In deciding whether an article or structure annexed to land, or annexed to another article or structure which is itself legally a part of the land, is to be regarded as part of the land, that is, as a fixture, the courts usually name one or more of the following considerations as determinative of the question:(1) The mode of attachment or annexation; (2) the character of the

51. Pierce v. Goddard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 559; Woodruff v. Adams, 37 Conn. 233; Reese v. Jared, 15 Ind. 142 (semble); Pryatt v. Sullivan Co., 5 Hill (N. Y.) 116, 7 Hill 529; Jackson v. Walton, 28 Vt. 43. See also the quotation from Brooke's Abridgement, in Lord Lindley's opinion in Gough v. Wood, [1894] 1 Q. B. 713.

52. Shoemaker v. Simpson, 16 Kan. 43; Central Branch R. Co. v. Fritz, 20 Kan. 430; Gill v. DeArmant, 90 Mich. 425, 51 N. W. 455; Lansing Iron & Engine

Works v. Wilbur, 111 Mich. 413, 30 Am. St. Rep. 488, 69 N. W. 667; (dictum) Eisenhauer v. Quinn, 36 Mont. 368, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 435, 122 Am. St. Rep. 370, 93 Pac. 38; Mills v. Reddick, 1 Neb. 437; Cochran v. Flint, 57 N. H. 514 (dictum); San Antonio Brewing Ass'n v. Arctic Ice-Machine Mfg. Co., 81 Tex. 90, 16 S. W. 797; Huebschmann v. McHenry, 29 Wis. 655; Walker v. Grand Rapids Flouring Mill Co., 70 Wis. 92, 35 N. W. 332.

53. post Sec. 271.

54. See Holland v. Hodgson, L. R. 7 C. P. 323; Leigh v. Taylor, (1902) App. Cas. 157; Langston v. State, 96 Ala. 44, 11 So. 334; Ozark v. Adams, 73 Ark. 227, 83 S. W. 920; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245, 13 Am. St. Rep. 147, 22 Pac. 184; Horn v. Clark Hardware Co , 54 Colo. 522, 131 Pac. 405; Fifield v .Farmers' Nat. Bank, 148 111. 163, 39 Am. St. Rep. 166, 35 N. E. 802; Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley, 44 Iowa, 57, 24 Am. St. Rep. 719; Eaves v. Estes, 10 Kan. 314, 15 Am. Rep. 345; L. & M. Mercantile Co. v. Wimer, 94 Kan. 573, 146 Pac. 1162; Roderick v. Sanborn, 106 Me. 159, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1189, 20 Ann. Cas. 469, 76 Atl. 263; Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 6 L. R. A. 249, 15 Am. St. Rep. 235, 23 N. E. 327; State Sav. Bank v. Ker-cheval, 65 Mo. 683, 27 Am. Rep. 310; Feder v. Van Winkle, 53 N.

J. Eq. 370, 51 Am. St. Rep. 628, 33 Atl. 399; Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170; Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 293, 100 Am. Dec. 485; Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634; Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. 271, 91 Am. Dec. 209; Hurst v. Craig Furniture Co., 95 S. C. 221, 78 S. E. 960; Hutchins v. Masterson, 46 Tex. 551, 26 Am. Rep. 286; Baringer v. Evenson, 127 Wis. 36, 106 N. W. 801.

55. Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634, per Bartley, C. J.

56. To the came effect, see Capen v. Peckham, 35 Conn. 88; Ogden v. Stock, 34 111. 522, 85 Am. Dec. 332; Thompson v Smith, 111 Iowa, 718, 50 L. R. A. 780, 82 Am. St. Rep. 541, 83 N. W. 789; Read-field Tel. & T. Co. v. Cyr, 95 Me. 287, 49 Atl. 1047; Schaper v. Bibb, 71 Md. 145, 17 Atl. 935; Houle v. Abramson, 210 Mass. 83, 96 N. E. 77; Thomas v. Davis, 76 Mo. 72, that the secret intention of the person making the annexation is immaterial, the intention which controls being that inferable from his acts, considered with relation to the surrounding circumstances.57 That the intention which controls is not a mere attitude of mind is also strongly indicated by the consideration that the question whether an article is a fixture is regarded, not as one exclusively of fact but as one partly of law and partly of fact.58

Many of the cases which thus lay stress upon the intention of the person making the annexation, as determining whether the article annexed becomes part of the land, are cases in which such person was, at the time of the annexation, the absolute owner of the land, as well as of the article annexed.59 In such a case, the absence of any conflicting interests at the time of the annexation renders his intention an appropriate consideration in this connection, when the question subsequently arises, for instance, between his heir and personal representatives, or between one to whom he conveys the land, absolutely or by way of mortgage, and one claiming the article as a chattel.

43 Am. Rep. 756; Johnson v. Pacific Land Co., 84 Ore. 356, 164 Pac. 564; Jones v. Bull, 85 Tex. 136, 19 S. W. 103.

57. W. B. Thompson & Co. v. Lewis, 120 Ark. 252, 179 S. W. 343;Radigan v. Hughes, 86 Conn. 536, 86 Atl. 220; Crum v. Hill, 40 Iowa, 506; John P. Squire & Co. v. City of Portland, 106 Me. 234, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 576, 20 Ann. Cas. 603, 76 Atl. 679; Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav. Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 6 L. R. A. 249, 15 Am. St. Rep. 235, 23 N. E. 327; Tate v. Blackburne, 48 Miss. 1; State Savings Bank v. Kercheval, 65 Mo. 682; Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N.

Y. 170; Alberson v. Elk Creek Min. Co. 39 Ore. 5521, 65 Pac. 978; Catasauqua Nat. Bank v. North, 160 Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 294; Washington Nat. Bank v. Smith. 15 Wash. 160, 45 Pac. 736.

