That the line of an adjoining tract given as a means of locating a boundary, whether termed a monument or not, ordinarily controls courses and distances, see Morrow v. Whitney, 95 U. S. 551, 24 L. Ed. 456; Rock Creek ments must yield to those for courses and distances if it in any way appears that the calls for courses and distances are more to be relied on,66 and the courses and distances may at times serve to aid in identifying the monuments.67 When the courses and distances conflict, the whole description is to be considered to determine which conforms to the intention of the parties, and there is ordinarily no rule by which preference is to be given to one element as against the other.68

Property Co. v. Hill, 162 Ky. 324, 172 S. W. 671; Chapman v. Hamlet, 100 Me. 454, 62 Atl. 215; Hill v. Mcconnell, 106 Md. 574 68 Atl. 199; Percival v. Chase, 182 Mass. 371, 65 N. E. 80; Smith v. Catlin Land & Improvement Co. 117 Mo. 438, 22 S. W. 1083; Whitaker v. Cover. 140 N. C. 280, 52 S. E. 581; Calhoun v. Price, 17 Ohio St. 96; Airey v. Kunkle, 190 Pa. 196, 42 Atl. 533; Connor v. Johnson, 59 S. C. 115, 37 S. E. 240; Pritchard v. Rebori. 135 Tenn. 328, 186 S. W. 121; Miller v. Holt, 47 W. Va. 7, 34 S. E. 956. But see Kock v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 645, apparently contra.

In some cases it is stated that courses and distances are controlled by natural monuments, as if to imply that they are not controlled by artificial monuments. Brown v. Huger, 21 How. (U. S.) 305, 16 L. Ed. 125; Kimball v. Mckee, 149 Cal. 435, 86 Pac. 1089; Thompson v. Hill. 137 Ga. 308, 73 S. E. 640; Myers v. St. Louis, 82 Mo. 367; Hen-nigan v. Matthews, (Ore.) 155 Pac. 169; Maddox v. Fenner, 79 Tex. 279, 15 S. W. 237.

In North Carolina, only natural monuments, or the established line of another tract, will control courses and distances. Tate v. Johnson, 148 N. C. 267, 61 S. E. 741; Wilson Lumber Co. v. Hut-ton, 152 N. C. 537, 68 S. E. 2.

Quite frequently the quantity or estimated quantity of the land is named in the conveyance, but this is considered inferior as an indication of the location of the boundaries to the elements above named, and, if inconsistent, must yield to calls for courses and distances,69

66. White v. Luning, 93 U. S. 514, 23 L. Ed. 938; Barker v. Mobile Electric Co., 173 Ala. 28, 55 So. 364; United States v. Cameron, - Ariz., - 21 Pac. 177; Matthews v. Pursifull, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1001, 96 S. W. 803; Hamilton v. Foster, 45 Me. 32; Murdock v. Chapman. 9 Gray (Mass.) 156; Jamison v. Fopiano, 48 Mo. 194; Buffalo N, Y. & E. R. Co. v. Stigeler, 61 N. Y. 348; Christen-son v. Simmons, 47 Ore. 184, 82 Pac. 805; Southern Realty Inv. Co. v. Keenan, 99 S. C. 195, 83 S. E. 39; Smith v. Hutchison, 104 Tenn. 394, 58 S. W. 226; Joggers v. Stringer, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 571, 106 S. W. 151.

67. Tyler v. Fickett, 73 Me. 410; Chisholm v. Thompson, 233 Pa. 181, 82 Atl. 67.

68. Preston's Heirs v. Bowmar, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 580, 5 L. Ed. 336; Mcclintock v. Rogers, 11 111. 279; Blight v. Atwell, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 278; Loring v. Norton, 8 Me. 61; Hall v. Eaton, 139 Mass. 217, 29 N. E. 660;

As well as to calls for monuments.70 In particular cases, however, when the other calls do not clearly show the intention of the parties, a call for quantity may have a controlling effect.71

Curtis v. Aaronson, 49 N. J. L. 68, 60 Am. Rep. 584, 7 Atl. 886; Williams v. Mayfield, 57 Tex. 364; Green v. Pennington, 105 Va. 801, 54 S. E. 877; Davies v. Wickstrom, 56 Wash. 154, 105 Pac. 454. But that ordinarily distances yield to courses, see Paschal v. Swepston, 120 Ark. 230, 179 S. W. 339; Ramsay v. Morrow, 133 Ky. 486, 186 S. W. 296; May v. Wolf Valley Coal Co., 167 Ky. 525. 180 S. W. 781.

