Closely related to consolidation and depending like it on the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity is another set of cases which are commonly called tacking '(u), but which do not raise any question of priority between different mortgagees of the same property and are therefore not affected by the provisions of the Registry Act. In order to avoid circuity of action, a mortgagor's heirs or devisees were not permitted to redeem the mortgage without also paying a bond or judgment debt owing by the mortgagor because the equity of redemption in the hands of the heirs or devisees was assets for the payment of such a debt (v). So, since lands are assets for the payment of all kinds of debts, simple contract debts may be tacked as against the heirs or devisees (w), and now that real estate devolves upon the personal representative of a deceased person, the same right of tacking exists against the personal representative (x). But this tacking is allowed only for the purpose of avoiding circuity of action and it cannot be made use of so as to gain priority as to unsecured debts over other creditors (y). Debts which have not been incurred on the security of the land cannot be tacked either as against the mortgagor or persons claiming under him inter vivos (z).

(t) The same principle would apply in the case of charges or mortgages made under the Land Titles Acts. Reeves v. Konschur, 1909, 2 S.L.R. 125.

(u) See 21 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 333; 2 W. & T.L.C. Eq. 143-144.

(v) McLaren v. Fraser, 1870, 17 Gr. 533.

(w) Rolfe v. Chester, 1855, 20 Beav. 610; Thomas v. Thomas, 1856, 22 Beav. 341.

(x) 21 Halsbury, op. cit., p. 333.

(y) Pile v. Pile, 1875, 23 W.R. 440; Heams v. Bance, 1748, 3 Atk. 630; Adams v. Claxton, 1801, 6 Ves. 226; Rolfe v. Chester, supra; Irby v. Irby, 1855, 22 Beav. 217.

(z) Coleman v. Winch, 1721, 1 P. Wms. 775; Trough ton v. Troughton, 1748, 1 Ves. Sen. 86; Adams v. Claxton, supra; Richardson v. Horton, 1843, 7 Beav. 112, at p. 123; Ferguson v. Frontenae, 1874, 21 Gt. 188.