In order to make a valid conveyance of land, it is essential that the land itself, the subject of the conveyance, be capable of identification, and, if the conveyance does not describe the land with such particularity as to render this possible, the conveyance is absolutely nugatory.40 The language of the conveyance by which the land is sought to be identified is usually referred to as the "description."

39. Such a view is, however, contradicted by occasional decisions that a power given to a chattel mortgagee to enter and to take the goods on the mortgagor's land is destroyed by an unauthorized alteration of the instrument. Hollingsworth v. Holbrook, 80 Iowa 151, 20 Am. St. Rep. 411, 45 N. W. 561; Bacon v. Hooker, 177 Mass. 335, 83 Am. St. Rep. 279, 58 N. E. 1078.

40. Brandon v. Leddy, 67 Cal.

43, 7 Pac. 33; Huntress v. Port-wood, 116 Ga. 351, 42 S. E. 513; Carter v. Barnes, 26 111. 455; Wilson v. Johnson, 145 Ind. 40, 38 N. E. 38, 43 N. E. 930; Mcbride v. Steinweden, 72 Kan. 508, 83 Pac. 822; Wilson v. In-loes, 6 Gill (Md.) 121, Holme v. Strautman. 35 Mo. 293; Bailey v. White, 41 N. H. 337; Jackson v. Ransom, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 107; Kea v. Robeson, 40 N. C. 373; Howard v. North, 5 Tex. 290, 51 Am. Dec. 769.

The description may be by the use of a designation for the land which has a recognized application thereto, as when one conveys the "A" estate or the "B" farm.41 The grantor may also describe the land as his land in a certain town, or in a certain block, or on a certain street, and such a description is sufficient if the land can be identified.42 So, a conveyance of "all the land" or "all the property" owned by the grantor, or of all that owned by him in a particular district, is sufficient to convey land within the scope of the description,43 as is a conveyance of all one's interest in the estate of a person deceased,44 or of such land as formerly belonged to or was conveyed to a particular person.45

Whenever land is occupied and improved by a building or other structure designed for a particular purpose, which comprehends its beneficial use and enjoyment, it may be conveyed by a term which describes the purpose to which it is thus appropriated.40 For instance,

41. See Haley v. Amestoy, 44 Cal. 132; Trentman v. Neff, 124 Ind. 503; Vaughan v. Swayzie, 56 Miss. 706; Charles v. Patch, 87 Mo. 450; Barker v. Publishers Paper Co., - N. H., - 41 97 Atl. 749; Lennig's Ex'rs v. White (Va.) 20 S. E. 831.

42. Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal. 335; Blair v. Bruns, 8 Colo. 397; Bird v. Bird, 40 Me. 398; Harmon v. James, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) Ill, 45 Am. Dec. 296; Doe d. Carson v. Ray, 52 N. C. 609, 78 Am. Dec. 267.

43. Pettigrew v. Dobbelaar, 63 Cal. 396; Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randell, 82 Iowa 89, 47 N. W. 905; Marr v. Hobson, 22 Me. 321; First Nat. Bank of Attleboro v. Hughes, 10 Mo. App. 7; Brown v. Warren, 16 Nev. 228; Sally v. Gunter, 13 Rich.

Law (S. C.) 72; Harvey v. Edens, 69 Tex. 420, 6 S. W. 306.

44. Sheppard's Touchstone, 250; Barnes v. Bartlett, 47 Ind. 98; Patterson v. Snell, 67 Me. 559; Butrick v. Tilton, 141 Mass. 93, 6 N. E. 563; Austin v. Dolbee, 101 Mich. 292, 59 N. W. 608; Stewart v. Cage, 59 Miss. 558; Barton's Lessee v. Morris' Heirs, 15 Ohio, 408; Mcgavock v. Deery, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 265.

45. Eufaula Nat. Bank v. Pruett, 128 Ala. 470; Choteau v. Jones, 11 111. 300, 50 Am. Dec. 460; Hogan v. Page, 22 Mo. 55; Mcchesney's Lessee v. Wain-wright, 5 Ohio, 452; Gresham v. Chambers, 80 Tex. 544, 16 S. W. 326.

46. Johnson v. Rayner, 6 Gray (Mass.) 107; Cunningham v. Webb, 69 Me. 92.

Under the designation of a "house," a "mill," a "factory," or like expressions, not only the land beneath the building,47 but also so much of the adjoining land as is ordinarily used therewith for the purpose expressed in such designation,48 will pass, provided, of course, a contrary intention does not appear. So, by a conveyance of a "well," not merely the right to take water from the well, but the land itself occupied by the well, will pass.49

By a conveyance of "water," the land under the water does not usually pass, the proper description being of the land as covered by water.50 A conveyance of "woods" or "forests" is sufficient to pass the land itself.51 A conveyance in terms of the "profits" of land will pass the land itself, "for what is the land but

47. Comyn's Dig. Grant, E 11; Pottkamp v. Buss, 3 Cal. Unrep. 694, 31 Pac. 1121; Dikeman v. Taylor, 24 Conn. 219; Hatch v. Brier, 71 Me. 542; Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp. v. Chandler, 9 Allen (Mass.) 159; Webster v. Potter, 105 Mass. 414; Cravens v. Pettit, 16 Mo. 210; Lang-worthy v. Coleman, 18 Nev. 440; Doe d. Wise v. Wheeler 28 N. C. 196; Wilson v. Hunter, 14 Wis. 683, 80 Am. Dec. 795.

48. Whitney v. Olney, 3 Mason 280 Fed. Cas. No. 17,595 ; Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186; Maddox v. Goddard, 15 Me. 218, 33 Am. Dec. 604; Esty v. Baker, 48 Me. 495; Doane v. Broad Street Ass'n, 6 Mass. 332; Porbush v. Lombard, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 109; Am-midown v. Ball, 8 Allen (Mass.) 293; Snow v. Inhabitants of Orleans, 126 Mass. 453; Gibson v. Brockway, 8 N. H. 465, 31 Am. Dec. 200; Winchester v.

Hees, 35 N. H. 43; Marston v. Stickney, 58 N. H. 609; Bogard v. Barhan, 56 Ore. 269, 108 Pac. 214; Smith v. Martin, 2 Wms. Saund. 400, note 2. Compare Ogden v. Jennings, 62 N. Y. 526

So a conveyance of a "pound" has been held to include the land under the pound (Wooley v. Inhabitants of Groton, 2 Cush. [Mass.] 305), of a "rope walk," land actually and exclusively devoted to the use of the rope walk (Davis v. Handy, 37 N. H. 65), and of a "bridge," land on which the bridge is erected (Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186). And a conveyance of a "railroad" may include land used with a railroad. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Maffit, 94 Mo. 56. 6 S. W. 600.

49. Johnson v. Rayner, 6 Gray (Mass.) 107; Mixer v. Reed, 25 Vt. 254. See Co. Litt. 5.

50. Co. Litt. 4b.

51. Co. Litt. 4b.

The profits" thereof,52 and the same may be said of a conveyance of the "use" of the land.53