34. 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, Sec.Sec. 158-104; Randolph, Eminent Domain, Sec.Sec. 402, 403; Chicago, B. & Q. R, Co. v. Wvst Chicago St. R. Co., 156 111. 255, 29 L. R, A. 4S5, 40 N. E. 1008; Louisville Ey. Co. v. Foster, 108 Ky. 743, 50 L. R. A. 813, 57 S. W. 480; Briggs v. Lewiston & H. R. Co., 79 Mr. 363, 1 Am. St. Rep. 316, 10 All.

47; Attorney General v. Metropolitan R. Co., 125 Mass. 515; Austin v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 149, 2 Ann. Cas. 530, 96 N. W. 35; Placke v. Union Depot Ry. Co., 140 Mo. 634, 41 S. W. 915; Kirkpatriek v. Piedmont Traction Co., 170 N. C. 477, 87 S. E. 232; Rafferty v. Central Traction Co., 147 Pa. 579, 30 Am. St. Rep. 763,23 Atl. 884; San Antonio Rapid Transit St. Ry. Co. v. Lim-burger, 88 Tex. 79, 53 Am. St. Rep. 730, 30 S. W. 533. Contra. Slaughter v. Meridian Light & R. Co., 95 Miss. 251, 25 L. E. A.(n. S.) 1265, 48 So. 6; Jaynes v. Omaha St. Ey. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 39 L. R. A. 751, 74 N. W. 67, by reason of trolley poles).

34a. Lincoln Safe Deposil Co., 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. E. 768. See Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 100 Am. St. Eep. 577, 69 N. B, 327.

34b. Colorado Springs v. .Stark, 57 Colo. 384, 140 Tar. 701; Barnard v. Chicago, 270 111. 27, 110 N.

E 412

2 R. P. - 22 is no actual encroachment upon the land; and the fact that the easements of light, air, or access are thereby affected is immaterial.35

Besides the abutting owner's easements of light, air and access, there are occasional decisions or dicta to the effect that he has a right of unobstructed view from and over every part of the highway to and from his property,36 and a number of courts have recognized rights in him to the comfort and satisfaction obtainable from the presence of trees in the highway, with a resulting right of action against persons injuring or destroying the trees, he being sometimes referred to as having an easement in the trees.36a In one state it has been broadly asserted that the abutting owner has a property right in all the advantages and benefits which

35. Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 20 How. (U. S.) 135, 15 L. Ed. 858; Bowden v. Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394; Roberts v. City of Chicago, 26 111. 249; Reilly v. Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa, 633, 92 N. W. 887; Cal-lender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 417, 430; City of Pontiac v. Carter, 32 Mich. 164; Radeliff's Ex'rs v. City of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 19"; Brand v. Multnomah County, 38 Ore. 791, 50 L. R, A. 389, 62 Pac. 209, 84 Am. St. Rep. 772, 60 Pac. 390; O'connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. St. 187; Kehrer v. Richmond City, 81 Va. 745; Walsh v. Campbellsport, 123 Wis. 334, 101 N. W. 709; 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, Sec.Sec. 127-140; 3 Dillon, Mun. Corp., Sec. 1152.

In Ohio the abutting owner may recover compensation for damage to improved property from an unreasonable change of grade. City of Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 Ohio St. 328; Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196.

36. First Nat. Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459, 59 L. R. A. 399, 91 Am. St. Rep. 46, 32 So. 144; Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592, 89 Pac. 330; Perry v. Castner, 124 Iowa, 386, 100 N. W. 84; Mccormick v. Weaver, 144 Mich. 6, 107 N. W. 314; Jaynes v. Omaha St. R. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 39 L. R. A. 751, 74 X. W. 67; Hallock v. Scheyer. 33 Hun (N. Y.) Ill; Cobb v. Saxby [1914] 3 K. B. 822. See Green v. Thresher, 255 Pa. 169, 83 Atl. 711, and editorial note, 28 Harv. Law Rev. 499, from which some of the above references have been taken.

36a. Newland v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 179 Iowa, 228. 159 N. W. 244; Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co., 181 N. Y. 313, 70 L. R. A. 761, 106 Am. St. Rep. 549, 73 N. E. 1108: Wheeler v. Norfolk- Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 172 N. C. 9, 89 S. E. 793; Norman Milling & Grain Co. v. Bethaccrue to him by reason of the location of his land upon the street.37

- Rights of deviation. There are a number of decisions and dicta to the effect that, if a highway becomes impassable at a certain point, a traveler may deviate on the adjoining land.38 The existence of such a right at common law has been generally assumed; but whether it would be recognized at the present day in England, in the absence of a prescriptive right to deviate, is doubtful.39 Even where the right is recognized, it is restricted to cases of strict necessity,40 and the deviation upon neighboring land must be to the smallest possible extent.41

- Extinction of highway. The common-law maxim, "Once a highway, always a highway,"42 may be regarded as entirely obsolete in this country, and here a highway may cease to exist through one of several causes.

There are in many states statutory provisions for the "vacation" of a highway, frequently by proceedings upon petition, more or less similar to proceedings urem, 41 Okla. 735, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1082, 139 Pac. 830.

37. Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co., 181 N. Y, 313, 70 L. R. A. 761, 106 Am. St. Rep. 549, 73 N. E. 1108. See 3 Dillon, Mun. Corp. Sec. 1126.

38. Carey v. Rae, 58 Cal. 159; Irwin v. Yeager, 74 Iowa, 174, 37 N. W. 136; Campbell v. Race, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 408, 58 Am. Dec. 728; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 507; Williams v. Safford. 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 309; State v. Brown, 109 N. C. 802, 14 S. E. 98; Morey v. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487, 48 Am. Rep. 811; Taylor v. Whitehead, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 745; Dawes v. Hawkins, 8 C. B. N.

S. 848; 2 Wms. Saund., 161 note (12).

39. See the remarks of Black-1 urn, J., in Arnold v. Holbrook, L. R. 8 Q. B. 96, in which he shows that, in Duncomb's Case, Cro. Car. 366, and Absor v. French, 2 Show. 28, usually referred to in support of the right, the question was not involved.

40. Campbell v. Race, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 408; State v. Brown, 109 N. C. 802; Morey v. Fitzgerald, 56 Vt. 487, 48 Am. Rep. 811.

41. Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 510; White v. Wiley, 59 Hun. 618, 13 N. Y. Supp. 205.

42. Dawes v. Hawkins, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 848, 858.

For the establishment of a highway.43 The owner of land immediately abutting on the highway thus vacated is, if the highway is a city street, usually regarded as deprived of property by reason of the impairment of his right of access, and so entitled to compensation.44 The courts differ as to whether an abutting owner is entitled to compensation in case a part of the highway other than that contiguous to his land is vacated, and even those which recognize a possible right of compensation in such case differ as to the criteria by which to determine whether he suffers substantial injury different from that suffered by members of the public generally, so as to be entitled to compensation in the particular case.44a