That the license is evidenced by an unsealed writing is a fortiori immaterial as regards the power of revocation. Lehigh & N. E. R. Co. v. Bangor & P. R. Co., 228 Pa. 350, 77 Atl. 552.

41. Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 Mees. & W. 838; Workman v. Stephenson, - Colo. App. - , 144 Pac. 1126; St. Louis National Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 112 111. 384, 54 Am. Rep. 543; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 51 Minn. 304, 53 N. W. 639; Shippey v. Kansas City, 254 Mo. 1, 162 S. W. 137; Dodge v. Mcclintock, 47 N. H. 383; Wiseman v. Lucksinger. 84 N. Y. 31, 38 Am. Rep. 479; Eckerson v. Crippen, 110 N. Y. 585, 1 L. R. A. 487, 18 N. E. 443; Herndon v. Durham & S. Ry. Co , 161 N. C. 650, 77 S. E. 683; Baldwin v. Taylor, 166 Pa. 507, 31 Atl. 250; Caledonian County Grammar School v. Kent, 86 Vt. 151, 84 Atl. 26; Thoemke v. Fiedler, 91 Wis. 386, 64 N. W. 1030. And see cases cited supra, this section, note 39.

That this is so has been i're-quently decided in cases involving the rights of the holder of a ticket to a theater or other place of entertainment. V. >d v.

Leadbitter, 13 Mees. & W. 845; Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S. 633, 57 L. Ed. 679. 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 691; Mccrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray (Mass.) 21, 71 Am. Dec. 745; Burton v. Scherpf, 1 Allen (Mass.) 133, 79 Am. Dec. 717; Meissner v. Detroit B. I. & W. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872, 129 Am. St. Rep. 493, 118 N. W. 14; Shu-bert v. Nixon Co., 83 N. J. L. 101, 83 Atl. 369; People v. Fynn, 189 N. Y. 180, 82 N. E. 169; Pur-cell v. Daly, 19 Abb. N. Cas. 301; Taylor v. Cohn, 47 Ore. 538, 84 Pac. 388; Horney v. Nixon, 213 Pa. St. 20, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1184, 61 Atl. 1088, 110 Am. St. Rep. 520; Buenzle v. Newport Amusement Ass'n, 29 R. I. 23, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1242, 68 Atl. 721; Bos-well v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, 185 S. W. 692; W. W. V. Co. v. Black, 113 Va. 728, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 558, 75 S. E. 82.

42. Sullivan Timber Co. v. Mobile, 124 Fed. 648; Hicks v. Swift Creek Mill Co., 133 Ala. 411, 57 L. R. A. 720, 91 Am. St. Rep. 38, 31 So. 947; Alderman v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 137, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 74, 70 Atl. 626; Hiers v. Mill Haven Co., 113 Ga. 1002, 39 S. E. 444; Mcreynolds v. Harrigfield, 26 Idaho, 26, 140 Pac. 1096; Morse v. Lorenz, 262 111. 115, 104 N. E. 237; Nowlin nature of the privilege created by a license can be altered in this or any other respect by reason of the fact that a consideration was paid for the license is not readily perceptible. But though the payment of a consideration should not render a license irrevocable, the fact that a consideration is paid for a grant of permission, either oral or in writing, to make a particular use of one's land, is a circumstance tending to show that the grant of an easem2nt and not a license merely was intended, in which case, as hereafter explained, the making of improvements on the faith of such invalid grant will justify the interposition of a court of equity to protect the grantee.43

- Improvements by licensee. The question whether, after the licensee has expended money in the making of improvements "on the faith of the license," v. Whipple, 120 Ind. 596, 6 L. R. A. 159, 22 N. E. 6G9; Ruthven v. Farmers' Co-oporative Creamery Co., 140 Iowa, 570, 118 N. W. 915; Kastner v. Benz, 67 Kan. 486, 73 Pac. 67; Martin v. O'brien, 34 Miss. 21; Wright v. Brown, 163 Mo. App. 117, 145 S. W. 518; Ewing v. Rhea, 37 Ore. 583, 52 L. R. A. 140, 82 Am. St. Rep. 783. 62 Pac. 790; Falls City Lumber Co. v. Watkins, 53 Ore. 212, 99 Pac. 884; Salinger v. North American Woolen Mills, 70 W. Va. 151, 73 S. E. 312.

In Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd. (1915) K. B. 1, it was decided, by two judges against one, that the license involved in the sale of a ticket for a performance could not be revoked. The majority opinions appear to be based upon the theory that there was a contract, capable of enforcement by injunction, that the ticket holder should be allowed to sit through the performance, which gave him an equitable interest in the land itself, which could not be withdrawn at will. Such an interest, if its existence be conceded, must be in the nature of an easement, and an easement to endure only for the period of a moving picture performance is, to say the least, a novelty. That the ticket holder has no interest in such a case, entitled to protection, see editorial notes in 13 Mich. Law Rev. at p. 401, 27 Harv. Law Rev. 495 and article by J. C. Miles, Esq., 31 Law Quart. Rev. 217. The decision is approved in editorial notes in 14 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 608; 26 Yale Law Journal, 395.

43. Post, this section, notes 43-49.

That is, for the purpose of availing himself of the license, the license continues revocable as it was before such expenditure, has been the subject of a great number of dicta and decisions. These may be broadly divided into two groups. Those in the one group are in terms that, after the licensee has made expenditures upon the strength of the license, a revocation of the license would involve a fraud upon him, which a court of equity, and occasionally a court of law, will not permit.44 Those in the other group are to the opposite voked even after the making of improvements on the faith thereof appear properly to involve the assertion of a rule that permission to make a particular use of land is not to he construed as an intended grant of an easement, even though its enjoyment does involve the making of improvements by the person to whom it is given. In accordance with this view, that the question is properly one of the construction of the language used in granting the permission, in connection with the character of the acts authorized and the necessity of expenditures to make the permission practically available, are occasional decisions that if the license is expressed to be revocable, or subject to the pleasure of the licensor, it may be revoked in spite of expenditures for improvements,50 as well as occasional suggestions that if the permission is granted for a named period it canot be revoked until the end of that period.51 If permission to use 'another's property is expressed to be revocable, it must necessarily be either a license merely, or the grant of an easement, subject to a power of revocation, while if it is granted for a named period, it cannot be intended as a license merely, but must be construed as a grant, or attempted grant, of an easement.