This section is from the book "Dart's Treatise On The Law And Practice Relating To Vendors And Purchasers Of Real Estate", by J. Henry Dart . Also available from Amazon: A treatise on the law and practice relating to vendors and purchasers of real estate.
When right of action accrues for withdrawal of support.
(n) Gale, 10th ed. p. 378.
(o) Backhouse v. Bonomi, sup., overruling Nicklin v. Williams, (1854) 10 Ex. 259; 23 L. J. Ex. 335; see, too, Elliot v. N. E. R. Co., (1863) 10 H. L. C. 333; 32 L. J. Ch. 402.
(p) A.-g. v. Conduit Colliery Co., 1895, 1 Q. B. 301; 64 L. J. Q. B. 207.
(q) Elliot v. N. E. R. Co., Siddons v. Short, and Rigby v. Bennett, ubi sup.
(r) Parley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, (1886) 11 A. C. 127; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; overruling Lamb v. Walker, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 389; 45 L. J. Q. B. 551; see also Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board, 1891, 1 Q. B. 503; 60 L. J. Q. B. 392; Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Coat Co., 1897, 2 Q. B. 165; 66 L. J. Q. B. 643; Gale, 10th ed. 351.
(s) Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Coal Co., sup.; Hall v. Duke of Norfolk, 1900, 2 Ch. 493; 69 L. J. Ch. 571; Goddard, 8th ed. 478.
A reservation or grant of minerals with power to work them does not, in the absence of express stipulation, deprive the surface owner of his natural right to the support of the subjacent strata; the presumption being that he is entitled to enjoy the surface modo et forma as it was before (u), even though special provision is made for compensation in the event of damage being done (x). And the right of support which a surface owner is presumed to retain for himself on a sale of minerals, belongs equally to an allottee under an inclosure, where the minerals and the right to work them are reserved to the lord of the manor (y). The ordinary presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the Inclosure Act or deed of grant contains "words, however large, applicable to the right of working, and privileges conneoted with it, and compensation to be paid for working, and for the use of those privileges which may receive full effect consistently with the right of support" (z). But if it is contemplated that the minerals will be worked and the parties are aware that it is impracticable for the same to be worked without letting down the surface, the right to let down may be inferred (d).
Right of surface owner to support where minerals and the right to work them are severed.
(t) W. Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunnicliffe & Sampson, Ld., 1908, A. C. 27.
(u) Dugdale v. Robertson, (1857) 3 K. & J. 695; 3 Jur. N. S. 687; Rogers v. Taylor, (1868) 2 H. & N. 828; 27 L. J. Ex. 173; Harris v. Ryding, (1839) 5 M. & W. 60; and Smart v. Morton, (1855) 5 E. & B. 30; 24 L. J. Q. B. 60; and see Rowbotham v. Wilson, (1860) 8 H. L. C. 348; 27 L. J. Q. B. 61, where there was an express stipulation; Davis v. Treharne, (1881) 6 A. C. 460; 50 L. J. Q. B. 665; Dixon v. White, (1883) 8 A. G. 833; Love v. Bell, (1884) 9 A. C. 286; 53 L. J. Q. B. 257; Bishop Auckland, etc. Soc. v. Butterknowle Coll. Co., 1904, 2 Oh. 419, 423; 1906, A. C. 305; New Moss Coll. Co. v. Manchester Corp., 1908, A. C. 117.
(x) New Sharlston Collieries Co. v. Earl of Westmoreland, (1900) 82 L. T. 725 (H. L.); 73 L. J. Ch. 338, n. (5); Butterknowle Coll. Co. v. Bishop Auckland, etc. Soc, 1906, A. C. p. 309.
(y) S. C; Roberts v. Haines, (1856) 6 E. & B. 643; 25 L. J. Q. B. 353; Wakefield v. Luke of Buccleuch, (1867) 4 Eq. 613.
(z) Love v. Bell, (1884) 9 A. C. 286, 289; 53 L. J. Q. B. 257; Gill v. Lickinson, (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 159; 49 L. J. Q. B. 267; and cf. Benfieldside Local Board v. Consett Iron Co., (1877) 3 Ex. D. 54; 47 L. J. Ex. 49; see, too, Davis v. Treharne, (1881) 6 A. C. 469; 50 L. J. Q. B. 665; and Dixon v. White, (1883) 8 A. C. 833; Consett Water v. Ritson, (1889) 22 Q. B. D. 702; Bell v. Earl of Dudley, 1895, 1 Ch. 182; 64 L. J. Ch. 291; Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Coal Co., 1897,
Where A., by draining his land, causes a subsidence of the land of B., an adjoining owner, he is not liable for the injury thus occasioned, the Common Law doctrine as to the right to support not extending to subterranean water (b). It does, however, extend to an underground stratum of quicksand or pitch (c).
The absolute owner of a mineral stratum, whether under a grant or a reservation, is entitled to use it for any purpose he thinks fit, not inconsistent with the rights of the owner of the surface, e.g., as a means of access to adjoining mineral property (d). The effect of a reservation of mines is that the space of sub-soil containing the minerals, as well as the minerals therein, remain the property of the grantor, whether the minerals have been worked out or not (e). But this was not so in the case of copyholds, where, though the minerals
-were the lord's, yet the space formerly occupied by them belonged after they had been worked out to the copyholder, who could maintain trespass against anyone using the vacant space (f); unless the mine, as well as the minerals, was by Act of Parliament expressly reserved to the lord (g). This principle will, it seems, apply in the case of land enfranchised under the L. P. Act, 1922, where mines and minerals remain in the lord and there is no agreement to the contrary (h).
A reserve stratum may be used for all purposes, but not by lord of manor as against his copyholder.
2 Q. B. 165; 66 L. J. Q. B. 643; Butterknowle Coll. Co. v. Bishop Auckland Industrial, etc. Soc, sup. But see Consett Industrial, etc. Soc. v. Consett Iron Co., 1922, 2 Oh. 135. ,
(a) Butterley Co. v. New Hucknall Coll. Co., 1909, 1 Ch. 37; 1910, A. C. 381; Davies v. Powell Duffryn, etc. Co., 1917, 1 Oh. 488; Consett Industrial, etc. Soc. v. Consett Iron Co., 1922, 2 Oh. 135.
(b) Popplewell v. Hodkinson, (1869) L. R. 4 Ex. 248; 38 L. J. Ex. 126; and see Wilson v. Waddell, (1876) 2 A. C. 95; 35 L. T. 639; English v. Met. Water Bd., 1907, 1 K. B. 588, 602.
(c) Jordeson v. Sutton, Southcoates & Drypool Gas Co., 1899, 2 Ch. 217; 68 L. J. Ch. 457; Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Ambard, 1899, A. C. 594; 68 L. J. P. C. 114; Fletcher v. Birkenhead Corp., 1907, 1 K. B. 205, 208.
(d) Proud v. Bates, (1865) 34 L. J. Ch. 406; 12 L. T. 565; Duke of Hamilton v. Graham, (1871) L. R. 2 Sc. & D. 166; 7 Macph. 970, more fully reported in 7 Ct. Sess. Ca. 3rd ser. 976; and see also Duke of Hamilton v. Dunlop, (1885) 10 A. C. 813.