It not infrequently occurs that, after the statute of limitations has begun to run against the right to recover land, and before it has run for the period named therein, it, for some reason, ceases to run. Since it runs by reason of the failure to assert one's right to the land as against one in possession thereof whose possession is adverse to the rightful owner, one would expect it to cease to run either upon the owner's assertion of the right to the land, upon the cessation of the possession, or upon the cessation of the hostile character of the possession. We will consider, in the above order, the operation in this regard of these various classes of circumstances.

- By entry or action. One whose land is in the wrongful possession of another may assert his right to the land either by entry or by action. It is well recognized that the running of the statute is interrupted by the owner's entry on the land, if, and only if, this is made openly and under claim of right, with a clearly indicated purpose of taking possession.15 In several states, however, such an effect has been denied to a forcible entry, at least when not followed by continuous possession,16 and in some states there is a statutory provision restricting the operation of an entry as an interruption of the adverse possession, as by requiring it to be followed by possession for a certain time, or by an action of ejectment, and occasionally the statute expressly deprives the entry of any such effect.17

13. Molton v. Henderson, 62 Ala. 426; Patchett v. Pac. Coast Ry., 100 Cal. 505, 35 Pac. 73; Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. 178, 12 Am. St. Rep. 249, 4 S. E. 391; Barclay v. Goodloe, 83 Ky. 493; Crook v. Glenn, 30 Md. 71; Ewing v. Shanahan, 113 Mo. 188, 20 S. W. 1065; Thompson v. Carmi-r-hael, 122 Pa. St. 478,15 Atl. 867; Williams v. Otey, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 563, 47 Am. Dec. 632; Collins v. Mccarty, 68 Tex. 150, 2 Am. St. Rep. 475, 3 S. W. 730.

14. Cushman v. Coleman, 92 Ga. 772, 19 S. E. 46; Mclain v.

Rabon, 142 Ga. 163, 82 S. E. 544; Waterman v. Waterman Hall, 220 111. 569; Edwards v. Woolfolk, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 376; Ewing v. Shanahan, 113 Mo. 1Ss. 20 S. W. 1065; King v.rhew. 108 N. C. 696, 23 Am. St. Rep 76, 13 S. E. 174; Watkins v. Specht, 7 Cold. (Tenn.) 585.

Obviously, if the trustee has only a life estate, the statute does not run against the legal remainderman. East Rome Town Co. v. Cothran, 81 Ga. S. E.737; Ewin v. Limlsoy. (Tenn.) 58 S. W. 388.

The bringing of an action by the true owner to recover the possession, if followed both by a judgment in his favor and the recovery of possession thereunder, interrupts the running of the statute,18 and such interim. Doe v. Clayton, 81 Ala. 391, 2 So. 24; Burrows v. Gallup, 32 Conn. 493, 87 Am. Dec. 186; Brett v. Farr, 66 Iowa, 684, 24 N. W. 275; Batchelder v. Rob-bins, 93 Me. 579, 45 Atl. 837; Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md. 307, 56 Atl. 1017; Bowen v. Guild, 130 Mass. 121; Musser-sauntry Land, Logging & Mfg. Co. v. T'ozer, 56 Minn. 443, 57 N. W. 1072; Campbell v. Wallace. 12 N. H. 362. 37 Am. Dec. 219 Landon v. Town-shend, 129 N. V. 166, 29 N. E. 71; Altemus v. Campbell, 9 Watts (Pa.) 28, 34 Am. Dec. 494; Evitts v. Roth, 61 Tex. 81; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 115 Wis. 68, 90 N. W. 1019.

The owner may enter by an agent as well as in person. Batchelder v., Robbins, 93 Me. 579, 45 Atl. 837; Johnson v. Fitz-george, 50 N. J. L. 470, 14 Atl. 762; Ingersoll v. Lewis, 11 Pa. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536; Camp v. Camp, 88 Vt. 119, 92 Atl. 12; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 115 Wis. 68, 90 N. W. 1019.

16. Gould v. Carr. 33 Fla. 523, ruption occurs, it has been decided, at the time of the bringing of the action.19 The bringing of an action, however, which results unsuccessfully to plaintiff, does not interrupt it.20 There are a number of decisions to the effect that even though a judgment is rendered for plaintiff in such action, the statute does not cease to run unless there is a change of possession in accordance with the judgment,21 while there are other decisions to the contrary.22

24 L. R. A. 130, 15 So. 259; Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283; Men-denhall v. Price, 88 Iowa, 203, 55 N. W. 321 (semble); Ferguson v. Bartholomew, 67 Mo. 212; Norvell v. Gray, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 96. Contra, San Francisco v. Fulde, 37 Cal. 349, 99 Am. Dec. 278. In Illinois an entry has been regarded as forcible for this purpose if against the will of the person in possession. Bug-ner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 280 111. 620, 117 N. E. 711.

17. See Place v. Place, 139 Mich. 509, 102 N. W. 996; Douglas v. Irvine, 126 Pa. 643, 17 Atl. 802; Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 122 Am. St. Rep. 609, 86 S. W. 746, 87 S. W. 1148. .• 18. Moore v. Greene, 19 How. (U. S.) 69. 15 L. Ed. 533; Bishop v. Truett, 85 Ala. 376; Mcgrath v. Wallace, 85 Cal. 622; Smith v. Hornback, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 232, 14 Am. Dec. 122; Barrell v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 27 Ore. 77, 39 Pac. 992; Potts v. Wright, 82 Pa. 498.

In some of the earlier cases,23 the asserted ineffectiveness in this regard of a judgment, not followed by a change of possession in accordance therewith, was based upon the consideration that a judgment in ejectment decided only that the plaintiff was entitled to possession during the term named in the fictitious demise.

19. Butler v. Secrist, 92 Neb. 506, 138 N. W. 749; Barrell v. Title Guarantee Co., 27 Ore. 77, 39 Pac. 992; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Jenkins, 103 111. 588; Dunn v. Miller, 75 Mo. 260; Breon v. Robrecht, 118 Cal. 469, 62 Am. St. Rep. 247, 50 Pac. 689, 51 Pac. 33; Ball v. Lively, 1 Dana (Ky.) 60; Beard v. Ryan, 78 Ala. 37.

20. Moore v. Greene, 19 How. (N. Y.) 71; Langford v. Poppe, 56 Cal. 73; Workman v. Guthrie. 29 Pa. St. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 654; Snell v. Harrison, 131 Mo. 495, 52 Am. St. Rep. 642, 32 S. W. 37; Nelson v. Triplett, 99 Va. 421, 39 S. E. 150.

21. Bradford v. Wilson, 140 Ala. 633, 37 So. 295; Carpenter v. Natoma, etc., Water Co., 63 Cal. 616; Gould v. Carr, 33 Fla. 523, 24 L. R. A. 130, 15 So. 259; O'neal v. Boone, 53 111. 35; Forbes v. Caldwell, 39 Kan. 14, 17 Pac. 478; Smith v. Trabue, 1 Mclean (U. S.) 87.