58. Ante, Sec. 265, note 50.

59. See, e. g., Roseville Alta Min. Co. v. lowa Gulch Min. Co., 15 Colo. 29, 22 Am. St. Rep. 373, 24 Pac. 920; Seedhouse v. Broward, 34 Fla. 509, 16 So. 425; McFarlane v. Foley, 27 Ind. App. 484, 60 N. E. 357; Thomson v. Smith, 111 Iowa, 718, 50 L. R. A. 780, 82 Am. St. Rep. 541, 83 N. W. 789; Erdman v. Moore, 58 N. J. L. 445, 33 Atl. 958; Potter v. CromBut it seems that if, at the time of the annexation, the person annexing has no right in the land, his intention, however clearly expressed by word or act, that the article shall not become a part of the land, should have no effect in divesting the rightful owner of the land of any right to the chattel which he would otherwise have.60 And the cases seem in effect to support this view, though not in terms so stating, it being held that if a trespasser makes erections upon another's land, the erection becomes a part thereof,61 although it may be assumed that in such case there is no intention to make the article a part of the other person's land. And so where the person making the annexation has an estate in the land of limited duration only, it would seem that, if the articles are such, and are so annexed, that they would ordinarily become a part of the land, the fact that the tenant of the limited estate, whether one for life or years, proclaims, at the time of the annexation, that he intends to retain the right to the articles annexed, should not affect the rights of the owner of the remainder or reversion, and there are a few cases in which this view is asserted.62 There are, however, it must be conceded, a greater number of cases in which the right of the tenant of a limited estate to remove articles annexed by him is based in terms on the theory of an intention on his part not to make well, 40 N. Y. 287, 100 Am. Dec. 485; Kendall v. Hathaway, 67 Vt. .122, 30 Atl. 859

60. That the intention of the annexor is in such case immaterial, see Tread way v. Sharon, 7 Nev. 37; Miles v. McNaughton, 111 Mich. 350, 69 N. W. 481; Henderson v. Ownby, 56 Tex 647. 42 Am. Rep. 691 (semble); Huebschmann v. McHenry, 29 Wis. 655; Contra, Curtis v. Laesia, 78 Mich. 480, 44 N. W. 500.

61. See cases cited in Ewell, them a part of the realty.63 It seems questionable, however, whether these cases can be regarded as authorizing; the view that the mere mental intention of the tenant, when making the annexation, subsequently to remove articles annexed, even though expressly declared to the landlord at the time, will preserve the personal character of such articles, or render them removable by him, unless their nature and mode of annexation are themselves such as to preserve their physical character, or unless they come within one of the excepted classes of fixtures which, as is hereafter stated, the tenant has the right to remove.

V. Apfield, 86 Cal. 335. 24 Pac 993; Linahan v. Barr, 41 Conn. 471; Baker v. McClurg, 198 111. 28, 64 N. E. 701, 59 L. R. A. 131, 92 Am. St. Rep. 261; Horn v. Indianapolis Nat. Bank, 125 Ind. 381, 9 L. R. A. 676, 21 Am. St. Rep. 231, 25 N. E. 558; Eaves v. Estes, 10 Kan. 314, 15 Am. Rep. 345; Munroe v. Armstr ng, 179 Mass. 165, 60 N. E. 475; Schellen-berg v. Detroit Heating & Lighting Co., 130 Mich. 439, 57 L. R. A. 632, 97 Am. St. Rep. 489, 90 N. W. 47; Brownell v. Fuller, 60 Neb. 558, 83 N. W. 669; Pope v. Skinkle, 45 N. J. L. 39; Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287, 100 Am. Dec. 485; Kinnear v. Scenic Railways Co., 223 Pa. 390, 72 Atl. 808.

Fixtures, c. 2; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, (2nd Ed.) 620.

62. West Coast Lumber Co. v. Apfield, 86 Cal. 335, 24 Pac. 993;

Wright v. Du Bignon, 114 Ga. 765, 57 L. R. A. 669, 40 S. E. 747; Mc-Lain Inv. Co. v. Cunningham, 113 Mo. App. 519, 87 S. W. 605. And so when a purchaser in possession intended to remove improvements made by him. Ogden v. Stock, 34 111. 522, 85 Am. Dec. ?32; Crum v. Hill, 40 Iowa, 506.

The question of the intention of the person making the annexation is to be distinguished from that of the intention, so called, of both the interested parties, as evidenced by agreement between them. Any such agreement is, as we shall see presently, conclusive in its effects.64 The courts not infrequently use the word "intention" in this sense, sometimes apparently without sufficiently recognizing the distinction referred to.65

63. Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542, 557, 19 L. R. A. 611, 26 Atl. 127; Baker v. McClurg 198 111. 21, 92 Am. St. Rep. 261, 64 N. E.

701; Roth v. Collins, 109 Iowa. 501, 98 N. W. 543; Hayford v. Wentworth, 97 Me. 347, 54 Atl. 940; Ryder v. Faxon, 171 Mass. 206, 68 Am. St. Rep. 417, 50 N. E. 631; McMath v. Levy, 74 Miss. 450, 21 So. 9, 523; Holmes v. Standard Pub. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 55 Atl. 1107; Seeger v. Pettit, 77 Pa. 437, 18 Am. Rep. 452; Menger v. Ward, (Tex. Civ. App.) 28 S. W. 821; Wing v Gray, 36 Vt. 261.

64. Post, Sec. 270.

65. See e. g., Wood v. Holly Mfg. Co., 100 Ala. 326, 21 L. R. A. 787, 46 Am. St. Rep. 56, 13 So. 948; West Coast Lumber Co.

910 Real Peoperty. [Sec. 268