This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
43. Post, Sec. 482.
44. Highland Realty Co. v. Avondale Land Co., 174 Ala. 325, 56 So. 716; Harrison v. Augusta, Factory, 73 Ga. 447; Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 38; Schneider v. Jacob, 86 Ky. 101. 5 S. W. 350; Horton v. Williams, 99 Mich. 423, 58 N. W. 369. Heitz v. St. Louis,
Of the grantee are said to be limited to the street on which his land purports to abut, so far as is necessary in order to reach a cross street in either direction.49
110 Mo. 618, 19 S. W. 735; Hawley v. Baltimore, 33 Md. 270; Carter v. Portland, 4 Ore. 339: Dobson v. Hohenaiel, 148 Pa. 367, 23 Atl. 1128.
45. See Prescott v. Edwards. 117 Cal. 298, 59 Am. St. Rep. 186; 49 Pac. 178; Danielson v. Sykes, 157 Cal. 686, 109 Pac. 87, 2S L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024; Overland Machinery Co. v. Alpenfels. 30 Colo. 163, 69 Pac. 574; White v. Tidewater Canal Co., 60 N. J. Eq. 1, 25 Atl. 199; Lennig v. Ocean City Ass'n, 41 N. .1. Eq. 606, 56 Am. Rep. 16, 7 Atl. 491; Carroll v. Asbury, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 354; grantee in such case ordinarily acquires a right of way.46
The authorities are not entirely harmonious as to whether one receiving a conveyance of land described with reference to a plat acquires a right of way over, or rather, corresponding to, every street which, though nonexistent, appears upon the plat. Some cases are to the effect that, while the grantee is not restricted to such supposed streets as are actually adjacent to his land, he acquires rights only in such as are reasonably necessary for convenient access to and exit from the land conveyed, and that the grantor is not, as against him, estopped to deny the actual existence of streets appearing on the plat which he would not ordinarily have occasion to use for such purpose,47 while some recognize rights in the grantee along the routes of all the streets designated on the plat.48 In one or two states the rights
Wolf v. Brass, 72 Tex. 133, 12 S. W. 159.
46. Smith v. Young, 160 I11. 163, 43 N. E. 486; Marshall v. Lynch, 256 111. 522, 100 N. E. 289; Kaatz v. Curtis, 215 Mass. 311, 102 N. E. 424; Lowenberg v. Brown, 79 N. Y. App. Div. 414, 79 N. Y. Supp. 1060 (semble).
47. Pearson v. .Allen 151 Mass. 79, 21 Am. St. Rep. 426, 23 N. E. 731; Doavney v. Hood, 203 Mass. 4, 89 N. E. 24; Bell v. Todd, 51 Mich. 21, 16 N. W. 304; State v. Hamilton, 109 Tenn. 276, 70 S. W. 619.
Occasionally the view has been taken that while the grantee, may have a legal right as to all strips designated as streets on the plat, he has a right to an injunction only as to those which are more or less necessary for his purposes. Danielson v. Sykes, 157 Cal. 686, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1024, 109 Pac. 87; Thorpe v. Clanton, 9 Ariz. 351, 85 Pac. 1061; Chapin v. Brown, 15 R. I. 579, 10 Atl. 639.
48. Price v. Stratton, 45 Fla. 535, 33 So. 644 (semble); Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200. 51 Am. Rep. 749; Nagel v. Dean, 94 Minn. 25, 101 N. W. 954 (semble) ; Rowan v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232; Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460; Collins v. Land Co., 128 N. C. 563, 83 Am. St. Rep. 720, 39 S..e. 21; Jessop v. Kittaning Borough, 225 Pa. 583, 74 Atl. 553; Thaxter v. Turner, 17 R. I. 799, 24 Atl. 829; Sipe v. Alley, 117 Va. 819, 86 S. E. 122; Cook v. Totten, 49 W. Va. 177, 87 Am. St. Rep. 792, 38 S. E. 491; Edwards v. Moundsville Land Co., 56 W. Va. 43, 48 S. E. 754.
In so far as the vendee thus acquires an easement in the strips designated as streets on the plat he has, it appears, the right to have them kept open to the full width indicated on the plat.50
It has occasionally been stated that, when laud is sold or conveyed according to a plat, the grantee acquires the right, not only to use the' streets appearing on the plat, but also the right to have the public use them,51 the theory being that, having purchased with this expectation, he should not be disappointed therein. Such a view is not entirely satisfactory. Assuming that there is a dedication by the sale or conveyance, the public obviously acquires a right to use the streets, or strips designated as streets, because in that case they are streets. But this is a right in the public, not in the individual grantee, and the conception of an easement, appurtenant to land, to have the members of the public use the property in the neighborhood along certain designated routes, not for the purpose of access to such land, but for their own individual purposes, is a difficult one. Such an easement in one's favor would mean, it seems, that though all those desiring to go to or from his land, including himself, were allowed to use these designated streets, he could maintain an action because other persons were not allowed to do so. Even when the streets are actually exist cut, it docs not seem that an abutting owner on one street could complain because the public generally are not allowed to no street or way existed would be a material consideration, not only as showing that he was not misled by the reference to the street or way, but also as showing that the reference to the street or way was not to be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether an easement passed by the conveyance. So a conveyance of land by reference to a plat on which streets and squares or the like appear, is presumed, in case the streets or squares do not actually exist, to mean the land with corresponding private easements annexed thereto, but presumably evidence that the words used meant the land without any easements appurtenant thereto would be admissible. In case the conveyance makes no reference to any street or way, or to a plat, but the grantor, previous to making the conveyance, states to the grantee that there is a street or way, such statement may be referred to for the purpose of determining whether the language of the conveyance meant the land with an easement appurtenant thereto of the character referred to, or the land without such an easement. And the same may be said as regards the exhibition by the vendor of a plat on which streets or squares appear, which plat is not referred to in the conveyance. Such act on his part is, it is conceived, to be considered because it serves to explain the meaning of the language used in the conveyance as applying, not to the land alone, but to the land with easements appurtenant thereto corresponding to the public easements depicted on the plat. Just as in the case of what is ordinarily referred to as the implied giant of an easement, the basic principle is that a conveyance of land in general terms may be shown, by reference to extrinsic facts, to be intended as a conveyance of land with an easement annexed, so in this case a conveyance of land may be shown, by reference to an extrinsic fact, to be intended as a conveyance of land with an easement or easements annexed. The application of the doctrine of estoppel might well be confined to those cases in use other streets in the neighborhood, this being for the individual members of the public, or the muncipal authorities, to do, and his rights can not well be greater when the streets are nonexistent.