82. People v. Johnson, 237 I11. 237, 86 N E. 676; Whittington v. Comm'rs of Crisfield, 121 Md. 387, 88 Atl. 232.

83. Ivey v. City of Birmingham, 190 Ala. 196, 67 So. 506; San Francisco v. Carnavan, 42 Cal. 541; Benton v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, 129 Am. St. Rep. 561, 118 S. W. 418; Pence v. Bryant, 54 W. Va. 263, 46 S. E. 275.

The question whether there has been an acceptance is, like that of the offer of dedication, ordinarily one of fact.84

It is not infrequently said that the acceptance of a dedication must take place within a reasonable time, or that the public has a reasonable time for acceptance.85 What is a reasonable time appears to be a question of fact in each particular case86 and is to be determined, to some extent at least, by the necessity or desirability of the public use of the land dedicated, the public being under no obligation to accept the dedication before conditions are ripe for its utilization of the land.87 The delay of acceptance, to render it nugatory, must, it has been said, be for such a length of time and under such

84. City of Hartford v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 59 Conn. 250, 22 Atl. 37; Grube v. Nichols, 36 111. 92; Flack v. Village of Green Island, 122 N. Y. 107, 25 N. 267; Downend v. Kansas City, 71 Mo. App. 529; Folsom v. Town of Underhill, 36 Vt. 580.

85. People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, 91 Am. Dec. 542, 22 Pac. 474; Rose v. Elizabethtown, 275 111. 167, 114 N. E. 14; Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa, 337, 158 N. W. 655; Field v. Manchester, 32 Mich. 279; Briel v. City of Natchez, 48 Miss. 433; Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N. D. 504, L. R. A. 1916B, 1160, 154 N. W. 195.

86. H. A. Hillmer Co. v. Behr, 264 111. 568, 106 N. E. 481; Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa, 377, 158 N. W. 655; Chafee v. City of Aiken, 57 S. C. 507, 35 S. E. 800. So it is said that the acceptance of the dedication need not be within any particular time. Henderson v. Yeaman, 169 Ky. 603, 184 S. W. 878; Leale v.

Takoma Park, 130 Md. 297, 100 Atl. 379.

In Christopherson v. Incorporated Town of Forest City. 178 Iowa, 893, 160 N. W. 691, it was held that an acceptance thirty years after the dedication and twenty years after the fencing in of the property was too late. And in People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70, 91 Am. Dec. 542, 22 Pac. 474, a like view was taken of .in acceptance twenty-one years after the dedication. And in Kelley v. Jones, 110 Me. 360, 86 Atl. 252, of an acceptance eighty years after the dedication.

87. Lee v. Harris. 206 111. 428, 97 Am. St. Rep. 176, 69 N. E. 230; Mccienehan v. Town of Jesup, 144 Iowa, 352, 120 N. W. 74: City of Meridian v. Poole, 88 Miss. 108, 40 So. 548; Meier v. Portland Cable Ky. Co., 16 Ore. 500, 1 . L. R. A.. 866, 19 Pac. 610; City of Ashland v. Chicago & N. W. Ky. Co.. 105 Wis. 398, 80 N. W. 1101.

Circumstances as clearly to indicate an abandonment of any intention to accept the offer of dedication.88

Since a municipality has authority, in the ordinary case, to accept a dedication in behalf of the public, the question whether, when the dedication is made by the municipality, an acceptance, by public user or otherwise, is necessary to complete the dedication, is one of some difficulty.88a And the same question may arise in connection with a dedication by the United States or a state.89 No clear and harmonious rule appears to exist in this regard.

The question whether the dedication of a highway has been accepted as regards its entire breadth or length by reason of repairs on part only of its breadth or length, or of public user of such part only, would seem to be a question of fact, to be determined with reference to the circumstances of the case, with a presumption perhaps, by the weight of authority, in favor of the acceptance of the whole way as dedicated.90

88. Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N. D. 504, L. R. A. 1916B, 1160, 154 N. W. 195. And see 129 Am. St. Rep. at p. 619, note to Benton v. City of St. Louis.

