I11 App. 13S; Doescher v. Doescher (Minn.) 63 N. W. 736; Leiweke v. Jordan, 59 Mo. App.. 619; Merrill v. Hurley (S. D.) 62 N. W. 958; Strouse v. Cohen, 113 N. a 349„ 18 S. E. 323.

2 Soper v. Guernsey, 71 Pa. St 219; Flanders v. Lamphear, 9 N. H. 201; Hoyt v. Bradley, 27 Me. 242; Austin v. Austin, 9 Vt 420; Hiatt v. Parker, 29 Kan. 765. Unless otherwise provided, the obligation to support is a personal one, and cannot be assigned. Eastman v. Batchelder, 36 N. H. 141; Bethlehem v. Annis, 40 N. H 34; Bryant v. Erskine, 55 Me. 153. But contra, Joslyn v. Parlin, 54 Vt 670. And see Bodwell Granite Co. v. Lane, 83 Me. 168, 21 Atl. 829.

3 Lyle v. Ducomb, 5 Bin. (Pa.) 585; Gardner v. Webber, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 407; Commercial Bank v. Cunningham, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 270; Adams v. Niemann, 46 Mich. 135, 8 N. W. 719; Duncan v. Miller, 64 Iowa, 223, 20 N. W. 161

4 1 Jones, Mortg. (5th Ed.) § 70; Hodgdon v. Shannon, 44 N. H. 572. As to description of the indebtedness, see Usher v. Skate Co., 163 Mass. 1, 39 N. E. 416; Merrill v. Elliott, 55 111. App. 34; Bo wen v. Ratchff, 140 Ind. 393, 39 N. E. 860; Harper v. Edwards, 115 N. C. 246, 20 S. E. 392.

5 Chittenden v. Gossage, 18 Iowa, 157; New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Hagan, 1 La. Ann. 62.

* 1 Jones, Mortg. (5th Ed.) § 678; Tusk y. Ridge, 41 N. Y. 201; Smith r. Rice, 12 Daly (N. Y.) 307; Coleman v. Van Rensselaer, 44 How. Prac (N. Y.) 368.

6 1 Jones, Mortg. (5th Ed.) § 75. When the mortgage is to secure a note, the mortgagor is entitled to days of grace. Coffin r. Loring, 5 Allen (Mass.) on default of payment of any installment of interest or principal, the whole debt shall become due, is valid.7

111. The parties to a mortgage must be competent to convey and hold real property.

As to the parties who are competent to execute a mortgage,8 it may be said that any one may be a mortgagor who has the capacity to transfer real property,9 and any one may be a mortgagee who can hold real property.10