Tide waters are those in which the tide ordinarily ebbs and flows, including the son, and also bays, rivers, and creeks, so far as they answer this description. A body or stream of water cannot be considered as tidal merely because, under unusual circumstances, the level of the water is affected by the tide,97 nor is the amount of salt in the water material.98

Land under tide waters within the state, below low-water mark, belongs prima facie to the state,98a except, perhaps, in the ease of creeks and inlets of the sen so small as not to be susceptible of use for navigation.98b him continued for a considerable time, on the theory, apparently, that a grant will be presumed.11

If the state or private ownership, as the case may be, of land under water, is once established, by reason of the tidal or non tidal character of the water, the fact that the character of the water in this regard is changed; by reason of the building of a dam or the cutting of a channel, does not, it has been decided, operate to change the ownership of the land.99

30 Ind. 321; Corwin v. New York & E. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 42; Gill v. Atlantic & G. W. Ry. Co., 27 Ohio St. 240; McCall v. Chamberlain, 13 Wis. 637; See 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1067.

97. Reece v. Miller, S Q. B. Div. 626.

98. Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 324, 343, 8 L. Ed. 506; Attorney General v. Woods, 108 Mass. 436; People v. Tibbetts, 19 N. Y. 523; Gould, Waters, Sec. 44.

98a. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 367, 10 L. Ed. 997; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 331; Coburn v. Ames, 52 Cal. 385; State v. Sargent, 45 Conn. 358; Com. v. City of Rox-bury, 9 Gray (Mass.) 451; Langdon v. City of New York. 93 N. Y. 129.

98b. See Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, Ann. C as. 1914A, 72, 58 So. 25; Com. v. Inhabitants of Charleston, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 178, 186; Glover v Powell, 10 N. J. Eq. 211; State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50; Rex v Montagu,

4 B. & C. 598; Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 1 ('own. 86. But that the land belongs to the stats if the tide ebbs and flows thereover, though the water is not navigable, see Sollers v. Sellers, 77 Md. 148, 26 L. U. A. 94, 39 Am. St. Rep. 404. 26 Atl. 188; Walsh v. Hopkins, 22 R. 1. 418.

99. People v. Tibbetts, 19 N. Y. 523; Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N.

The power of the state, as owner of the land under tide waters, to dispose thereof by grant, has been frequently recognized,1 though one claiming under such a grant takes the land subject to the public right to pass thereover in the course of navigation,2 except in so far as such passage may be prevented by the reclamation or improvement of the land.3 But while the power of the state, by reason of its ownership of land under tide waters, to make grants of such land, has been frequently asserted without qualification, the state's power in this regard, in the case of land under navigable waters, whether tidal or non tidal, is, by the trend of the more recent authorities, subject to the restriction that the grant must be such that it can fairly be said to be for the public benefit, or at least not injurious to the public interest.4 That is, while the

Y. 377 See Clement v. Watson. 63 Fla. 109, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 72, 58 So 25.

1. Kimball v. McPherson, 40 Cal. 105; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 25, 38 L. Ed. 331; Jones v. Oemler, 110 Ga. 202, 35 S. E. 375; Brown v. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195, 9 Am. Dec. 503; Stover v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 348, 4 Am.

Dec. 155; Polhemus v. Bateman, CO N. J. 163, 37 Atl. 1015; People v. Jessup, 160 N. Y. 256; Shep-ard's Point Land Co., v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 N. C. 517, 44 S. E. 39; State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50; Morse v. O'Connell, 7 Wash. 117, 34 Pac. 426; See citations in ote to State v. Gerbing. 22 L. R. A. N. S. 337.

2. Hale, De Jure Maris, Ch. 5; Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365: State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 21 L. R. A. 189. 13 So. 640; Nichols v. Boston, 98

Mass. 39, 93 Am. Dec. 132; People v. New York & S. I. Ferry Co , 68 N. Y. 71; Saunders v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 75. 26 L. R. A 378. 43 Am. St. Rep. 729, 38 N. E. 992; Tudson v. Tidewater Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 164, 9S Pac. 377.

