The question whether land under water belongs, in certain eases, to the state or to individuals, has been before discussed.74 The question now arises as to when, in case of land under water not belonging to the state, a conveyance of land as abutting on the water will be construed as including such land under the water as belongs to the grantor. The general rule of contraction of a conveyance of land bounded by water is that, unless a contrary intention appears, it passes the soil towards the center of the water as far as the grantor owns.75 Accordingly, if the shore of the sea belongs to the owner of the upland, it passes by a conveyance by him of land bounded "by the sea," or "harbor," or other words descriptive of the water.76 And a grant of land bounded on a navigable nontidal river, in those states in which the land under such a river is not vested in the state, prima facie conveys the whole interest of the grantor so far as he owns, which is usually to the center of the stream.77 A conveyance of land bounded on a nontidal, nonnavigable river, the land under which is usually in the abutting owner ad filum aquae, that is, to the line by mere oral agreement. See ante, Sec.Sec. 294 297.

74. Ante, Sec. 300-303.

75. Cicero v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 270 111. 606, 110 N. E. 811; Brophy v. Richeson, 137 Ind. 114, 36 N. E. 424; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160. See note to Allen v. Weber, 80 Wis. 531, 14 L. R. A. 361, 27 Am. St. Rep. 51, 50 N. W. 514..

76. City of Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351; Winslow v. Patten, 34 Me. 25; Partridge v. Luce, 36 Me. 16; Harlow v. Fisk, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 302; Freeman v. Bellegarde, 108 Cal. 179, 49 Am. St. Rep. 76, 41 Pac. 289.

77. Braxon v. Bressler, 64 111. 492; Williamsburg Boom Co. v. Smith, 84 Ky. 372, 1 S. W. 765; Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 75 Me. 329, 46 Am. Rep. 397; City of Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351; Butler v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 85 Mich. 246, 24 Am. St. Rep. 84, 48 N. W. 569; In re West Farms Road, 212 N. Y. 325, 106 N. E. 102; June v. Pur-cell, 36 Ohio St. 396; Jones v. Janney, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 436, 42 Am. Dec. 309; Richmond v. Thompson's Heirs, 116 Va. 178, 81 S. E. 105; Norcross v. Griffiths, 65 Wis. 599, 66 Am. Rep. 642, 27 N. W. 606.

The effect thus given to conveyances as passing, prima facie, the soil under the water, is based not only

78. Hanlon v. Hobson, 24 Colo. 284, 42 L. R. A. 502, 51 Pac. 433; Stanford v. Mangin, 30 Ga. 355; Kinsella v. Stephenson, 265 111. 369, 106 N. E. 50; Foster v. Bussey, 132 Iowa 640, 109 N. W. 1105; State v. Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 461; Canal Fund Com'rs v. Kempshall, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 404; Wall v. Wall, 142 N. C. 387, 55 S. E. 283; Fulmer v. Williams, 122 Pa. St. 191, 1 L. R. A. 603, 9 Am. St. Rep. 88, 15 Atl. 726; Muller v. Landa, 31 Tex. 265, 98 Am. Dec. 529; State v. Superior Court for Cowlitz County, 84 Wash. 252, 146 Pac. 609.

79. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. Ed. 428; Johnson v. Elder, 92 Ark. 30, 121 S. W. 1066; Mill River Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. 462; Brophy v. Richeson, 137 Ind. 114, 36 N. E. 424; Stevens v.

King, 76 Me. 197, 49 Am. Rep. 609 (semble); Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Clute v. Fisher, 65 Mich. 48, 31 N. W. 614; Castle v. Elder, 57 Minn. 289, 59 N. W. 197; Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 360; Gouverneur v. National Ice Co., 134 N. Y. 355, 18 L. R. A. 695, 30 Am. St. Rep. 669; 31 N. E. 865; Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 8 L. R. A. 578, 21 Am. St. Rep. 828, 24 N. E. 686; Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 225 Pa. 605, 74 Atl. 648; Holden v. Chandler, 61 Vt. 291, 18 Atl. 310; Providence Forge Fishing & Hunting Club v. Miller Mfg. Co., 117 Va. 129, 83 S. E. 1047.

80. Boardman v. Scott, 102 Ga. 404, 51 L. R. A. 178, 30 S. E. 982; Patapsco Guano Co. v. Bowers White Lumber Co., 146 N. Car. 187, 125 Am. St. Rep. 473, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 81, 59 on the presumption that the parties intend the ownership thereof to be vested in the person who is alone, usually, in a position to make use of it, and who probably will need to do so, but also, in some decisions, upon the ground of public policy, which renders it desirable to prevent the existence of small strips of land along the margin of streams or other bodies of water, the title to which may remain in abeyance for many years, and which may then be asserted merely in order to harass the owner of the adjoining land.81 Sometimes, however, in the case of a stream, the rule is stated as being merely an application of the principle that, when a monument is referred to, the land conveyed extends to the center of such monument.82

When the land conveyed is described, not as bounded by a stream, but by or on the "bank," "shore," "margin," or "edge" of the stream, or equivalent terms are used, the land under the water has usually been regarded as intended to be excluded.83 The same view has been adopted in the case of conveyances of land bounded by the margin or shore of a lake.84

S. E. 538; Kanouse v. Slockbower, 48 N. J. Eq. 42.

81. See dissenting opinion by Redfield, J, in Buck v. Squiers, 22 Vt. 484; Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 451, 35 Am. Dec. 637.

