If the statue had been actually affixed to the base by cement or clamps, or in any other manner, it would be conceded to be a fixture and to belong to the realty. But, as it was, it could have been removed without fracture to the base on which it rested. But is that circumstance controlling? A building of wood, weighing even less than this statue, but resting on a substantial foundation of masonry, would have belonged to the realty. A thing may be as firmly affixed to the land by gravitation as by clamps or cement. Its character may depend much upon the object of its erection. Its destination, the intention of the person making the erection, often exercise a controlling influence, and its connection with the land is looked at principally for the purpose of ascertaining whether that intent was that the thing in question should retain its original chattel character, or whether it was designed to make it a permanent accession to the lands. * * *

No evidence could be received more satisfactory of the intent of the proprietor to make a statue part of his realty, than the fact of his having prepared a niche or erected a permanent base of masonry expressly to receive it; and to remove a statue from its place, under such circumstances, would produce as great an injury and do as much violence to the freehold, by leaving an unseemly and uncovered base, as it would have done if torn rudely from a fastening by which it had been connected with the land. The mound and base in this case, though designed in connection with the statue as an ornament to the grounds, would, when deprived of the statue, become a most objectionable deformity.

There are circumstances in this case, * * * greatly strengthening the presumption of such intent. The base was made of red sandstone, the same material as the statue, giving to both the statue and base the appearance of being but a single block, and both were also of the same material as the house. The statue was thus peculiarly fitted as an ornament for the grounds in front of that particular house. It was also of colossal size, and was not adapted to any other destination than a permanent ornament to the realty. The design and location of the statue were in every respect appropriate, in good taste, and in harmony with the surrounding objects and circumstances.

I lay entirely out of view in this case the fact that Thorn testified that he intended to sell the statue when an opportunity should offer. His secret intention in that respect can have no legitimate bearing on the question. He clearly intended to make use of the statue to ornament his grounds, when he erected for it a permanent mound and base; and a purchaser had a right so to infer and to be governed by the manifest and unmistakable evidences of intention. It was decided by the Court of Cassation in France, in Hornelle v. Enregistr. 2 Ledru Rollin, Journal du Palais, Repertoire, etc., 214, that the destination which gives to movable objects an immovable character results from facts and circumstances determined by the law itself, and could neither be established nor taken away by the simple declarations of the proprietor, whether oral or written. There is as much reason in this rule as in that of the common law, which deems every person to have intended the natural consequences of his own acts.

There is no good reason for calling the statue personal because it was erected for ornament only, if it was clearly designed to be permanent. If Thorn had erected a bower or summer-house of wicker-work, and had placed it on a permanent foundation in an appropriate place is front of his house, no one would doubt it belonged to the realty; and I think this statue as clearly belongs to the realty as a statue would placed on the house, or as one of two statues placed on the gate-posts at the entrance to the grounds.

An ornamental monument in a cemetery is none the less real property because it is attached by its own weight alone to the foundation designed to give it perpetual support.

It is said the statues and sphinxes of colossal size which adorn the avenue leading to the Temple of Karnak, at Thebes, are secured on their solid foundations only by their own weight. Yet that has been found sufficient to preserve many of them undisturbed for 4,000 years. Taylor's Africa, 113 et seq. And if a traveler should purchase from Mehemet Ali the land on which these interesting ruins rest, it would seem quite absurd to hold that the deed did not cover the statues still standing, and to claim that they were the still unad-ministered personal assets of the Ptolemies, after an annexation of such long duration. No legal distinction can be made between the sphinxes of Thebes and the statue of Thorn. Both were erected for ornament, and the latter was as colossal in size and as firmly annexed to the land as the former, and by the same means.

I apprehend the question whether the pyramids of Egypt or Cleopatra's needle are real or personal property does not depend on the result of an inquiry by the antiquarian whether they were originally made to adhere to their foundations with wafers, or sealing-wax, or a handful of cement. It seems to me puerile to make the title to depend upon the use of such or of any other adhesive substances, when the great weight of the erection is a much stronger guaranty of permanence.

The sun-dial stands on a somewhat different footing. It was made for use as well as for ornament, and could not be useful except when firmly placed in the open air and in the light of the sun. Though it does not appear that the stone on which it was placed was made expressly for it, it was appropriately located on a solid and durable foundation. There is good reason to believe it was designed to be a permanent fixture, because the material of which it was made was the same as that of the house and the statue, and because it was in every respect adapted to the place.

My conclusion is, that the facts in the case called on the judge of the circuit to decide, as a matter of law, that the property was real, and to nonsuit the plaintiff; and if I am right in this conclusion, the judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed.1