J. Old Colony St. Ry. Co. v. Phillips, 207 Mass. 174, 93 N. E. 792. See People v. Steeple Chase Park Co., 218 N. Y. 459, 113 N. E. 521.

4. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. Ed. 1018; Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 Pac. 156; State v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337, 47 So. 353; Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y. 396, 405, 39 N. E. 400; Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 212 N. Y. 1. 105 N. E. 849. (But see People v. Steeple Chase Park Co., 218 N. Y. 459,113 N. E. 521.) Pacific Milling & Elevator state may, for the purpose of aiding navigation and commerce, or of encouraging new industries, make grants of limited extent adjacent to or upon the margin of waters available for navigation, any grant which is calculated, in its final result, materially to abridge the public right of navigation, or the control of the water, in behalf of such right, by the state or the United States, is invalid.

- The shore. Land bordering on the sea, on an arm thereof, or on a tidal river, and lying above ordinary low water mark, but below ordinary high watermark,5 is known as the shore,6 and this, like the land beyond low watermark, belongs prima facie to the state,7 as it does in England to the crown,8 the theory

Co. v. Portland, 65 Ore. 349, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 363, 133 Pac. 72. See Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 33 L. R. A. 645, 67 N. W. 918; Ross-miller v. State, 114 Wis 169, 58 L. R. A. 93, 89 N. W. 839, 91 Am. St. Rep. 910.

5. The "ordinary" high-water mark, by which to determine the line of the shore is the line of. the medium high tide between the springs and the neaps." (Attorney General v. Chambers, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 206), or, as otherwise expressed, by "the medium line between the ordinary line of high water in ordinary spring tides at the full and change of the moon, and the ordinary line of high water at neap tides, at about midway in time between the full and change of the moon" (Com. v. City of Roxbury, 9 G ay [Mass.] 451, 483). See N. J. Zinc & I. Co. v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 398. 1 L. R. A. 133, 15 Atl. 227. In Taylor Sands

Pishing Co. v. State Land Board. 56 Ore. 157, 108 Pac. 126, high water mark is said to be the line reached by the flux of the usual tide.

6. Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 346; Andrus v. Knott, 12 Ore. 501, 8 Pac. 763; Jones v. Janney, 8 Watts. & S. (Pa ) 436, 443, 42 Am. Dec. 309.

7. Gould. Waters Sec.Sec. 4, 27, 169-175, 178, 3 Kent. Comm. 427; Barney v. Keokuk. 94 U. S 324, 24 L. Ed. 224; People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336; Lane v. New Haven Harbor Comm'rs, 70 Conn. 685, 40 Atl 1058; Hathaway v. Wilson, 123 Mass. 361; Gough v. Bell, 21 N. J. L. 156; Sage v. New York. 154 N. Y. 61, 38 L. R A. 606, 61 Am. St. Rep. 592, 47 N. E. 1096; Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Ore. 244, 66 Pac. 923. See, especially, the opinion of Justice Gray in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 331, where the whole law of the subject is reviewed.

R. P.-64 being that it is land not capable of ordinary cultivation or occupation, and so is in the nature of unappropriated soil. The stale may grant this shore land to the owner of the adjoining "upland," or to any other person,9 but the grantee will take it, as one takes land beyond low watermark, subject to the rights of the public as regards navigation and fishing.10 Even in the absence of actual evidence of a grant, title to the shore may be vested in an individual by reason of acts of user by

In Pennsylvania the soil between high and low water mark appears to belong, prima facie, not to the state, but to the owner of the upland. Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21.

In Maine and Massachusetts, by the terms of a general legislative grant made at an early date, the shore in most cases belongs to the proprietor of the land adjoining- Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me. 482; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Comm. v. City of Roxbury, 9 Gray (Mass.) 451. And in some other states there is such a general legislative, grant, see Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 62 Fla. 549, 57 So. 428; Whealton & Wisherd v. Doughty, 112 Va. 649. 72 S. E. 112.

