The right of the mortgagee to sue on the covenant arises when the covenantor is in default according to the terms of the covenant, but the time for payment may be impliedly extended as to the result of subsequent transactions between the parties. By a covenant in a mortgage dated the 4th September, 1857, the mortgagor covenanted and the defendant covenanted as his surety for the payment of. the mortgage debt of £450 on the 4th of March, 1858. By a deed dated the 15th December, 1884, the above mentioned mortgage and various other mortgages given by the mortgagor were consolidated, the plaintiff advancing the total sum of £3200 for payment to the various mortgagees of the amounts of their claims, and taking assignments of the mortgage debts and the mortgaged properties, "with the full benefit of the covenants" contained in the various mortgages; and the mortgagor covenanted with the plaintiff for the payment of £3200 on the 19th January, 1885. The defandant was not a party to the deed. It was held that the covenant in the deed necessarily implied that the principal debtor could not be sued for the

(h) Gordon v. Warren, 1897, 24 O.A.R. 44. (i) See the Infants Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 153. (j) Brown v. Grady, 1899, 31 O.R. 73.

£450 under the covenant in the mortgage of 1857 before the 19th January, 1885, and consequently there had been a giving of time to the principal debtor by which the defendant as surety was discharged from liability (k).

If money is payable on a certain day, the debtor has the whole of that day for payment and the creditor is not entitled to commence an action until the following day (I). If, however, the debtor has made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, a debtor whose debt has not accrued due may prove his claim and vote at meetings of creditors, but in ascertaining the amount of the creditor's claim a deduction for interest shall be made for the time which has to run until the claim becomes due (m).

Where there is a condition for payment of a sum at a time and at a place certain, the condition is not broken by nonpayment at the time unless a demand for payment is made at the place specified (n). In other cases, apart from a stipulation to the contrary, a demand is not a condition precedent to the bringing of an action against a principal debtor even if he has covenanted or promised to pay on demand, but it has been held that if a surety covenants or promises to pay on demand, he must be requested to pay before he is sued (o).

In case a demand is required by the terms of the contract, a verbal demand is sufficient unless a demand in writing is expressly stipulated for. If a demand is left for the debtor at his place of business there will be no default until the debtor shall have had a reasonable opportunity of receiving the notice (p).

(k) Bolton v. Buckenham, [1891] 1 Q.B. 278.

(l) Kennedy v. Thomas, [1894] 2 Q.B. 759.

(m) The Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 134, s. 26, sub-s. 5.

(n) Thorn v. City Rice Mills, 1889, 40 Ch.D. 357.

(o) In re Brown's Estate, Brown v. Brown, [1893] 2 Ch. 300. Generally speaking, even a surety may be sued without previous demand. Hitchcock v. Humphrey, 1843, 5 Man. & G. 559.

In case no place is named for payment it is the duty of the mortgagor to seek out the mortgagee and pay him, unless the mortgagee shall have gone abroad after the making of the mortgage; but if the mortgagee was abroad when the contract was made the mortgagor must pay him abroad (q).