So when one having an easement of light availed himself of such easement by maintaining windows in a wall for many years, this was regarded as fixing the character and extent of the easement. Kesseler v. Bow-ditch, 223 Mass. 265, 111 N. E. 887.

63. Bowers v. Myers, 237 Pa. 533, 85 Atl. 860; Hammond v. Hammond, 250 Pa. 51, 101 Atl. 855. This, even though the person having the easement consented to an erection which prevented it full exercise. Cotting v. Murray, 209 Mass. 133, 95 N. E. 212.

64. Tallon v. City of Hoboken, 60 N. J. L. 212, 37 Atl. 895, it being there decided that if one dedicating land for a street reserved the right to lay tracks for horse cars and steam cars he could lay tracks and string wires for electric cars.

65. See United States Pipe Line Co. v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 254, 42 L. R. A. 572.

- Rights of way. A right of way appurtenant to a particular tenement, as being intended for the purpose of access to and egress from such tenement, cannot be utilized by the owner of such tenement for the purpose of reaching other land.68 He may, however, after going to the dominant tenement by the right of way, pass to a place beyond, if he did not have this in mind when going to the dominant tenement, the question being of his bona fides in making use of the way.69

66. Luttrell's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 87; Sanders v. Norman, 1 B. & Ald. 258; Johnston v. Hyde, 33 N. J. Eq. 632; Angell, Watercourses, Sec.Sec. 228-230.

67. Kaler v. Beaman, 49 Me. 207; Appleton v. Fullerton, 1 Gray (Mass.) 186; Ganley v. Looney, 14 Allen (Mass.) 40; Elliott v. Rhett, 5 Rich. (S. C.) 405, 57 Am. Dec. 750.

68. Howell v. King, 1 Mod. 190; Colchester v. Roberts, 4 Mees. & W. 769; West v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 137 Ala. 568, 34 So. 852; Anderson v. Sweeney, 82 Conn. 694, 75 Atl. 76; Good-willie Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272; Hoosier Stone Co. v. Malott, 130 Ind. 21, 29 N. E. 412; Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Malott, 135 Ind. 113, 34 N. E. 709; Albert v. Thomas, 73 Md. 1, 20 Atl. 912; Davenport v. Lamson, 21 Pick. ,Mass.) 72; Greene v. Canny, 137

Mass. 64; Randall v. Grant, 210 Mass. 302, 96 N. E. 672; French v. Marstin, 32 N. H. 316; Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 702, 70 Atl. 606; Hales v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 172 N. C. 104, 90 S. E. 11; Shroder v. Brenneman, 23 Pa. St. 348; Springer v. Mclntyre, 9 W. Va. 196; Reise v. Enos, 76 Wis. 634, 8 L. R. A. 617, 45 N. W. 414.

So it was held that one could not bring materials to the dominant tenement by a right of way appertaining thereto, and after leaving them there a short time, carry them to a point beyond, to be used in the construction of buildings. Skull v. Glenister. 16 C. B. (N. S.) 81.

69. Williams v. James, L. R. 2 C. P. 577; French v. Marstin, 32 N. H. 316. The use of a right of way for access to a highway stands on a different basis, and the owner of the dominant tenea right of way may be general, as capable of use for all purposes, or may be limited to use by foot passengers only, or horses only, or particular species of vehicles, or for the transportation of certain classes of articles.70 So one may have a right of way for carriages, without the right of driving cattle along the way, or of using it for the transportation of farm products;71 or he may have a way for agricultural purposes, without any right to transport other classes of articles, such as coal taken from the dominant tenement.72

A grant in general terms will ordinarily be construed as creating a general right of way capable of use for all reasonable purposes,73 but the circumstances may demand a different construction,74 as for instance when the physical condition of the servient tenement is such that a general user of the way would involve an injury to such tenement,75 and the named ment may go therefrom to the highway, though he intends thereafter to go from the highway to a point beyond, since this is the obvious purpose of a right of way to a highway. Colchester v. Roberts, 4 Mees. & W. 769.

70. As a privilege of transporting wood (Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71), stone (Hoosier Stone Co. v. Malott, 130 Ind. 21, 29 N. E. 412; Shoemaker v. Cedar Rapids, I. F. & N. W. R. Co., 45 Minn. 366, 48 N. W. 191), or coal (Webber v. Vogel, 159 Pa. 235, 28 Atl. 226).

71. Ballard v. Dyson, 1 Taunt. 279; Herman v. Boberts, 119 N. Y. 37, 16 Am. St. Rep. 800; Perry v. Snow, 165 Mass. 23; Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71.

72. Cowling v. Higginson, 4 Mees. & W. 245.

That an automobile was a carriage within a grant of a right of way for carriages, see Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N. J. Eq. 702, 70 Atl. 606.

73. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Mann, 160 111. App. 649; Frost v. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 1, 90 N. E. 357; Randall v. Grant, 210 Mass. 302, 96 N. E. 672; Abbott v. Butler, 59 N. H. 317; Shreve v. Math-is, 63 N. J. Eq. 170, 52 Atl. 234; Arnold v. Fee, 148 N. Y. 214, 238, 42 N. E. 588; Bowers v. Myers, 237 Pa. 533, 85 Atl. 860; Central Christian Church v. Lennon, 59 Wash. 425, 109 Pac. 1027; United Land Co. v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 10 Ch. App. 586.

74. See Cannon v. Villars, 8 Ch. Div. 420.

75. Rowell v. Daggett, 143 Mass. 483, 10 N. E. 182.

Width of the way may be such as to render it apparent that a foot way only is intended.76

A right of way may, by the terms of the grant, be limited to certain seasons77 or persons,78 or even to a particular time of day.79 It may also be subject to interruption by reason of a particular use that may be made by the owner of the servient tenement.80

In the absence of express restrictions in that regard in the grant, it seems that all persons who can be regarded as having permission, express or implied, to enter on the dominant tenement, may use a way for the purpose of access to such tenement and of egress therefrom.81 Consequently members of the family of the dominant owner,82 his servants and employees,83 his guests,84 and tradesmen and other persons with whom he does business,85 may do so. Such persons are