8. Atty. Gen. v. Chambers, 4 De G. M. & G. 206. The view taken by the English courts, that the ownership of the shore is prima facie in the crown, has been strongly questioned. See Moore on the Foreshore, passim.

9. Shiveley v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 331; Brower v. Wake-man, 88 Conn. 8, 89 Atl. 913; Rivas v. Solary, 18 Fla. 122;

Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21; Gough v. Bell, 22 N. J. L. 441; People v. New York & S. I. Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 71; Langdon v. New York, 93 N. Y. 129, 145; Bowlby v. Shively, 22 Ore. 414, 30 Pac. 154; Galveston v. Menard. 23 Tex. 349; Puget Mill Co. v. State, 93 Wash. 128, 160 Pac. 310. 10. Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable, 11 H. L. Cas. 192; People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 Pac. 79 (state constitution); Chase v. Cochran, 102 Me. 431, 67 Atl. 320; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Clement v. Burns, 43 N. H. 609; Bell v. Gough, 23 N. J. L. 624, affirming 22 N. J. L. 441; People v. New York & S. I. Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 71; (Compare People v. Steeple Chase Park Co., 218 N. Y. 459, 113 N. E. 521.);Lenoir County v. Crabtree, 158 N. C. 357, 74 S. E. 105: Harrison v. Pacific R. & Navigation Co., 72 Ore. 553, 144 Pac. 91; Providence Steam Engine Co. v. Providence & S. Steamship Co., 12 R. I. 348, 357; Judson v. Tidewater Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 164, 98 Pac. 377.

The public ordinarily has, as against an individual proprietor of the shore, in case this has been granted by the state, no right to make use thereof for any purpose other than navigation and fishing. Hence there is no genera] right to take sand or gravel therefrom, or even fish shells, as distinct from Live fish;12 nor can the public go on the shore for the purpose of bathing.13 In one state, however, the grantee of the shore apparently holds it subject to a right in the owner of the land above high-water mark to erect a pier upon the shore, so constructed as not unnecessarily to interfere with other use of the shore.14

If the shore belongs to the state, the individual proprietor of the adjoining land has no exclusive right to the seaweed on the shore,15 but an individual owning the shore is exclusively entitled to the seaweed lying

11. Co. Litt. 261a. Butler's note; 2 Kent's Comm. 427; G'ould Waters, Sec.Sec. 22, 23, 37; Lord Advocate v. Young, 12 App. Cas. 544; Church v. Meeker, 34 Conn. 421; Palmer v. Hicks, 6 Johns (N. Y.) 133; Nichols v. Boston, 98 Mass. 39, 93 Am. Dec. 132; Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R. I. 200; Compare People v. Kerber, 152 Cal. 731, 125 Am. St. Rep. 93, 93 Pac. 878; De Lancey v. Piep-gras, 138 N. Y. 26.

12. Gould, Waters. Sec. 24; Porter v. Shehan, 7 Gray (Mass.) 435; Clement v. Burns, 43 N. II 609; Merwin v. Wheeler, 41 Conn. 14; State v. Wilson. 42 Me. 9, 28; Moore v. Griffin, 22 Me. 350.

13. Blundell v. Catterall, 5 Barn. & Ald. 268, Hetfield v. Baum. 35 N. C. 394. 57 Am. Dec. 563; Brinckman v. Marley [1904] 2 ch. 313; Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1047, 80 N. E. 688.

14. Brookhaven, Trustees of Freeholders & Commonalty of Town of v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326, 11 Ann.

1; Barnes v. Midland R. R. Terminal Co., 193 N. Y. 378, 1093, 127 Am. St. Rep. 962, 85 N. E.; Compare People v. Steeple Chase Park Co., 21S N. V. 459, 113 N. E. 521.

15. Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382.

Real Property.

[Sec. 301 thereon,16 though not to that floating in the water thereover.17