Tests of validity.

K. & J. 223 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 196 ; Robson v. M'Creight, (1858) 25 Beav. 272; 27 L. J. Ch. 471.

(u) Re Carl Hirth, 1899, 1 Q. B. 612, 620; 68 L. J. Q. B. 287; cf. Alton v. Harrison, inf., at p. 620 ; Ex parte Games, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 314, 324.

(x) Godfrey v. Poole, (1888) 13 A. C. 497, 503 ; Masheleyne v. Smith, 1903, 1 K. B. 671 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 237, 240.

(y) Re Holland, 1902, 2 Ch. 360, 373; 71 L. J. Ch. 518.

(z) Janes v. Whitbread, (1851) 11 C. B. 406 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 217 ; Godfrey v. Toole, (1888) 13 A. C. 497,

502

(a) Owen v. Body, (1836) 5 A. & E. 28 ; 5 L. J. N. S. K. B. 191 ; see 11 C. B. 418; and Holt v. Kelly, (1849) 13 Ir. L. R. 33 ; see Masheleyne v. Smith, 1903, 1 K. B. 671, 676 ; 72 L. J. K. B. 237, 240.

(b) Maskeleyne v. Smith, sup.

(c) Alton v. Harrison, (1869) 4 Ch. 622 ; Boldero v. London and Westminster Discount Co., (1879) 5 Ex. D. at p. 51; see and distinguish Spencer v.Slater,(1878)4Q.B.D. 13; 48L.J. Q. B. 480 ; also Maskeleyne v. Smith, sup., where these cases are referred to.

Where a husband being entitled jure mariti to property makes a proper settlement thereof, the fact that he makes the life interest reserved in the settlement to himself determinable on bankruptcy, does not, in the absence of evidence of indebtedness by the husband at the date of the settlement, or of an intention on his part to enter upon a speculative business, raise the inference that the settlement was fraudulent under the Act (i); nor, it seems, is such a limitation void against the husband's trustee in bankruptcy (/»•).

Life interest determinable on bankruptcy.

(d) Edwards v. Harben, (1788) 2 T. K. 587.

(e) Latimer v. Batson, (1825) 4 B. & C. 652 ; 4 L. J. (0. S.) K. B. 25; see Coote on Mortgages, 7th ed. 185 -187.

(f) Middleton v. Pollock, (1870) 2 Ch. D. 104 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 293 ; approved in New Prance and Garrard's Trustee v. Hunting, 1897, 2 Q. B. 19 ;

66 L. J. Q. B. 554

(g) Smith v. Pilgrim, (1876) 2 Ch. D. 127, and oases there cited.

(h) Golden v. Gillam, (1881) 20 Ch. D. 389 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 154, 503.

(i) Re Holland, 1902, 2 Ch. 360, and cases there cited at p. 373.

(k) lb. at p. 381 ; see Williams on Bankruptcy, 8th ed. 204, 205.

Where a recovery was suffered by A., tenant for life, and B., his son, tenant in tail in remainder, and by the deed leading the uses of the recovery, A.'s life estate was limited to B., in order to defraud A.'s creditors, and, subject thereto, the property was settled on B. for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail, but B. was not privy to the fraud, it was held that the recovery was good, and that the deed leading the uses was bad; so that A.'s life estate passed to his assignees in a subsequent bankruptcy, and subject thereto, B. became entitled in fee simple (7). A voluntary conveyance with the intention of depriving the plaintiff in an action of the fruits of his verdict has been held to be void (m) ; so, also, where the object of the deed was to defeat proceedings under a winding-up order (n). But the intention to defraud must be clear; thus, where A. married in Hong Kong on May 31st, and on October 8th in the same year was served with a writ in a breach of promise action, brought against him in England, and nine days later made a voluntary settlement of a fund which had fallen into possession on May 11th, a fact of which he had not been aware when he married, the settlement was held to be good, there being no sufficient evidence of an intention to "delay, hinder, or defraud creditors " (o) ; and a conveyance, pending an action or judgment, is not necessarily void if supported by a valuable consideration (p).

Tarleton v. Liddell.

It has been held that a conveyance can be set aside as fraudulent against creditors only at the instance of a person who was a creditor at the time; though, when it shall have been set aside, subsequent creditors may be let in (q) : but the former branch of the proposition cannot now be relied on (r) ; except perhaps in cases where all debts due at the date of the deed have been paid, and there is no evidence of an intention to defraud future creditors (s); or in cases where the deed is impeached only on account of the presumption of fraud which arises from its being voluntary (t). The whole subject was fully considered in the case of Spirett v. Willows (u) ; in which Lord Westbury expressed his opinion that the following conclusions were well founded : - "If the debt of the creditor by whom the voluntary settlement is impeached existed at the date of the settlement, and it is shown that his remedy is defeated or delayed by the existence of the settlement, it is immaterial whether the debtor was, or was not, solvent, after making the settlement (x) ; but if a voluntary settlement, or deed of gift, be impeached by subsequent creditors, whose debts had not been contracted at the date of the settlement, then it is necessary to show, either that the settlor made the settlement with express intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, or that, after the settlement, he had not sufficient means or reasonable expectation of being able to pay his then existing debts - that is to say, was reduced to a state of insolvency ; in which case the law infers that the settlement was made with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, and is, therefore, fraudulent and void(y). Where a trader settled all his property, present as well as future, reserving to himself the control over his stock in trade, and continued to trade, the settlement was held to be void as against his creditors, though he did not appear to have been indebted at the date of its execution (s). And where a father had given to a bank a guarantee to secure his son's balance up to £1,000, and, when it was already overdrawn to the extent of £1,500, made a voluntary settlement of leaseholds worth £200 a year subject to a ground rent of £3 10s. 0d.-his only other property being a small amount of furniture and a debt of £1,500 due from his same son- it was held that the settlement was void as against creditors, as amounting in fact to a settlement of all the settlor's property, since the liability under the guarantee must be regarded as substantial, and the settlor would, after the settlement, have nothing to meet that liability except the debt due from his son, which ex hypothesi could only be a dividend on his son's estate (a).