69. Doe d. Phillips' Heirs v. Porter, 3 Ark. 18, 36 Am. Dec. 448; Ray v. Pease, 95 Ga. 153, 22 S. E. 190; Allen v. Kersey, 104 Ind. 1, 3 N. E. 557; Sanders v. Godding, 45 Iowa, 463; Rock Creek Property Co. v. Hill, 162 Ky. 324, 172 S. W. 671; Sher-win v. Bitzer, 97 Minn. 252, 106 N. W. 1046; Pohlman v. Evangelical Lutheran Trinity Church, 60 Neb. 364, 83 N. W. 201; Christian v. Bulbeck, 119 Va. 74, 90 S. E. 661; Gilman v. Smith. 12 Vt. 150; Mclrwin v. Charle-bois, 38 Wash. 151, 80 Pac. 285.

When the description of a boundary line is uncertain and ambiguous, if the parties to the conveyance locate on the ground a certain line as being that described, and the grantee holds possession accordingly, this "practical location" of the line is regarded as showing the meaning of the ambiguous description, and, as such, conclusive on each of them.72 Occasionally it has even been decided that a line thus located and acted on is conclusive upon the parties, though the course as given in the conveyance is free from ambiguity, and calls for a different line.73

See Cecil v. Gray, 170 Cal. 137, 148 Pac. 935.

70. Thompson v. Sheppard, 85 Ala. 611, 5 So. 334; Dutra v. Pereira, 135 Cal. 320, 67 Pac. 281; Cottingham v. Parr, 93 111. 233; Allen v. Kersey, 104 Ind. 1, 3 N. E. 557; Martin v. Frazier, 172 Iowa 63, 152 N. W. 14; Emery v. Fowler, 38 Me. 99; Sandrett v. Whalston, 124 Minn. 331, 144 N. W. 1089; Friesz v. Butcher, (Mo.), 191 S. W. 66; Doe d. Arden v. Thompson, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 371; Petts v. Shaw, 15 Pa. St. 218; Ayers v. Harris, 64 Tex. 393.

71. Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Min. & Mill Co., 183 Fed. 51, 105 C. C. A. 343; Win-ans v. Cheney, 55 Cal. 567; Campbell v. Carruth, 32 Fla. 264, 13 So. 432; Sanders v. Godding, 45 Iowa 463; O'brien v. Clark. 104 Md. 30, 64 Atl. 53; Hoffman v. City of Port Huron, 102 Mich. 417, 60 N. W. 831; Davis v. Hess, 103 Mo. 31, 15 S. W.

324; Wilson Lumber & Milling Co. v. Hutton & Bourbonnais, 152 N. C. 537, 68 S. E. 2 Mcdowell v. Carothers, 75 Ore. 126, 146 Pac. 800; Holden v. Cantrell, 100 S. C. 265, 84 S. E. 826; Virginia Coal & Iron Co. v. Ison, 114 Va. 144, 75 S. E. 782; State v. Herold, 76 W. Va. 537, 85 S. E. 733.

72. Hastings v. Stark, 36 Cal. 122; Raymond v. Nash, 57 Conn. 447; Stone v. Clark, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 381; Wells v. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co., 47 N. H. 235; Den d. Haring v. Van Houten, 22 N. J. L. 61; Meeks v. Wil-lard, 57 N. J. L. 22, 29 Atl. 318; Linney v. Wood, 66 Tex. 22, 17 S. W. 244; Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, 18 N. W. 6.

73. Knowles v. Toothaker, 58 Me. 172; Kellogg v. Smith, 7 Gush. (Mass.) 375. This seems to be an approximation to the view held by some of the courts that adjoining owners may locate the intervening boundary middle or thread of the stream, prima facie passes the soil to such middle line.78 In the case of a conveyance of land bounded by a lake or pond, the same general rule, by the weight of authority, applies, and the conveyance prima facie passes the soil so far as the the grantor owns, whether this ownership extends to the center of the lake or pond, to the high-water mark, or to an intermediate point.79 Occasional decisions to the contrary, that a conveyance of land in terms bounded by a lake or pond of a permanent character does not prima facie pass land belonging to the grantor under the water,80 appear to be based, to a considerable extent at least, upon the authority of decisions that the state, and not the individual, had title to such land, a very different matter.