The fact that, after the making of a grant of an easement, there is a change in the mode in which the dominant tenement is utilized, so that as a result thereof the easement is more constantly exercised, has usually been regarded as not affecting the existence of the easement.41 Occasionally, however, a different view

39. Wright v. Moore, 38 Ala. 593, 82 Am. Dec. 731; Postle-t'hwaite v. Payne, 8 Ind. 104; Barry v. Edlavitch, 84 Md. 95, 33 L. R. A. 294, 35 Atl. 170; Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N. Y. 341; Lewis v. New York etc. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 202, 56 N. E. 540. Elliott v. Rhett, 5 Rich. L. (S. C.) 405, 57 Am. Dec. 750; Arbuckle v. Ward, 29 Vt. 43.

40. Crossley v. Lightowler, 2 Ch. App. 478; Mccalluni v. Ger-mantown Water Co., 54 Pa. St. 40, 93 Am. Dec. 656; Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell, 149 Mass. 509, 21 N. E. 872.

40a. Turner v. Hart, 71 Mich. 128, 15 Am. St. Rep. 243; Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N. J. Eq. 576; Gilford v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co., 52 N. H. 262; Tucker v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 13 Ore. 28, 7 Pac. 53. Sabine v. Johnson, 35 Wis. 185.

40b. Post, Sec. 531.

41. Greist v. Amrhyn, 80 Conn. 280, 68 Atl. 521 (snnble); Randall v. Grant, 210 Mass. 302, 96 N. E. 672; Parsons v. New York N. H. & H. R. Co., 216 Mass. 269. 103 N. E. 693; Abbott v. Butler, 59 N. H. 317; Kretz v. Fireproof Storage Co., 127 Minn. 304. 149 N. W. 648; Gillespie v. Weinberg, 148 N. Y. 238, 42 N. E. 676, Flint v. Bacon, 13 Hun. (N. Y.) 454; Benner v. Junker, 190 Pa. 423, 43 Atl. 72; was adopted in the particular case.42 It is, properly speaking, a question of the construction of the grant, that is, of whether the parties thereto intended that the easement should be exercised irrespective of a change in the user of the dominant tenement, and, by the weight of authority, the presumption appears to be, as above indicated, that such was the intention. The increase of the burden on the servient tenement is, it would seem, immaterial, except as it may render it less probable that such a change of user was within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the grant.

In accordance with the view ordinarily taken, that a change in the mode of utilizing the dominant tenement does not affect the existence of the easement, is the view generally adopted, that upon the subsequent subdivision of the original dominant tenement, a right of way is appurtenant to each and every part.43 And

Frazier v. Berry, 4 R. I. 440; United Land Company v. Great Eastern. Railway Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 586; Newcomen v. Coulson, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 133; Finch v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 5 Ex. D. 254; White v. Grand Hotel, Bast-bourne, Limited (1913) 1 Ch. 113.

42. It was held that, where there was a grant of a way to a loft, and the space or opening under the loft then used as a wood house, the way no longer existed after the open space had been built over and changed into a dwelling house. Allan v. Gom-me, 11 Adol. & E. 759. This decision was, however, questioned by Parke, B., in Henning v. Burnet, 8 Exch. 187.

In Wood v. Saunders, 10 Ch. App. 582, it was held that one to whom was granted a right of drainage through adjacent land for the benefit of land on which was a private residence at the time of the grant could not exercise the right for the benefit of large additions made to the house for the purpose of changing it into a sanitarium. See also Great Western Railway v. Talbot (1902) 2 Ch. 759.

In Goodwillie v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 111. 42, 89 N. E. 272, it was held that the grant of a right to use a switch track, in favor of owners of a lumber yard, did not justify the use of the track for carrying coal to an electric plant thereafter constructed on the site of the lumber yard.

43. Currier v. Howes, 103 Cal. 431, 37 Pac. 521; Sweeney v. Landers Frary & Clark, 80 Conn. 575, 69 Atl. 566; Durkee v. Jones, 27 Colo. 159, 60 Pao. 618; Brossart the same rule has been applied in connection with an easement of another character.44

An easement of necessity has been regarded as not limited, as regards its utilization, by the mode in which. the dominant tenement was used at the time of the creation of the right, but as available for any use incident to a change in the use of such tenement.45 And accordingly a way of necessity has been regarded as available to each one of various grantees of a part of the tenement to which the way was originally appurtenant.46

In the case of a prescriptive easement, the question whether a change in the dominant tenement affects the right to exercise the easement depends, in a general way, upon whether the effect of the change is materially to increase the burden upon the servient tenement or alter the character of the user thereof.46a v. Corlett, 27 Iowa, 288; Garrison v. Rudd, 19 111. 559; Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Dur-kin v. Cobleigh, 156 Mass. 108, 17 L. R. A. 270, 32 Am. St. Rep. 436, 30 X. E. 474; Forbes v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 289, 52 N. E. 511. Moore v. White, 159 Mich. 460, 124 X. W. 62; Dawson v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 15 Minn. 136, (Gil 102), 2 Am. Rep. 109; Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 X. J. Eq.702, 70Atl. 606; Lansing v. Wiswwall, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 213. Gunson v. Healy, 100 Pa. 42; Ehret v. Gunn, 166 Pa. 384, 31 Atl. 200; Dee v. King, 77 Vt. 230, 68 L. R. A. 860, 59 Atl. 839; Linkenhofer v. Graybill, 80 Va. 835; Newcomen v. Coulson, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 141. A different rule "would force every person who has a right of way to preserve his property entire, in order to preserve his passage." Tilgh-man, C. J., in Watson v. Bioren, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 227, 7 Am. Dec. en.

44. Harris v. Drewe, 2 B. & Ad. 164 (church pew); Blood v. Millard, 172 Mass. 65, 51 N. E. 527 (right to take water from spring); Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 254, 24 Am. Dec. 218 (right to have strip of land left vacant).

45. Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn 71; Whittior v. Winkley, 62 N. H. 338; Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233; Contra, Corporation of London v. Riggs, L. B. 13, Ch. Div. 798.

46. Erie R. Co. v. S. H. Klein-man Realty Co., 92 Ohio St. 96, 110 N. E. 527.

46a. Post, Sec. 531.