84. Ehrman v. Alabama Mineral Land Co., 109 Ala. 478, 20 So. 112; Strever v. Earl, 60 Hun (N. Y.) 528, 15 N. Y. Supp. 350; Clark v. Clark, 56 N. H. 105.

85. See Wallace v. Blair, 1 Grant (Pa.) 75; Carpenter v. Gleason, 58 Vt. 244, 4 Atl. 706; Stewart v. Eaton, 20 Wash. 378, 55 Pac. 314.

86. Ehrman v. Alabama Mineral Land Co., 109 Ala. 478, 20 So. 112.

87. Edgerton v. Young, 43 111. 464; Peterborough Sav. Bank v. Pierce, 54 Neb. 712, 75 N. W. 20; Quimby v. Williams, 67 N. H. 489, 68-Am. St. Rep. 685, 41 Atl. 862; Aiken v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 37 Wis. 69.

88. Newman v. Fidelity Savings & Loan Ass'n, 14 Ariz. 354, 128 Pac. 53; Jordan v. Cheney, 74 Me. 587; Purdy v. Huntington, 42 N. Y. 334, 1 Am. Rep. 532; Curtis v. Moore, 152 N. Y. 159, 57 Am. St. Rep. 506, 46 N. E. 168; Pratt v. Bank of Bennington, 10 Vt. 293, 3" Am. Dec. 201; Oregon v. Washington, 5 Sawy. 336, Fed. Cas. No. 10556. See International Bank of would have no right to presume a merger from the apparent ownership of the two interests by one person at the same time, a presumption to this effect would be justified if such person, in subsequently conveying" the land, entered into a covenant for title which would cover the mortgage,92 and also if such person, while apparently owner of the debt and land, placed on record a release or satisfaction of the mortgage.93

Chicago v. Wilshire, 108 111. 143.

89. Gregory v. Savage, 32 Conn. 250; Dubbels v. Thompson, 49 Mont. 550, 143 Pac. 986, and cases in next following notes.

90. Bowling v. Cook, 39 Iowa, 200; James v. Newman 147 Iowa, 574, 126 N. W. 781; Pritchard v. Kalamazoo College, 82 Mich. 587, 47 N. W. 31; Leonard v. Leonia Heights Land Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 43, 85 Atl. 602.

91. Ames v. Miller, 65 Neb. 204, 91 N. W. 250; Artz v. Yeager, 30 Ind. App. 677, 66 N. E. 917; Pritchard v. Kalamazoo College, 82 Mich. 587, 47 N. W. 31.

- (f) Bar of obligation by limitations. By the weight of authority, the fact that the recovery of a personal judgment for the amount of the debt secured is barred by the running of the statute of limitations does not affect the right to enforce the mortgage lien against the land, that is, does not in effect extinguish the mortgage.94 There are, however, in quite a num92. Pearson v. Bailey, 180 Mass. 229, 62 N. E. 265; Thomas v. Simmons, 103 Ind. 538, 2 N. E. 203, 3 N. E. 381; Summy v. Ramsey, 53 Wash. 93, 101 Pac. 506.

93. Ogle v. Turpin, 102 111. 148. Soc ante, this subsection, notes 52, 53.

94. Austin v. Edwards, - Ala. -, 78 So. 886; Belknap v. Glea-son, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721; Browne v. Browne, 17 Fla. 607, 35 Am. Rep. 96; Elkins v. Edwards, 8 Ga. 325 (see Allen v. Glenn, 87 Ga. 414, 13 S. E. 565); Joy v. Adams, 26 Me. 330; Crooker v Holmes, 65 Me. 195, 20 Am. Rep. 687; Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 60 Am. St. Rep. 322; Thayer v. Mann, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 532; Shaw v. Silloway, 145 Mass. 503, 14 N. E. 783; Michigan Insur. Co. v. Brown, 11 Mich. 265; Camp-boll v. Upton, 56 Neb. 385, 76 N. W. 910; Cookes v. Culbertson, 9 Nev. 199; Colton v. Depew, 60 N. J. Eq. 454, 83 Am. St. Rep. 650, 46

