(11) Where the estate or interest claimed is an estate or interest in reversion or remainder, or other future estate or interest, and no person has obtained the possession or receipt of the profits of such land, or the receipt of such rent, in respect of such estate or interest, such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which such estate or interest became an estate or interest in possession.

(12) A right to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover any land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued, in respect of an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or other future estate or interest at the time at which the same became an estate or interest in possession, by the termination of any estate or estates in respect of which such land has been held or the profits thereof or such rent have been received, notwithstanding that the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom he claims, has, at any time previously to the creation of the estate or estates which have determined, been in the possession or receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent.

7.- (1) If the person last entitled to any particular estate on which any future estate or interest was expectant has not been in the possession or receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent, at the time when his interest determined, no such entry or distress shall be made and no such action shall be brought by any person becoming entitled in possession to a future estate or interest, but within ten years next after the time when the right to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action for the recovery of such land or rent, first accrued to the person whose interest has so determined, or within five years next after the time when the estate of the person becoming entitled in possession has become vested in possession, whichever of those two periods is the longer.

(a) As to a mortgagor in possession, see chapter 22, Action for Possession, Sec. 213.

(2) If the right of any such person to make such entry or distress, or to bring any such action, has been barred no person afterwards claiming to be entitled to the same land or rent in respect of any subsequent estate or interest under any deed, will or settlement executed or taking effect after the time when a right to make an entry or distress or to bring an action for the recovery of such land or rent, first accrued to the owner of the particular estate whose interest has so determined, shall make any such entry or distress, or bring any such action, to recover such land or rent.

(3) Where the right of any person to make an entry or distress or to bring an action to recover any land or rent to which he has been entitled for an estate or interest in possession, has been barred by the determination of the period which is applicable in such case, and such person has, at any time during such period, been entitled to any other estate, interest, right, or possibility, in reversion, remainder or otherwise, in or to the same land or rent, no entry, distress or action shall be made or brought by such person, or by any person claiming through him, to recover such land or rent in respect of such other estate, interest, right or possibility, unless in the meantime such land or rent has been recovered by some person entitled to an estate, interest or right which has been limited or taken effect after or in defeasance of such estate or interest in possession.

8. For the purposes of this Act, an administrator claiming the estate or interest of the deceased person of whose property he has been appointed administrator, shall be deemed to claim as if there had been no interval of time between the death of such deceased person and the grant of the letters of administration.

9. No person shall be deemed to have been in possession of any land, within the meaning of this Act, merely by reason of having made an entry thereon.

10. No continual or other claim upon or near any land shall preserve any right of making an entry or distress, or of bringing an action.

11. No descent cast, discontinuance or warranty, which has happened or been made since the 1st day of July, 1834, or which may hereafter happen or be made, shall toll or defeat any right of entry or action for the recovery of land.

12. Where any one or more of several persons entitled to any land or rent as coparceners, joint tenants or tenants in common has or have been in possession or receipt of the entirety, or more than his or their undivided share or shares of such land, or of the profits thereof, or of such rent for his or their own benefit, or for the benefit of any person or persons other than the person or persons entitled to the other share or shares of the same land or rent, such possession or receipt shall not be deemed to have been the possession or receipt of or by such last mentioned person or persons, or any of them.

13. Where a relation of the persons entitled, as heirs, to the possession or receipt of the profits of any land, or to the receipt of any rent, enters into the possession or receipt thereof, such possession or receipt shall not be deemed to be the possession or receipt of or by the persons entitled as heirs.

The possession of the mortgagor is not adverse to the rights of the mortgagee, and the statute does not begin to run against the mortgagee, until his right to bring the action arises (b). When the mortgage provides for possession by the mortgagor until default the right of action arises when the mortgagor has made default. If, however, the mortgage deed does not contain a provision that the mortgagor shall be entitled to remain in possession, the time will begin to run from the date of the mortgage (c). In the case of a mortgage payable on demand, the right of action arises immediately upon the execution of the mortgage, and a demand is not necessary (d).

Under a mortgage containing the statutory provision that in default of the payment of the interest the principal shall become payable, default in payment of interest has the effect of making the principal payable as if the time for payment had fully come, and a right of action therefore then arises and the Statute of Limitation then begins to run (e).

It has been held that the registration of a discharge of mortgage has the effect of revesting the title in the mortgagor and gives a new starting point in favour of the mortgagor as against a person claiming possession adversely (f).

(b) Doe d. Jones v. Williams, 1836, 5 A. & E. 291; Wrixon v. Vize, 1842, 3 Dr. & War. 104.

(c) Doe d. Roylance v. Lightfoot, 1841, 8 M. &. W. 553.

(d) In re Brown's Estate, Brown v. Brown, [1893] 2 Ch. 300.

(e) McFadden v. Brandon, 1904, 8 O.L.R. 610.

In the case of a future estate or interest the right to bring an action continues for ten years after the estate has become an estate in possession, even although the action on the covenant has been in the meantime barred by lapse of time (g).

The statute runs against a second mortgagee notwithstanding that the prior mortgagee is in possession during the whole or part of the statutory period, the second mortgagee's interest not being a future interest within the meaning of sub-s. 11 of s. 6 (h). Similarly the statute runs against a mortgagee of the fee simple notwithstanding the existence of a prior lease for 21 years. The interest mortgaged in such case is properly described, not as being a remainder of freehold expectant upon the term of years, but as being the freehold in possession subject to the term. Inasmuch as the object of a foreclosure action is not to obtain the payment of rent but to deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem, the fact that the mortgagee will not by bringing his action derive any immediate pecuniary benefit from the rents and profits-because, for instance, the rent is a peppercorn or has been paid in advance-will not prevent time from running under the statute (i).

One Sootheran, having obtained a registered conveyance of the land in suit from one of the respondents, executed, more than ten years before action, a reconveyance to both respondents, indorsing thereon a forged certificate of registration, and later on mortgaged it to the appellants within the said ten years. It was held that the respondents were not protected by the Limitations Act. The reconveyance was valid between the parties thereto, and no action could have been brought against them before the date of the appellants' mortgage, which was within the statutory period (j).

(f) Henderson y. Henderson, 1896, 23 O.A.R. 577; see, however, Noble v. Noble, 1912, 27 O.L.R. 342, 9 D.L.R. 735.

(g) Hugill v. Wilkinson, 1888, 38 Ch.D. 480.

(h) Samuel Johnson & Sons v. Brock, [1907] 2 Ch. 533.

(i) Wakefield and Barnsley Union Bank v. Yates, [1916] 1 Ch. 452.

The English statute of 1833, 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, s. 26, provided for the case of concealed fraud. The corresponding provision in Ontario is contained in R.S.O. 1914, c. 75, ss. 32 and 33, as follows:

32. In every case of a concealed fraud the right of any person to bring an action for the recovery of any land or rent of which he or any person through whom he claims may have been deprived by such fraud shall be deemed to have first accrued at and not before the time at which such fraud was or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered.

33. Nothing in the next preceding section shall enable any owner of land or rent to bring an action for the recovery of such land or rent, or for setting aside any conveyance thereof, on account of fraud against any purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration, who has not assisted in the commission of such fraud, and who, at the time that he made the purchase did not know.and had no reason to believe that any such fraud had been committed.

It has been held that s. 32 must be strictly construed. "Concealed fraud" is not to be inferred from the simple fact that a person has got possession under a false assertion of title (k). Fraud, to take a case out of the statute, must be the fraud of the person who seeks the protection of the statute or his agent (I).