If, on the other hand, the land itself be regarded as "property," the practical result is the same. The purpose of this constitutional prohibition cannot be ignored in its interpretation. The framers of the Constitution intended to protect rights which are worth protecting; not mere empty titles, or barren insignia of ownership, which are of no substantial value. If the land, "in its corporeal substance and entity," is "property," still, all that makes this property of any value is the aggregation of rights or qualities which the law annexes as incidents to the ownership of it. The constitutional prohibition must have been intended to protect all the essential elements of ownership which make "property" valuable. Among these elements is, fundamentally, the right of user, including, of course, the corresponding right of excluding others from the use. See, Comstock, J., in Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378, p. 396. A physical interference with the land, which substantially abridges this right, takes the owner's "property" to just so great an extent as he is thereby deprived of this right. "To deprive one of the use of his land is depriving him of his land;" for, as Lord Coke said, - "What is the land but the profits thereof?" Sutherland, J., in People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357, p. 399; Co. Litt., 4 b. The private injury is thereby as completely effected as if the land itself were "physically taken away."

The principle must be the same whether the owner is wholly deprived of the use of his land, or only partially deprived of it; although the amount or value of the property taken in the two instances may widely differ. If the railroad corporation take a strip four rods wide out of a farm to build their track upon, they cannot escape paying for the strip by the plea that they have not taken the whole farm. So a partial, but substantial, restriction of the right of user may not annihilate all the owner's rights of property in the land, but it is none the less true that a part of his property is taken. Taking a part "is as much forbidden by the Constitution as taking the whole. The difference is only one of degree; the quantum of interest may vary, but the principle is the same." See 6 Am. Law Review, 197-198; Lawrence, J., in Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 111. 502, p. 511. The explicit language used in one clause of our Constitution indicates the spirit of the whole instrument. "No part of a man's property shall be taken....." Constitution of N. H., Bill of Rights, article 12. The opposite construction would practically nullify the Constitution. If the public can take part of a man's property without compensation, they can, by successive takings of the different parts, soon acquire the whole. Or, if it is held that the complete divestiture of the last scintilla of interest is a taking of the whole for which compensation must be made, it will be easy to leave the owner an interest in the land of infinitesimal value.

The injury complained of in this case is not a mere personal inconvenience or annoyance to the occupant. Two marked characteristics distinguish this injury from that described in many other cases.

First, it is a physical injury to the land itself, a physical interference with the rights of property, an actual disturbance of the plaintiff's possession. Second, it would clearly be actionable if done by a private person without legislative authority. The damage is "consequential," in the sense of not following immediately in point of time upon the act of cutting through the ridge, but it is what Sir William Erle calls " consequential damage to the actionable degree." See Brands. H. & C. R. Co., Law Reports, 2 Queen's Bench, 223, p. 249. These occasional inundations may produce the same effect in preventing the plaintiff from making a beneficial use of the land as would be caused by a manual asportation of the constituent materials of the soil. Covering the land with water, or with stones, is a serious interruption of the plaintiff's right to use it in the ordinary manner. If it be said that the plaintiff still has his land, it may be answered, that the face of the land does not remain unchanged, and that the injury may result in taking away part of the soil (" and, if this may be done, the plaintiff's dwelling-house may soon follow"); and that, even if the soil remains, the plaintiff may, by these occasional submergings, be deprived of the profits which would otherwise grow out of his tenure. "His dominion over it, his power of choice as to the uses to which he will devote it, are materially limited." Brinkerhoff, J., in Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County, 8 Ohio St.

333, P. 346.

The nature of the injury done to the plaintiff may also be seen by adverting to the nature of the right claimed by the defendants. * * *

In asserting the right to maintain the present condition of things as to the cut, the defendants necessarily assert the right to produce all the results which naturally follow from the existence of the cut. In effect, they thus assert a right to discharge water on to the plaintiff's land. Such a right is an easement. A right of "occasional flooding" is just as much an easement as a right of "permanent submerging;" it belongs to the class of easements which "are by their nature intermittent - that is, usable or used only at times." See Goddard's Law of Easements, 125. If the defendants had erected a dam on their own land across the river below the plaintiff's meadow, and by means of flash-boards thereon had occasionally caused the water to flow back and overflow the plaintiff's meadow so long and under such circumstances as to give them a prescriptive right to continue such flowage, the right thus acquired would unquestionably be an "easement." The right acquired in that case does not differ in its nature from the right now claimed. In the former instance, the defendants flow the plaintiff's land by erecting an unnatural barrier below his premises. In the present instance, they flow his land by removing a natural barrier on the land above his premises. In both instances, they flow his land by making "a non-natural use" of their own land. In both instances, they do an act upon their own land, the effect of which is to restrict or burden the plaintiff's ownership of his land (see Leconfield v. Lonsdale, Law Reports, 5 Com. Pleas, 657, p. 696); and the weight of that burden is not necessarily dependent upon the source of the water, whether from below or above. See Bell, J., in Tillotson v. Smith, 32 N. H. 90, pp. 95-96. In both instances they turn water upon the plaintiff's land "which does not flow naturally in that place." If the right acquired in the former instance is an easement, equally so must be the right claimed in the latter. If, then, the claim set up by the defendants in this case is well founded, an easement is already vested in them. An easement is property, and is within the protection of the constitutional prohibition now under consideration. If the defendants have acquired this easement, it cannot be taken from them, even for the public use, without compensation. But the right acquired by the defendants is subtracted from the plaintiff's ownership of the land. Whatever interest the defendants have acquired in this respect the plaintiff has lost. If what they have gained is property, then what he has lost is property. If the easement, when once acquired, cannot be taken from the defendants without compensation, can the defendants take it from the plaintiff in the first instance without compensation? See Brinkerhoff, J., ubi sup.; Selden, J., in Williams v. N. Y. Central R. R., 16 N. Y. 97, p. 109. An easement is all that the railroad corporation acquire when they locate and construct their track directly over a man's land. The fee remains in the original owner. Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282. Yet nobody doubts that such location and construction is a "taking of property," for which compensation must be made. See Redfield, J., in Hatch v. Ft. Central R. R., 25 Vt. 49, p. 66. What difference does it make in principle whether the plaintiff's land is incumbered with stones, or with iron rails ? Whether the defendants run a locomotive over it, or flood it with the waters of Baker's river? See Wilcox, J., in March v. P. & C. R. R., 19 N. H. 372, p. 380; Walworth, Chancellor, in Canal Com'rs and Canal Appraisers v. The People, 5 Wendell, 423, p. 452. * * *

We think that here has been a taking of the plaintiff's property; that, as the statutes under which the defendants acted make no provision for the plaintiff's compensation, they afford no justification; that the defendants are liable in this action as wrongdoers; and that the ruling of the court was correct. [The court then proceeds to consider the prior decisions. This part of the opinion is omitted here.]

Exceptions overruled.