Possession for the statutory period by the tenant under a lease is, it is agreed, not ordinarily sufficient to confer title upon him as against his landlord.69

Ass'n, 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469; Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 6 Ann. Cas. 140, 52 S. E. 485.

65. Hooper v. Bankhead, 171 Ala. 626, 54 So. 549; Gordon v. Park, 219 Mo. 600, 117 S. W. 1163, 119 Am. St. Rep. 802; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284. See editorial notes, 11 Columbia Law Rev. 673, 26 Harv. Law Rev. 555.

66. Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 111. 275, 52 N. E. 144.

67. Pierce v. Barney, 209 Pa. 132, 58 Atl. 152; Huss v. Jacobs, 210 Pa. 145, 59 Atl. 1904. See French v. Lansing, 73 N. Y. Misc. 80, 132 N. Y. Supp. 523.

68. Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 180 111. 398, 72 Am. St. Rep. 216, 54 N. E. 214; Moreland v. H. C. Frick Coke Co., 170 Pa. St. 33. 32 Atl. 634.

69. Alabama State Land Co. v. Kyle, 99 Ala. 474, 13 So. 43; Rigg v. Cook, 9 111. 336; Pharis v. Jones, 122 Mo. 125, 26 S. W. 1032; Gwynn v. Jones' Lessee, 2 Gill & J. 173; Lyebrook v. Hall, 73 Miss. 509, 19 So. 348; Carson v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 71 Am. St. Rep. 691, 77 N. W. 80; Le-port v. Todd, 32 N. J. L. 124; Jackson v. Cams, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 301; Whiting v. Edmunds, 94 N. Y. 309; Doherty v. Matsell, 119 N. Y. 646, 23 N. E. 994; Tay-ior v. Kelly, 56 N. C. (3 Jones Eq.) 240; Schuylkill & D. Imp. & R. Co., 58 Pa. 304; Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904 Duke v. Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 462; Flanagan v. Pearson, 61 Tex. 302; Sherman v. Champlain Transportation Co., 31 Vt. 162; Emerick v. Tavenner,

The tenant's possession, taken under the lease, involves a recognition of the landlord's title in reversion, and is consequently not adverse or hostile to the latter. If, however, one becomes tenant of another without being aware of the fact, there is no recognition by him of the other's title, and his possession is consequently adverse, so as to cause the statute to run in his favor, provided only the landlord has no reason to suppose the possession to be otherwise. If, for instance, one takes possession by virtue of an invalid conveyance in fee simple, even an oral gift, under the impression that it is a valid conveyance, he is prima facie a tenant at will under his grantor or donor,70 but his possession is nevertheless, in the ordinary case, adverse to the latter.71 And if one takes possession under a conveyance which he supposes to give him a fee simple estate, but by reason of lack of form gives him a life estate merely, the possession is to be regarded as adverse to his grantor, so that the statute will ordinarily commence to run in favor of those claiming under him, so soon as, by reason of the expiration of the life estate, the landlord has a right of action to recover possession.72

Even though the landlord has a right to enforce a forfeiture for breach of an express condition, he i-under no obligation so to do, and the statute docs no1 commence to run by reason of the occurrence of a cause of forfeiture.73 Since the statute does not run even afer the term has come to an end,74 it could hardly run merely by reason of a right to bring the term to an end.

9 Gratt. (Va.) 220, 58 Am. Dec. 217; Swann v. Young, 36 W. Va. 57.

70. Ante, Sec. 61(a).

71. Post, Sec. 513(e).

72. Jackson v. Harsen, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 323, 17 Am. Dec. 517; Henley v. Wilson, 77 N. Car. 216. See Breland v. O'neal, 88 Mi

449, 40 So. 865. in New Haven Trust Company v. Camp, 81 Conn, 539, 71 Atl. 788. it appears to be held that the statute begins to run even before the life estate is out of the way.

73. Doe v. Danvers, 7 East 299; Gwynn v. Jones, 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 173..

2 It. P.-51

It has been frequently asserted that, although the tenant's possession is prima facie not adverse to the landlord, it may become adverse by reason of his open repudiation of the tenancy, and notice thereof brought home to the landolrd.75 The repudiation of the tenancy must, it has been said be "clear, positive, and continued,"76 and the landlord is not affected by the repudiation of the tenancy, even though this takes the form of an attornment to another,77 unless and until notice thereof is brought home to him.7s Express notice is not necessary, it being sufficient that he in

74. Post, this subsection, note 90.

75. Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43; Ponder v. Cheeves, 104 Ala. 307, 16 So. 145; Rigg v. Cook, 9 111. 336, 46 Am. Dec. 462; Austin v. Wilson, 46 Iowa, 362; Patterson v. Hansel, 4 Bush (Ky.) 654; Sanscrainte v. Torongo, 87 Mich. 69, 49 N. W. 497: Meridian Land & Industrial Co. v. Ball, 68 Miss. 135, 8 So. 316; Doherty v. Matsell, 119 N. Y. 646, 23 N. E. 944; Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904; Mcginnis v. Porter, 20 Pa. 80; Duke v. Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 462; Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 226, 21 S. E. 347; Swann v. Thayer, 36 W. Va. 46, 14 S. E. 423.

76. Morris v. Wheat, 11 App. Dist. Col. 201; Rigg v. Cook, 9 111. 336, 46 Am. Dec. 462; Wilkins v. Pensacola City Co., 36 Fla. 36, 18 So. 20; Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904.

77. Doe v. Clayton, 81 Ala. 391, 2 So. 24; De Jarnette v. Mcdan-iell, 93 Ala. 215, 9 So. 570; Camden Orphan Soc. v. Lockhart, 2 Mull. Law (S. C.) 84. Contra, semble, Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U. S. 278, 42 L. Ed. 466.

Occasionally it appears to be asserted that the tenant's attornment to another cannot start the running of the statute as against the landlord. Dausch v. Crane, 109 Mo. 323, 19 S. W. 61; Fowler v. Simpson, 79 Tex. 611, 23 Am. St. Rep. 370, 15 S. W. 682. This does not accord with the decisions that the tenant's possession becomes adverse if he repudiates the tenancy and so informs the landlord.

78. Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 43; Le Croix v. Malone, 157 Ala. 434, 47 So. 725; Wilkins v. Pensacola City Co., 36 Fla. 36, 18 So. 20; Farrow's Heirs v. Ed-mundson, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 605, 41 Am. Dec. 250; Leport v. Todd, 32 N. J. L. 124; Campbell v. Shipley, 41 Md. 81; Holman v. Bonner, 63 Miss. 131; Greenwood v. Moore, 79 Miss. 201, 30 So. 609; Hamilton v. Boggess, 63 Mo. 233; Ross v. Mcmanigal, 61 Neb. 90, 84 N. E. 610; Nesley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904; Mcginnis v. Porter, 20 Pa. 80; Whaley v. Whaley, 1 Speer Law some way acquires knowledge of the tenant's action.79 And according to some decisions he is chargeable with notice by reason of the open and notorious character of the repudiation of the tenancy.80