81. Ante, Sec. 399.

82. Summers v. Beeler, 90 Md. 474, 45 Atl. 19, 48 L. R. A. 54, 78 Am. St. Rep. 446; Mulligan v. Jordan, 50 N. J. Eq. 363, 24 Atl. 543; Helmsley v. Marlboro Hotel Co.. 62 N. J. Eq. 164. 63 N. J. Eq.

804, 52 Atl. 1132; Leaver v. Gorman, 73 N. J. Eq. 129, 67 Atl. Ill; Mcnichol v. Townsend. 73 N. J. Eq. 276, 70 Atl. 965; Doerr v. Cobbs, 146 Mo. App. 342, 123 S. W. 547; Wright v. Pfrimmer, 99 Neb. 447, 156 N. W. 1060.

83. See Pollock, Contracts, (Williston's Edition) at p. 237 et seq.

In a discriminative note in 12 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 160, this theory is adopted to explain the reciprocal rights of the purchasers under a general plan, it being said that the results reached by the courts "cannot be entirely explained upon established principles, but must be accepted as a further extension of equity jurisprudence, whereby in a limited class of cases the interests of beneficiaries of a contract are recognized and protected."

84. It is more or less clearly indicated in Talmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105; Equitable Life Insurance Coc v. Bren-nan, 148 N. Y. 661, 43 N. E. 173; Lawrence v. Woods, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 233, 118 S. W. 551; Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. 2. See 5 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 283, article by Charles I. Giddings, Esq.

The question of the existence of a general plan is one of fact, to be determined with reference to the particulars and conditions of the laying out and sale of the lots, as indicated either verbally or in writing.87 That the vendor retains adjoining property without himself entering into any agreement similar to that which he exacts from purchasers has been regarded as tending to show the absence of a general plan enuring to the benefit of all the purchasers.88 That similar agreements were exacted of a considerable portion of the purchasers does not of itself show the existence of a general plan.89 On the other hand the fact that agreements are not exacted of a portion of the purchasers has been decided not to show the non existence of a general plan.90 The fact that a like agreement was exacted from all of the various purchasers has been regarded as showing the existence of a general plan,91

85. De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co.. 50 N. J. Eq. 329, 24 Atl. 388, per Green, V. C.

86. Korn v. Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 85 N. Ev 689, per Werner, J. And see Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.) 241.

So in Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. 12, Lord Macnaghten says that the community of interest necessarily requires and imports reciprocity of obligation.

87. See Hano v. Rigelow, 155 Mass. 341, 29 N. E. 628; Allen v. Barrett, 213 Mass. 36, 99 N. E. 575; Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N. E. 622; Barton v. Slifer, 72 N. J. Eq. 812, 66 Atl. 899; Foreman v. Sadler, 114 Mel. 574, 80 Atl. 298; Se Birmingham & District Land Co., (1893), 1 Ch. 342.

88. Keates v. Lyon, 4 Ch. at p. 225; Osborne v. Bradley (1903), 2 Ch. at p. 454; Sharp v. Ropes, 110 Mass. 381. Compare Be Birmingham & District Land Co., (1893), 1 Ch. 342.

89. Leaver v. Gorman, 73 N. J. Eq. 129, 67 Atl. Ill; Mcnichol v. Townsend, 73 N. J. Eq. 276, 67 Atl. 938; Mcneil v. Gary, 40 App.

D. C. 397, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1113; Summers v. Beeler, 90 Md. 474, 48 L. R. A. 54, 78 Am. St. Rep. 446.

45 Atl. 19; Coughlin v. Barker,

46 Mo. App. 54.

90. Leader v. La Flamme, 11 Me. 242, 88 Atl. 859; Velie v. Richardson, 126 Minn. 334, 148 N. W. 286; Hano v. Bigelow, 155 Mass. 341, 29 N. E. 628; Bacon v. Sandberg, 179 Mass. 396, 60 X.

