But the presence of a covenant for title may affect the construction of the instrument as showing an intention not to convey merely such estate or interest as the grantor has. Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98; Jones v. King, 25 111. 383; Baker v. Austin, 174 N. C. 433, 93 S. E. 949; Bayley v. Mccoy, 8 Ore. 259; Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 233. Compare, as to the North Carolina law, Coble v. Barringer, 171 N. C. 448, L. R. A. 1916E, 901, 88 S. E. 518; and see Rawle, Covenants for Title, Sec.Sec. 298, 299.

16. Wheeler v. Aycock, 109 Ala. 146, 19 So. 497; Gill v. Grand Tower Min. Co., 92 111. 249; Stoepler v. Silberberg, 220 Mo. 258, 119 S. W. 418; Mclnnis v. Pickett, 65 Miss. 354, 3 So. 660; Kent v. Watson, 22 W. Va. 561; Simanek v. Nemetz, 120 Wis. 42, 97 N. W. 508; Gillen v. Powe, 219 Fed. 553, 135 C. C. A. 321.

17. Huzzey v. Heffernan, 143 Mass. 232, 9 N. E. 570.

18. Jackson v. Hoffman, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 271; Bricker v. Bricker, 11 Ohio St. 240. Contra, Ayer v. Philadelphia & B. Face Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N. E. 177; discussed and merely to release her dower, a title subsequently acquired by her will not enure to the benefit of the grantee in the conveyance.19

Not infrequently it is said that the grantor in a quitclaim deed is not estopped to assert an after-acquired title,20 but unfortunately the courts do not always clearly indicate what they mean by a quitclaim deed. Occasionally they use the expression in this connection to describe a conveyance which purports in terms to transfer merely such interest as the grantor criticized in 7 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 429. And see Rawle, Covenants for Title, Sec. 298.

That an exception of a mortgage in a covenant against incumbrances does not extend to the covenant of warranty in the same instrument, so as to exclude an estoppel, see Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Zellmer, 48 Minn. 408; Rooney v. Koenig, 80, Minn. 483, 83 N. W. 399. See, as to this last case, 14 Harv. Law Rev. 233.

19. Sanford v. Kane, 133 111. 199, 8 L. R. A. 724, 23 Am. St. Rep. 602, 24 N. E. 414; Miller v. Miller, 140 Ind. 174, 39 N. E. 547; O'neill v. Vanderburg, 25 Iowa, 104; Raymond v. Holden, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 270; Griffin v. Sheffield, 38 Miss. 359.

20. Quivey v. Baker, 37 Cal. 465; Habig v. Dodge, 127 Ind. 31, 25 N. E. 182; Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 19 L. R. A. 379, 33 N. E. 358; French v. Bartel & Miller, 164 Iowa, 677, 146 N. W. 754; Fisher v. Hal-lock, 50 Mich. 465, 15 N. W. 552; People v. Miller, 79 Mich. 93, 44 N. W. 172; Ernst v. Ernst, 178 Mich. 100, 144 N. W. 513, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317; Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 18; Harden v. Collins, 8 Nev. 49; Perrin v. Perrin, 62 Tex. 477. In Illinois it is so provided by statute. Wells v. Glos, 277 111. 516, 115 N. E. 658.

In Hagensick v. Castor, 53 Neb. 495, 73 N. W. 932, it was held that although an instrument was in the ordinary form of a quitclaim deed, yet since the grantors described themselves as the heirs of A, wrongly believing A to be dead, they in effect purported to convey an estate of inheritance vested in them as heirs at law of A, and could not, on A's actual death, assert the title which then passed to them as A's heirs.

It has been said that the exception to the general rule in the case of a quitclaim deed does not apply when the title subsequently acquired by the grantor is "merely an evidence and fortification of the title" which ho previously had. Ford v. Axel-son, 74 Neb. 92, 103 N. W. 1039; Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Ky. 701, 191 S. W. 672. This might mean merely that the effect of tho quitclaim as passing what the grantor has at the time of its may have,21 a form of conveyance which, as before stated,22 gives no room for an estoppel. Occasionally the courts apparently regard an instrument as a quitclaim deed for this purpose if the words "release" or "quitclaim," or both, appear as operative words therein,23 presumably on the theory that the use of such words precludes a construction of the instrument as purporting to pass any certain estate or interest. Occasionally the language used suggests that the court regards as a quitclaim deed any conveyance in which there are no covenants for title.24

The doctrine of estoppel to assert an after acquired title has been applied in the case of a mortgage as well execution is not affected by the fact that he subsequently obtains a deed purporting to convey what he already has, but the statement has also been applied to a case in which the grantor had an equitable title merely at the time of the execution of the quitclaim deed, and thereafter obtained the legal title. Johnson v. Johnson, 173 Ky. 701, 191 S. W. 672.

21. As in Anderson v. Yoakum, 94 Cal. 227, 28 Am. St. Rep. 121, 29 Pac. 500; Frink v. Darst, 14 111. 308, 58 Am. Dec. 575; Benneson v. Aiken, 102 111. 289; Irish v. Steeves, 154 Iowa, 286, 134 N. W. 634, 157 N. W. 734; Pring v. Swarm, 176 Iowa, 153; Nicholson v. Caress, 45 Ind. 479; Carter v. Mosier, 84 Kan. 361, 114 Pac. 226; Manson v. Peaks, 103 Me. 430, 69 Atl. 690; Butcher v. Rogers, 60 Mo. 138; Brawford v. Wolfe, 103 Mo. 391, 15 S. W. 426; Taft v. Stevens, 3 Gray (Mass.) 504; Bell v. Twilight, 26 N. H. 401; Dorr is v. Smith. 7 Ore. 267; Lindsay v.

Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S. W. 727; Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 Pac. 434.

22. Ante, this section, notes 14, 15.

23. As in Avery v. Akins, 74 Ind. 283; Bruce v. Luke, 9 Kan. 201; Wholey v. Cavanaugh, 88 Cal. 132, 25 Pac. 1112; Frost v. Missionary Society, 56 Mich. 62, 22 N. W. 189. Contra, Ford v. Axelson, 74 Neb. 92, 103 N. W. 1039. This is presumably the character of instrument intended by the Mississippi statute, which provides that a conveyance of quitclaim and release shall estop the grantor from asserting a subsequently acquired title. It could hardly mean a conveyance of such interest as the grantor may have. See Bramlett v. Roberts, 68 Miss. 325, 10 So. 56.

24. Bohon v. Bohon. 78 Ky. 408; Dart v. Dart, 7 Conn. 256; Tillotson v. Kennedy, 5 Ala. 413, 39 Am. Dec. 330; Cramer v. Benton, 64 Barb. (N. Y.) 522; Jackson v. Hubble, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 613.