A vested remainder is susceptible of transfer to the same extent as any other estate, either by conveyance inter vivos99 or by will.1 If an estate of inheritance, it will pass to the heir or heirs of the original

97. Augustus v. Seabolt, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 155; In re Gunning's Estate, 234 Pa. 144, 83 Atl. 61; Re-Townsend, 34 Ch. D. 357; In O-rear v. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. 1107, it is said that a contingent remainder is accelerated if such is the intention. But this would seem to be impossible. In that case the remainder appears actually to have been a vested one.

98. The New York statute providing that, where a remainder is limited on more than two successive estates for life, the life estates subsequent to the two first shall be void, and the remainder shall take effect as if only the two first life estates had been created, has been held not to apply so as to accelerate a contingent remainder. Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N. Y. 446.

99. Cruise, Dig. tit. 16, c. 1. Sec. 9; Acree v. Dabney, 133 Ala. 437, 32 So. 127; Kingsley v. Broward, 19 Fla. 722, 743; Archer v. Jacobs, 125 Iowa, 467, 101 N. W. 195; Johnson v. Jacob, 11 Bush (Ky.) 646; Watson v. Cressey, 79 Me. 381, 10 Atl. 59; Gardner v. Guild, 106 Mass. 25; Glidden v. v. Blodgett, 38 N. H. 74.

1. Woodman v. Woodman, 89 Me. 128, 35 Atl. 1037; Loring v. Carnes, 148 Mass. 223, 19 N. E. 343; Glidden v. Blodgett, 38 N. H. 74; Hinkson v. Lees, 181 Pa. St. 225, 37 Atl. 338; Davis v. Baw cum, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 406.

A remainder to a class is, as before staled, vested so soon as one member of the class is in existence and ascertained, subject to open and let in those who subsequently become members of the class. A remainder, though so subject to open and let in others to share therein, is transmissible by the member or members of the class in existence, to the same extent as other vested remainders.4

- (b) Contingent remainders. A contingent remainder, since it is merely a possibility of an estate, is, by the theory of the common law, not capable of transfer inter vivos,5 except by fine or common recovery.6 It might, however, even at common law, he released to the owner of an estate in possession or remainder.7

2. Archer v. Jacobs, 125 Iowa, 467, 101 N. W. 795; Park v. Mc-Combs, 146 Ky. 327, 142 S. W. 401; Curtis v. Fowler, 66 Mich. 696, 33 N. W. 804; Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 362, 13 S. W. 395; Wimple v. Fond, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 288; In re Kenyon, 17 R. I. 149, 20 Atl. 294; Pearson v. Easter-ling, 107 S. C. 265, 92 S. E. 619, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 980; Bridge-water v. Gordon, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 5; Gourley v. Woodbury, 42 Vt. 395.

3. Lufburrow v. Koch, 75 Ga. 448; Jackson's Adm'r v. Sublett, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 467; Blanchard v. Brooks, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 47; Ellwood v. Plummer, 78 N. C. 392; Drake v. Brown, 68 Pa. St. 223.

4. Doe v. Prigg, 8 B. & C. 231; Meredith v. Meredith, 10 East. 503; Duncan v. De Yampert, 182 Ala. 528, 62 So 673; Denny v. Allen, 1 Pick. (Mass.). 147; Turner v. Patterson, 5 Dana (Ky.) 292; Branton v. Buckley, 99 Miss. 116, L. R. A. 1917 C, 527. 54 So. 850; See Gibbons v. International Harvester Co., 146 Ga. 467, 91 S. E. 482.

5. Williams, Real Prop. 367; 4 Kent, Comm. 260; Robertson v. Wilson, 38 N. H. 48; Hall v. Chaffee, 14 N. H. 216; Den d. Hopper v. Demarest, 21 N. J. Law, 525; Striker v. Mott, 28 N. Y. 82; Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. St. 309; Mudge v. Hammill. 21 R. I. 463, 44 Atl. 595. See Williams v. Esten, 179 111. 267.

6. Fearne, Cont. Rem. 365.

7. Smith v. Pendall, 19 Conn. 107; Williams v. Esten, 179 111. 267, 53 N. E. 562; McDonald v. Bayard Sav. Bank, 123 Iowa, 413, 98 N. W. 1025; Miller v. Emans. 19 N. Y. 385; Jeffers v. Lampson. 10 Ohio St. 101; Williams, Real rule in this regard has been departed from, without reference to any statutory provision.12

Real. Property.

[ Sec. 147

And an attempted transfer of such an interest, if made on valuable consideration, will be recognized and enforced in equity, after the estate has vested, as a contract to convey.8 Moreover, under the doctrine which has been so generally asserted in this country,9 that a conveyance of land, especially if containing a covenant for title, will operate to transfer by estoppel any after acquired estate, a conveyance by one having a contingent remainder would frequently effect a transfer of the estate in the land when it subsequently vests.10

In some jurisdictions, contingent remainders are capable of transfer, by reason of a statutory provision extending the right of conveyance of interests in lands;11 and in some, notably in Massachusetts, the common law

Prop. 367; See Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 486.

It has been suggested that the release must be made in terms to the reversioner or vested remainderman, as the person to benefit by the release, and not to the particular tenant. See editorial note, 2 111. Law Rev. 48, 26 Yale Law Journ. 35. But this seems questionable. At common law, if two or more persons had estates in the land, it appears to have been immaterial to which of them a release by way of extinguishment purported to be made, it enuring to the benefit of all. See Litt. Sec. 450, Co. Litt. 275; Sheppard's Touchstone, 335.

8. Fearne, Cont. Rem. 551; 4 Kent, Comm. 261; Higden v. Williamson, 3 P. Wms. 132; Ridgeway v. Underwood, 67 111. 419; Hannon v Christopher, 34 N. J. Eq. 459, 28 Am. St. Rep. 665, 14 S. E. 640; Mudge v. Hammill, 21 R. I. 283, 79 Am. St. Rep. 802, 43 Atl. 544. See Grayson v. Tyler's Adm'x, 80 Ky. 358.

9. Post Sec. 545.

10. Isler v. Griffin, 134 Ga. 192, 67 S. E. 854; Walton v. Follansbee, 131 111. 147, 23 N. E. 332; Robeson v. Cochran, 225 111. 355, 99 N. E. 649 (statute); Bohon v. Bohon, 78 Ky. 408; Hayes v. Tobin, 41 N. H. 521; Hannon v. Christopher, 34 N. J. Eq. 459; James v. Hooker, 172 N. C. 780, 90 S. E. 925; Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. St. 309, 20 Atl. 1002; Hale v. Hallon, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 96, 35 S. W. 843, 36 S. W. 288; Young v. Young, 89 Va. 675, 23 L. R. A. 642, 17 S. E. 470.