E. 936; Sargent v. Leonardi. 223 Mass. 556, 112 N. E. 633; Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890, 133 N. W. 317; Chopin v. Dougherty, 165 111. App. 426.

The exaction of different agreements from the various purchasers does not tend to show a common plan. Webber v. Landrigan, 215 Mass. 221, 102 N. II 460; Clark v. Mcgee, 159 III. 518, 42 N. E. 965; Helmsley v. Marlborough Hotel Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 50 Atl. 14.

That in some conveyances there are restrictions additional to those which occur in all the conveyances does not show the non existence of a general plan. Evans v. Foss, 194 Mass. 513, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039, 11 Ann. Cas. 171, 80 N. E. 587; Allen v. Pvarrett, 213 Mass. 36, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 820, 99 N. E. 575. Nor is this shown by lack of exact uniformity in the restrictions in the different conveyances. Hart v. Ruter, 223 Mass. 207, 111 N. E. 1; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 N. J. Eq. 612, 61 Atl. 369; Coates v. Cullingford, 147 App. Div. 39, 131 N. Y. S. 700; Hooper v. Lott-man, - Tex. Civ. -, 171 S. W. 270.

91. Fete v. Foerstel, 159 Mo. App. 75, 139 S. W. 820; Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503, 126 Pac. 157 (semble); Hano v. Bigelow, but a contrary view has also been asserted.92 A common plan cannot be shown, as against one who purchased without knowledge of any restriction, by evidence that after his purchase the neighboring lots were sold by the common vendor subject to a particular restriction.93

That a building line appeared on a recorded plat of property lias been referred to as indicating that there was a general plan in this regard, subject to which each purchaser of a lot acquired title.94 On the other hand the appearance of such a line on a plat has been regarded as insufficient to show a general plan.95

Restrictions imposed in accordance with a general plan, like other restrictions,96 are enforceable only as against purchasers with notice thereof,97 and a purchaser with notice from a purchaser without notice takes free therefrom.98 A purchaser is, it has been decided, not charged with notice of a general plan by the uniformity of construction of Buildings on other lots sold by the same vendor.99 A purchaser can obviously not be charged with notice of a general plan, or affected thereby, if his purchase was prior to the establishment of such plan.1

155 Mass. 341, 29 N. E. 638 (sem-ble) ; Mcneil v. Gary, 40 App. Dist. Col. 397, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1113; Wright v. Pfrimmer, 99 Neb. 447, 156 N. W. 1060.

92. Mulligan v. Jordan. 50 N. J. Eq. 363, 24 Atl. 543; Roberts v. Lombard, 78 Ore. 100, 152 Pac. 499.

93. Lambrecht v. Gramlich, 187 Mich. 251, 153 N. W. 834.

94. Loomis v. Collins, 272 111. 221, 111 N. E. 999. See Oliver v. Kalick, 223 Mass. 252, 111 N. E. 879.

95. Mccloskey v. Kirk, 243 Pa.

319, 90 Atl. 73. 95. Ante, Sec. 398.

97. Roak v. Davis, 194 Mass. 481, 80 N. E. 690; Hyruan v. Tash (N. J. Eq.), 71 Atl. 742.

98. Mccuster v. Goode, 185 Mass. 607, 71 N. E. 76.

99. Bradley v. Walker, 138 N. Y. 291, 33 N. E. 1079, overruling dictum in Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105, 111; Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 Mich. 333, 154 N. W. 151.

1. Casterton v. Plotkin, 188 Mich. 333, 154 X. W. 151.

In England the doctrine of a general plan has been applied in connection with leases of flats in an apartment building, with the result that the lessee of a flat, whose written and printed lease shows that the whole building was used or intended to be used for residential flats, and imposes certain regulations upon the lessee in accordance with this intended use, is entitled to an injunction against the lessor, seeking to utilize the balance of the building for other than residential purposes.2