82. Sleeper v. Laconia, 60 N. H. 201; Child v. Starr, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 369.

83. Rockwell v. Baldwin, 53 111. 19; Murphy v. Copeland, 51 Iowa 515, 43 Am. Rep. 118; Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9; Child v. Starr, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 369, reversing 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 149; Halsey v. Mccormick, 13 N. Y. 296; Lamb v. Ricketts, 11 Ohio, 311; Eddy v. St. Mars, 53 Vt. 462, 38 Am. Rep. 695; Whittier v. Mont-pelier Ice Co., 90 Vt. 16, 96 Atl.

378; Commissioners Commercial Waterway v. Seattle Factory Sites Co., 76 Wash. 181, 135 Pac. 1042; Allen v. Weber, 80 Wis. 531, 27 Am. St. Rep. 51. Contra, Sleeper v. Laconta, 60 N. H. 201, 49 Am. Rep. 311.

But that the land is described as being on the side of the stream has not been regarded as excluding the land under the water. Harlow v. Fish, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 304; Hanlon v. Hobson, 24 Colo. 284, 42 L. R. A. 502; Miller v. Mann, 55 Vt. 475; Morrison v. Keen, 3 Me. 474; Carter v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 26 W. Va. 644, 53 Am. Rep. 116.

84. Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305, 28 L. R. A. 391, 17 So. 411; Brophy v. Richeson. 137 Ind.

In the absence of anything to show a contrary intention, a call for the bank of a stream as the boundary has been regarded as extending the description as far as the stream itself and not merely to the top of the bank,85 and as bounding the land by the low-water mark rather than by the high-water mark.86

Whether a boundary on or by "the shore" extends the land conveyed to high or to low water mark, has quite frequently been the subject of judicial discussion. Since the word shore, in its technical sense, describes the land between high and low water mark,87 a boundary on or by the shore would seem properly to carry the description as far as high water mark only, and such is the effect which has ordinarily been given thereto.88 But it is recognized that a consideration of the whole instrument, and of the monuments referred to therein, or of the point of beginning of the description, may serve to show that the word "shore" was used, in an untechnical sense, as meaning low water mark.89 A like view has been taken in the case of a boundary on a "beach"90 or on "flats."91

114, 36 N .E. 424; Allen v. Weber, 80 Wis. 531, 14 L. R. A. 361, 27 Am. St. Rep. 51, 50 N. W. 514. But see Castle v. Elder, 57 Minn. 289, 59 N. W. 197.

85. Murphy v. Copeland, 58 Iowa, 409, 43 Am. Rep. 118, 10 N. W. 786; Stone v. Augusta, 46 Me. 127; Daniels v. Cheshire R. Co., 20 N. H. 85.

86. Murphy v. Copeland, 58 Iowa, 409, 43 Am. Rep. 118, 10 N. W. 786; Halsey v. Mccormick, 13 N- Y. 296; Yates v. Van De Bogert, 56 N. Y. 526; Lamb v. Ricketts, 11 Ohio, 311; Palmer v. Farrell, 129 Pa. 162, 15 Am. St. Rep. 708, 18 Atl. 761. Contra, People ex rel Highway Comm'rs v. Madison County, 125 111. 9, 17 N. E. 147; Stone v. Augusta,

46 Me. 127. That a different intention may be inferred from the language used, see Dunlap v. Stetson, 4 Mason (U. S.) 349; Palmer v. Farrell. 129 Pa. 162, 15 Am. St. Rep. 70S, 18 Atl. 761.

87. Ante, Sec. 300.

88. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 4 Am. Dec. 155; Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 510; Brown v. Heard, 85 Me. 294, 27 Atl. 182; Galveston City Surf Bathing Co. v. Heidenheimer, 63 Tex. 559.

89. Whitmore v. Brown, 100 Me. 410, 61 Atl. 985; Oakes v. De Lancey, 133 N. Y. 227, 28 Am. St. Rep. 628, 30 N. E. 974; Haskell v. Friend, Utr, Mass. 198. 81 N. E. 962.

The fact that the description, while stating that the land is bounded "by" a stream, or that it extends "to" a stream, or that a boundary runs "along" the stream, names an object on the shore or bank as a monument, does not ordinarily show an intention to exclude the stream, but this is regarded as merely a statement of the point at which the boundary strikes the stream, it being usually impracticable to place monuments actually in the stream.92