21a. Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 111. 199, 40 N. E. 482; Edwards v. Brusha, 18 Okla. 234, 90 Pac. 727; Cincinnati v. Newell, 7 Ohio St. 37; Bolio v. Marvin, 130 Mich. 82, 89 N. W. 563; Elliot v. Small, 35 Minn. 396, 59 Am. Rep. 329, 29 N. W. 158; Tuttle v. Walker, 46 Me. 280.

As above stated,24a the language of reservation is not infrequently employed for the purpose of creating in the grantor a less estate than that conveyed, as when one conveys an estate in fee simple "reserving" an estate for his life. Such a clause is not a reservation, according to the common-law conception of the term, but it has occasionally been referred to as such for the purpose of the general rule that a reservation can operate only in favor of the grantor, with the result that in a conveyance in fee simple, for instance, an attempted "reservation" of a life estate in favor of a member of the grantor's family other than himself has been regarded as invalid.241' It may be questioned,

22. Stockwell v. Coullard, 129 Mass. 231; Wood v. Boyd, 145 Mass. 176, 13 N. E. 476; State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9; Richardson v. Palmer, 38 N. H. 212; Brid-ger v. Pierson, 43 N. Y. 601; Beardsley v. New Berlin Light & Power Co., 207 N. Y. 34, 100 N. E. 434; Bartlett v. Barrows, 22 R. I. 642, 49 Atl. 31.

23. Reynolds v. Gaertner, 117 Mich. 532; Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 133 Iowa 714, 110 N. W. 1039; Munn v. Worrall, 53 N. Y. 44; Umscheid v. Scholz, 84 Tex. 265, 16 S. W. 1065 (highway); Contra. Derby v. Hall, 2 Gray (Mass.) 236; Gould v. Howe, 131 111. 490, 23 N. E. 602; Richardson v. Palmer, 38 N. H. 212. See note 20 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 574.

24. Arabs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 266, 46 N. W. 321; Roberts v. Robertson, 53 Vt. 690. See Stone v. Stone, 141 Iowa 438, 119 N. W. 712, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 18 Ann. Cas. 797.

24a. Ante, this section, note 98.

24b. White v. City of Marion,

2 R. P. - 27 however, whether such words of reservation might not occasionally be construed as words of grant, vesting in the third person named a life estate, with remainder in fee simple. The tendency has been to regard such an attempted reservation of a limited estate in favor of a third person as what the courts denominate an "exception" of the estate named in favor of the grantor himself.24c

- Sufficiency of exception. An exception must be of part of the thing granted,25 and must not be as extensive as such thing, so as to be repugnant thereto.26 Nor is it valid if the subject thereof was previously specifically granted, as when, after granting twenty houses, one of such houses is sought to be excepted.27 There may be an exception, as before indicated, not only of a particular piece of land measured horizontally, but also of houses or other fixtures on the land conveyed,28 or of timber growing thereon,29 or of minerals therein.30

139 Iowa, 479, 117 N. W. 254; Martin v. Cook, 102 Mich. 267, 60 N. W. 679; Burchaid v. Walther, 58 Neb. 539, 78 N. W. 1061; In re Dixon, 156 N. C. 26, 72 S. E. 71.

24c. See the first three cases cited in last preceding note.

25. Sheppard's Touchstone, 78; Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 76 Atl. 705; Moore v. Lord, 50 Miss. 229; Cornell v. Todd, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 130.

26. Dorrell v. Collins Cro. Eliz. 6; Shoenberger v. Lyon, 7 Watts & S. C. (Pa.) 184; Young's Petition, 11 R. I. 636; Puckett v. Mcdaniell, 96 Tex. 94, 70 S. W. 739. See Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338, 18 Am. St. Rep. 404, 43 N. W. 984; Foster v. Runk, 109 Pa. St. 291, 58 Am. Rep. 720, 2 Atl. 25; Koenigheim v.

Miles, 67 Tex. 113, 2 S. W. 81; Adams v. Warner, 23 Vt. 395.

27. Sheppard's Touchstone 78; 4 Kent's Comm. 468; Sprague v. Snow, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 54.

28. Marshall v. Niles, 8 Conn. 369; Washington Mills Emery Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co. (C. C.) 13 Fed. Sep. 646; Sanborn v. Hoyt, 24 Me. 118 Ante Sec. 273.

It has been said however that an exception of a house will prima facie include not only the house but the land under it. Webster v. Potter, 105 Mass. 414.

29. Sheppard's Touchstone, 78; Heflin v. Bingham, 56 Ala. 566, 28 Am. Rep. 776; Howard v. Lincoln, 13 Me. 122; Putnam v. Tuttle, 10 Gray (Mass.) 48. See ante, Sec. 261.

30. Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo.

The part or thing excepted, it is said, must be described with such certainty that it may be identified, and an exception has not infrequently been held to be void for lack of such certainty.31 But this requirement of certainty is, by a number of cases, subject to an important qualification, to the effect that there is sufficient certainty if the exact location of the excepted part is left to the election of the grantor,32 or, it seems, is capable of subsequent ascertainment otherwise.33 The effect of the invalidity of an exception out of the land conveyed, by reason of its indefiniteness, is that the whole tract passes by the conveyance as if no exception had been attempted.34

479, 24 S. W. 142, 25 S. W. 932; Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 29 Ohio St. 568; Whitaker v. Brown, 46 Pa. St. 197. See ante Sec. 253, note 19.

31. Bromberg v. Smee, 130 Ala. 601, 30 So. 483; Mooney v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640; Nunnery v. Ford, 92 Miss. 263, 45 Co. 722; Andrews v. Todd, 50 N. H. 565; Den d. Waugh v. Richardson, 30 N. C. 470; Stambaugh v. Holla-baugh, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 357; Butcher v. Creel's Heirs, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 201; Harding v. Jennings 68 W. Va. 354, 70 S. E. 1.

32. Butler v. Gosling, 130 Cal. 422, 62 Pac. 596; Thruston v. Masterson, 9 Dana (Ky.) 228; Smith v. Furbush. 68 N. H. 123, 47 L. R. A. 226, 44 Atl. 398; Dygert v. Matthews, 11 Wend. (N Y.) 35; Deroach v. Clardy, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 233, 113 S. W. 22; Benn v. Hetcher, 81 Va. 25, 59 Am. Rep. 645. Compare Chapman v. Mill Creek Coal and Coke Co., 54 W. Va. 193. 46 S. E. 262.

Until the land excepted is ascertained by the election of the grantor, the parties are in the position of tenants in common, it has been said. Smith v. Fur-bush, 68 N. H. 123, 47 L. R. A. 226, 44 Atl. 398.