Atl. 728; Hurlbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y. 295, 14 L. R. A. 59, 28 N. E. 638; Pratt v. Huggins, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 277; Menzel v. Hinton, 132 N. C. 660, 95 Am. St. Rep. 647, 44 S. E. 385; Jenkins v. Griffin, 175 N. C. 184, 95 S. E. 166; McCarty v. Goodsman, - N. D. -, 167 N. W. 503; Fisher's Executor v. Mossman, 11 Ohio St. 42; Myer v. Beal, 5 Ore. 30; Hart-ranft's Estate, 153 Pa. St. 530, 34 Am. St. Rep. 717, 26 Atl. 104; Pallou v. Taylor, 14 R. I. 277; Nichols v. Briggs, 18 S. C. 473; Alexander v. Ransom, 16 S. D. 302, 92 N. W. 418; Irvine v. Shrum, 97 Tenn. 259, 36 S. W. 1089; Gleason v. Kinney's Adm'r, 65 Vt. 560, 27 Atl. 208; Smith v. Washington City, etc., R. Co., 33 Gratt. (Va.) 617; Camden v. Al-kire, 24 W. Va. 674; Potter v. Stransky, 48 Wis. 235, 4 N. W. 95; Ogden v. Bradshaw, 161 Wis. 49, 150 N. W. 399, 152 N. W. 654; Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 75G, ber of states, decisions to the opposite effect, that the bar of the personal action precludes the subsequent enforcement of the lien,95 and in several states it is expressly so provided by statute.96

The decisions to the effect that, apart from a statute expressly so providing, the bar of the personal claim extinguishes the lien, are ordinarily based on the theory that since the debt is the principal thing and the mortgage merely an accessory, the latter cannot exist after the right of action on the first has come to an end. But this involves an assumption that the statutes of limitations operate by way of destruction of the cause of action, while the view more usually accepted is that they operate upon the remedy only. Logically, it would seem, the question whether the bar of the debt extinguishes the lien depends upon whether, in that particular state, the bar of the debt extinguishes the debt. That the mortgagee has or has not the legal title, though occasionally referred to as a controlling consideration in this regard,97 is, it is conceived, im28 L. Ed. 1141; Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Ad. 413.

95. Ford v. Nesbitt, 72 Ark. 267, 79 S. W. 793; Kern Valley Bank v. Koehn, 157 Cal. 237, 107 Fac. Ill; McGovney v. Gwillim, 16 Colo. App. 284, 65 Pac. 346; Law v. Spcnce, 5 Idaho, 244, 48 Pac. 282; Harris v. Mills, 28 111. 44, 81 Am. Dec. 259; Pollock v. Maison, 41 111. 516; Lilly v. Dunn, 96 Ind. 220; Jenks v. Shaw, 99 Iowa, 604, 61 Am. St. Rep. 256, 68 N. W. 900 (mortgage not barred till debt barred); Fitzgerald v. Flanagan, 155 Iowa, 217, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1104, 135 N. W. 738; Schmucker v. Sibert. 18 Kan. 104, 26 Am. Rep. 765 (mortgage not barred till debt barred); Kulp v. Kulp, 51 Kan. 341, 21 L. R. A. 550, 32 Pac. 1118; Allen v. Shepherd, 162 Ky. 756, 173 S. W. 135; Gay v. Hebert, 44 La. Ann. 301, 10 So. 775; Fievel v. Zuber, 67 Tex. 275, 3 S. W. 273 (after debt barred no judicial foreclosure but ptill power of sale); George v. Butler, 26 Wash. 456, 57 L. R. A. 396, 90 Am. St. Rep. 756, 67 Pac. 263; Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 Pac. 434 (foreclosure not barred till debt barred).