There was at Bath, in this State, a saw-mill propelled by steam, generally called the steam saw-mill. Suppose this establishment had been conveyed by the name of the steam saw-mill, without a more particular description. What would pass? There is nothing in the books with respect to this species of property, for it is of quite modern invention; and there is no other mill of the kind in this part of the country. If you exclude such parts of the machinery as may be detached without injury to the other parts or to the building, you leave it mutilated, incomplete, and insufficient to perform its intended operations. The parties in using the general term would intend to embrace whatever was essential to it, according to its nature and design; and the law would doubtless so construe the conveyance as to effectuate the lawful intention of the parties. Salt-pans have been held to pass with the realty, and to belong to the inheritance; because adapted and designed for and incident to an establishment for the manufacture of salt. The principle is that certain things, personal in their nature, when fitted and prepared to be used with real estate, change their character, and appertain to the realty, as au incident or accessory to its principal. Upon this ground we are satisfied that the chain in question, being in the mill at the time, and essential to its beneficial enjoyment, passed by the deed of the defendant to Asa Redington, under whom the plaintiffs claim, independent of any reference to usage. The verdict is therefore sutained, although not upon a ground in accordance with the impressions of the judge who presided at the trial. This, we think, upon the whole, a fair application of the principles of law to the case. Had the term mill, however, by uniform and general usage, been understood not to embrace the chain, a different construction would no doubt have obtained; for it is a term of art the proper meaning of which would be fixed by the general understanding of those who are skilled and experienced in it. If they were not agreed, the law would adopt that which was most general, and which would best accord with the nature and character of the subject-matter. The jury have found, upon the evidence submitted to them, that by general and uniform usage the chain passed by a deed of the mill. This finding was somewhat stronger than the evidence warranted. It did appear that there had been exceptions to this usage, but the weight of evidence went to support it. At any rate, it is apparent that the usage is rather in favor than against the construction we have adopted. But as we are of opinion that the title of the plaintiffs is well supported by the deed, independent of usage, it becomes unnecessary to decide upon the competency or effect of the testimony adduced upon this point.

Judgment on the verdict.

Snedeker V. Warring

12 New York, 170. - 1854..

Action to recover the value of a statue and sun-dial withheld by defendant from plaintiff. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Parker, J. - The facts in this case are undisputed, and it is a question of law whether the statue and sun-dial were real or personal property. The plaintiffs claim they are personal property, having purchased them as such under an execution against Thorn. The defendant claims they are real property, having bought the farm on which they were erected at a foreclosure sale under a mortgage, executed by Thorn before the erection of the statue and sun-dial, and also as mortgagee in possession of another mortgage, executed by Thorn after their erection; the claim of the defendant under the mortgage sale is not impaired by the fact that the property in controversy was put on the place after the execution of the mortgage. Corliss v. Van Sagin, 29 Maine R. 115 ; Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 4 Metc. R. 306. Permanent erections and other improvements, made by the mortgagor on the land mortgaged, become a part of the realty and are covered by the mortgage. In deciding whether the property in controversy was real or personal, it is not to be considered as if it were a question arising between landlord and tenant, but it is governed by the rules applicable between grantor and grantee. The doubt thrown upon this point by the case of Taylor v. Townsend, 8 Mass. R. 411, is entirely removed by the later authorities, which hold that, as to fixtures, the same rule prevails between mortgagor and mortgagee as between grantor and grantee. 15 Mass. 159; 4 Metc. R. 306; 3 Edw. Ch. R. 246; 1 Hilliard on Mortgages, 294 note /, and cases there cited; and see Bishop v. Bishop, 1 Kern. 123, 126.

Governed, then, by the rule prevailing between grantor and grantee, if the statue and dial were fixtures, actual or constructive, they passed to the defendant as part of the realty. No case has been found in either the English or American courts, deciding in what cases statuary placed in a house or in grounds shall be deemed real and in what cases personal property. This question must, therefore, be determined upon principle. All will agree that statuary exposed for sale in a workshop, or wherever it may be before it shall be permanently placed, is personal property; nor will it be controverted that where statuary is placed upon a building, or so connected with it as to be considered part of it, it will be deemed real property, and pass with a deed of the land. But the doubt in this case arises from the peculiar position and character of this statue, it being placed in a court-yard before the house, on a base erected on an artificial mound raised for the purpose of supporting it. The statue was not fastened to the base by either clamps or cement, but it rested as firmly on it by its own weight, which was three or four tons, as if otherwise affixed to it. The base was of masonry, the seams being pointed with cement, though the stones were not laid in either cement or mortar; and the mound was an artificial and permanent erection, raised some two or three feet above the surrounding land, with a substantial stone foundation.