88a. That acceptance is necessary in such a case, see San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585, 91 Am. Dec. 542; Curtis v. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154, 48 Am. Dec. 149; Board of Trustees of Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 251 Pa. 125, 96 Atl. 126. Contra, Attorney Gen. v. Tarr, 148 Mass. 309, 2 L. R. A. 87, 19 N. B. 358. In Knox v. Roehl, 153 Wis. 239, 140 N. W. 1121, it is said that only slight proof of acceptance is necessary in such case.

89. That acceptance is necessary in the case of a dedication by the United States appears to be assumed in Wells v. Pennington County, 2 S. D. 1, 39 Am. St. Rep. 758, 48 N. W. 305; Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 165 Pac. 518. So in the case of a dedication by the state. Reilly v. City of Racine, 51 Wis. 526. 8 N. W. 417.

90. People v. Langenoir, - Cal. App., - 142 Pac. 888; Ellis v. City of Hazlehurst, 138 Ga. 181, 75 S. E. 99; Mcdonald v. Stark, 176 I11. 456, 52 N. E. 37; Sullivan v. Tichenor, 179 I11. 97, 53 N. E. 561; Village of Augusta v. Tyner, 197 111. 242, 64 N. E. 378; Hall v. Breyfogle, 162 Ind. 494, 70 N. E. 883; Kuehl v. Town of Bettendorf, 179 Iowa, 1, 161 N. W. 28; Crosby v. City of Greenville, 183 Mich. 452, 150 N. W.

In the case of a dedication for streets by the record of a plat, or the sale of lots with reference to a plat, the acceptance of one or more of the streets has occasionally been regarded as involving an acceptance of all, in the absence of a showing of a contrary intention.91 It has in one state been stated that the acceptance of one street does not show acceptance of all,92 and that the acceptance of those streets in one part of the land platted does not show acceptance of those in another part,93 but that the acceptance of the most important streets,94 or of most of the streets,95 justifies an inference that all have been accepted.

246; Kennedy v. Le Van, 23 Minn. 513; Triplett Twp. v. Mc-phearson, 172 Mo. App. 369, 157 S. W. 857; City of Pittsburg v. Epping-carpenter Co., 194 Pa. St. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Chaffee v. Aiken, 57 S. C. 507, 35 S. E. 800. In Borough of South Amboy v. New York & L. B. R. Co., 66 N. J. L. 623, 50 Atl. 368, it is said that the dedication must be accepted in whole, if accepted at all.

On the other hand it has been quite occasionally decided that, in the particular case, an acceptance as to the whole did not result from repairs on, or user of, a part of the land dedicated. Mobile v. Fowler, 147 Ala. 403, 41 So. 468; Hall v. Meriden, 48 Conn. 416; Kelsoe v. Oglethorpe, 120 Ga. 951, 102 Am. St. Rep. 138, 48 S. E. 366; Theissen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho, 505, 144 Pac. 548; Bell v. City of Burlington, 68 Iowa, 296, 27 N. W. 245; Wayne County v. Miller, 31 Mich. 447; Commonwealth v. Royce, 152 Pa. St. 88, 25 Atl. 162; Ashland v. Chicago & N. W.

Ry. Co., 105 Wis. 398, 80 N. W. 1101.

91. Village of Lee v. Harris. 206 I11. 428, 99 Am. St. Rep. 176, 69 N. E. 230; Parriott v. Hampton, 134 Iowa, 157, I11 N. W. 440; Heitz v. City of St. Louis, 110 Mo. 618, 19 S. W. 735; Derby v. Ailing, 40 Conn. 410; City of Jackson v. Laird, 99 Miss. 476, 55 So. 41. But see Kelsoe v. Oglethorpe, 120 Ga. 951, 102 Am. St. Rep. 138, 48 S. E. 366; Wolf-skill v. Los Angeles County, 86 Cal. 405, 24 Pac. 1094; Kennedy v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 65 Md. 514, 57 Am. Rep. 346, 9 Atl. 234.

92. Rose v. Elizabethtown, 275

I11. 167, 114 N. E. 14; Casey v. Chicago, 263 I11. 147. 104 N. E. 1025.

93. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 264 I11. 24. 105 N. E. 702.

94. Kimball v. Chicago, 253, Ill. 105, 97 N. E. 257; Dewey v. Chicago, 274 111. 268, 113 N. E. 599.

95. Consumers' Co. v. Chicago, 268 111. 113, 108 N. B. 1017.